1. Alternative theories of Small State Studies Máté Szalai 11.11.2015. Máté Szalai 11.11.2015.

3. The main assumptions of mainstream SSS  Size determines foreign policy  Lack of resources creates vulnerabilities and weakness  Size determines foreign policy  Lack of resources creates vulnerabilities and weakness Lack of resources Weakness Participation in international organizations Alliance- policy A/P/D

4. 1.Basic ideas of Social Constructivism 2.How can we apply Social Constructivism on Small States? 3.Fundamental writings 4.Five conclusions 1.Basic ideas of Social Constructivism 2.How can we apply Social Constructivism on Small States? 3.Fundamental writings 4.Five conclusions

5. 1.1. The context of the rise of social constructivism  1980s: many social theories have been falsified  States do not act like they supposed to  1990s: emergence of new theories  1992: Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics  1999: Social Theory of International Politics  1980s: many social theories have been falsified  States do not act like they supposed to  1990s: emergence of new theories  1992: Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics  1999: Social Theory of International Politics

6. 1.2. Anarchy is what states make of it 1.Introduction: the neo-neo debate 2.How did the self-help system evolve from anarchy? 3.How can the self-help system be altered into a more cooperative system? 1.Introduction: the neo-neo debate 2.How did the self-help system evolve from anarchy? 3.How can the self-help system be altered into a more cooperative system?

7. The Neo-Neo debate  Main question of the neo-neo debate: what are the main determinants of foreign policy?  The structure or institutions?  Absolute or relative gains?  But the starting point is the same  Rational logic  Connection between anarchy and self-help system  Main question of the neo-neo debate: what are the main determinants of foreign policy?  The structure or institutions?  Absolute or relative gains?  But the starting point is the same  Rational logic  Connection between anarchy and self-help system

8. The Neo-Neo debate  The anarchic nature of the interstate system does not necessarily lead to a self-help structure  It is a question of inter-social processes  Anarchy can lead to the self-help system but to other systems as well  The anarchic nature of the interstate system does not necessarily lead to a self-help structure  It is a question of inter-social processes  Anarchy can lead to the self-help system but to other systems as well

9.  States react differently to other actors who they consider friends or foes  Anarchy cannot explain that  Reason: structure of identity and interests  Actors do not have a specific and determined set of interests  Interests can only be interpreted in a given social context  Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self – by participating in such collective meanings  States react differently to other actors who they consider friends or foes  Anarchy cannot explain that  Reason: structure of identity and interests  Actors do not have a specific and determined set of interests  Interests can only be interpreted in a given social context  Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self – by participating in such collective meanings The nature of Anarchy

10. State, identity and interest StateIdentityInterests

11. 2. How did the self-help system evolve from anarchy?

12.  Institutions: manifestation of a stable set of identities and defined interests  Self-help is an institution which evolved from the state of anarchy in order to maintain the actors’ security  Two different perceptions of security  Competitive  Individual  This is the break between neoliberalism and neorealism  Institutions: manifestation of a stable set of identities and defined interests  Self-help is an institution which evolved from the state of anarchy in order to maintain the actors’ security  Two different perceptions of security  Competitive  Individual  This is the break between neoliberalism and neorealism 1.2. How did the self-help system evolve from anarchy?

13.  Interests and institutions are socially constructed structures which are formed through interactions – we have to see what was before that  State and government  Urge to survive  Interests and institutions are socially constructed structures which are formed through interactions – we have to see what was before that  State and government  Urge to survive 1.2. Emergence of the self-help system

14.  Two states (Ego and Alter) interact with each other  Ego acts, alter defines the act of ego, alter acts accordingly  The role of first impression is crucial  Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels are threating to the self, creating the expectations that the other is not to be trusted (…) the self is forced to mirror such behaviour  Two states (Ego and Alter) interact with each other  Ego acts, alter defines the act of ego, alter acts accordingly  The role of first impression is crucial  Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels are threating to the self, creating the expectations that the other is not to be trusted (…) the self is forced to mirror such behaviour 1.2. Emergence of the self-help system

15.  Why did the self-help system evolved?  Because of ‘predition’  An aggressive state appears. How do others behave?  the acts of Alter are determined by previously constructed interests and identities  Why did the self-help system evolved?  Because of ‘predition’  An aggressive state appears. How do others behave?  the acts of Alter are determined by previously constructed interests and identities 1.2. Emergence of the self-help system

16.  The acts of Alter depend on  The presence of collective identity  The presence and extent of the feeling of collective threat  The timing  For example  USA and Europe: collective identity  GCC: individual  The acts of Alter depend on  The presence of collective identity  The presence and extent of the feeling of collective threat  The timing  For example  USA and Europe: collective identity  GCC: individual 1.2. Emergence of the self-help system

17. 3. How does a state behave?

18. 1.3. How does a state behave? Sovereignty International System Foreign Policy Security

19. 1.3. How does a state behave? Identity Behaviour InterestsSocialization

20. 2. How can we use SC in small state studies?  Small states act as weak because they have been socialized this way  If sovereignty derives from social relations and not power, small states does not have a security deficit  Nothing is significant by itself, only in a given social context  Significant facts and factors are significant because we think they are  Small states act as weak because they have been socialized this way  If sovereignty derives from social relations and not power, small states does not have a security deficit  Nothing is significant by itself, only in a given social context  Significant facts and factors are significant because we think they are

21. 3. Fundamental writings  Dan Reiter (2006): Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past.  Christine Ingebritsen (2006): Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.  Alan Chong (2010): Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore.  Dan Reiter (2006): Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past.  Christine Ingebritsen (2006): Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.  Alan Chong (2010): Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore.

22. 3.1. Dan Reiter (2006): Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past  Alliance-policy  Realism versus the theory of learning  Facing unexpected situations, decision-makers tend to rely on personal, institutional and socio-psychological experiences  H1: Small states learn from their own history  H2: Small states learn from other’s mistakes as well  H3: Small states prefer alliance-policy according to their geopolitical situation, the nature of the direct threat, the size of the ally, etc.  Alliance-policy  Realism versus the theory of learning  Facing unexpected situations, decision-makers tend to rely on personal, institutional and socio-psychological experiences  H1: Small states learn from their own history  H2: Small states learn from other’s mistakes as well  H3: Small states prefer alliance-policy according to their geopolitical situation, the nature of the direct threat, the size of the ally, etc.

23. The results H1: 111/127 H2: 89/127 H3: less than half H1: 111/127 H2: 89/127 H3: less than half

24. „ An enlightened version of realism, then, would recognize the important role decision- makers’ beliefs play in forming foreign policy and would acknowledge that exploring the origins of these beliefs can substantially improve our understanding of world politics”

25. 3.2. Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics  Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland  Common wisdom: the powerful do as they will, and the weak do as they must  Norms in IR  Norm emergence  Norm acceptance  Norm internalization  Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland  Common wisdom: the powerful do as they will, and the weak do as they must  Norms in IR  Norm emergence  Norm acceptance  Norm internalization NORM ENTREPRENEURS

26. Why Scandinavia? Remote geopolitical position No intervention Limited material capacities Innovative policy- making Unique domestic institutions Attractive norms

27. Environmental norms 1970s Sustainable development (1987, Brutland report) Multilateral security 1970s: Helsinki Process 1990s: Oslo Process Global welfare Welfare state Nowadays: basic income

28. Alan Chong (2010): Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore.  ”The art of survival for small states includes attempts to enlarge their importance to the international community”  ”Smallness, being geographically limited, can be psychologically tactical in disarming major powers’ suspicions of the small state’s motives”  ”The art of survival for small states includes attempts to enlarge their importance to the international community”  ”Smallness, being geographically limited, can be psychologically tactical in disarming major powers’ suspicions of the small state’s motives”

29. Three ways for virtual enlargement  promotion of national political economy potential: demonstrable competence in the management of economic activities affecting the wealth of a government and its population.  models of good governance: convincing projection of a model society and organizational showcase abroad for objectives of national interest  diplomatic mediation:  stems from the moral capital derived from the domestic reputation and international record of small state  aspiration towards the pacific settlement of interstate disputes through the building of trust  promotion of national political economy potential: demonstrable competence in the management of economic activities affecting the wealth of a government and its population.  models of good governance: convincing projection of a model society and organizational showcase abroad for objectives of national interest  diplomatic mediation:  stems from the moral capital derived from the domestic reputation and international record of small state  aspiration towards the pacific settlement of interstate disputes through the building of trust

30. 4. Five conclusions 1.Small states have wider leverage than previously expected 2.Societal factors may outsmart the strong 3.Small states can be highly innovative – there are lessons to be learnt 4.Small states can affect political outcomes in international relations 5.Moral balance of power 1.Small states have wider leverage than previously expected 2.Societal factors may outsmart the strong 3.Small states can be highly innovative – there are lessons to be learnt 4.Small states can affect political outcomes in international relations 5.Moral balance of power