1. Henry Kissinger Diplomacy
Chapters 26 & 27
Discussion Questions

2. Chapter 26 Vietnam: On the Road to Despair

3. 2. (644) How important was the fundamental misconception that Moscow “called all the shots” in a global conspiracy with Beijing and Hanoi?

4. 3.(645) Why was Vietnam the battle to confront communism in the third world?

5. 5. (646) How did the failed Bay of Pigs invasion affect the Kennedy Administration’s conduct of foreign policy?

6. 6. (647) How did Kennedy “give” the trail to North Vietnam?

7. 9. (647) Big Picture: Bay of Pigs, 2nd Berlin Crisis, Laotian neutrality – Was withdrawal from Vietnam a viable option for the Kennedy Administration?

8. 10. (648) How do the Special Forces served the goal articulated by Kennedy’s quote on page 648?

9. 12. (649) The concept of nation building was (to some extent) formalized as U.S. policy under the Kennedy Administration. Why would this idea gain support from both liberals and conservatives since is requires increased U.S. commitment and involvement to interests outside our borders? Despite rhetoric against this idea (W during his first presidential campaign), do you feel that the U.S. is still committed to this idea?

10. 13. (649) Is a Vice-Presidential envoy assessment a valid political measure?

11. 14. (650) What was Vice-President Johnson’s “assessment” of the situation in South Vietnam in May 1961?

12. 15.(651) Why do you think that there was uniform underestimation of the future size of the conflict?

13. 16. (652) Why was gradual escalation the “fashion of the day”
16.(652) Why was gradual escalation the “fashion of the day”? Why did it prove to be the “most dangerous” option?

14. 20. (655) Describe how Diem was removed from office to include: (a) domestic tensions leading to the coup and (b) U.S. involvement

15. 21. (655) Assess the following statement in context of the American Revolution, “And history teaches this iron law of revolutions: the more extensive the eradication of existing authority, the more its successors have to rely on naked power to establish themselves.”

16. 22. (655/6) What problems did Diem’s coup solve
22. (655/6) What problems did Diem’s coup solve? What problems were created?

17. Context Goal of War - _______ Measurement of success
Limited or Total War
Measurement of success
Political: _______
Battlefield: _______
Gradual Escalation
“This is Language”
1964/5 – Civil War to Invasion
OP-Plan 34A
De Soto Patrols
Gulf of Tonkin

18. 24. (659) What does Kissinger mean when he said that methods used to achieve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution would not be possible today? Was he right?

19. 27. (660) Describe 2 strategies Kissinger believed would have produced a “victory” in Vietnam.

20. 28. (660) What strategy did the US employ?

21. 29. (660/1) How did the U.S. and North Vietnam view the theaters of war differently? How did reflect their approaches to foreign policy?

22. 36. (665) Describe how the experiences of the Korean and Vietnam Wars differed in respect to domestic support for the war.

23. 37. (666) Explain what is meant by Lipmann’s assertion that U. S
37. (666) Explain what is meant by Lipmann’s assertion that U.S. world standing would improve if it were “defeated” in Vietnam.

24. 40. (670/1) Does Kissinger offer any new perspectives and/or information about the Tet Offensive?

25. 42. (672) Why does Kissinger criticize Johnson for his ending of bombing campaigns in 1968? What strategy would have produced a more favorable climate for negotiations to be conducted by his successor (ultimately Nixon)?

26. Chapter 27: Vietnam: The Extrication; Nixon

27. 2. (675) Just how hated was LBJ by 1968?

28. 4. (676) Kissinger contends that Vietnam
occurred at a generational crossroad –
What specific experiences of the
generations involved created significantly
different perspectives?

29. 7. (679) What were the three options open
to Nixon to end America’s involvement
in Vietnam? How was Kissinger’s treatment
of this subject different from Norman Friedman?

30. 8. (679) Why was a unilateral withdrawal
politically and practically impossible?

31. 9. (680) With reference to question seven,
which option did Kissinger prefer?

32. 10. (680) What were the possible components
of the ‘dual track’ option?

33. 11. (681) Why didn’t Nixon go to congress
to obtain support for his Vietnam policy?

34. 12. (681) Which option did Nixon choose?

35. 13. (681-2) What conflicting expectations were
the American people demanding in Vietnam?
Did Vietnamization mitigate or exacerbate
this problem?

36. 14. (682) “Salted peanuts”? Examine the
excerpt of Kissinger and Anthony Lake’s
September 10, 1969 memorandum that
criticized Vietnamization. Assess the political
relevancy of each item. Could these criticisms be
valid concerning an Iraq exit policy? … assuming one
will be created in the future

37. 18. (684) Who were the four parties involved
in the formal negotiations?

38. 19. (685) Describe the negotiation positions
of the United States and Vietnam prior to
1972.

39. 20. (685/6) What was the stereotyped
procedure that the negotiations
followed?

40. 21. (686) What was the objective necessity
needed by Kissinger?

41. 22. (686) Why did the North Vietnamese
complicate negotiations with competing
seven and nine point plans? In other
words, what did Le Duc Tho mean by
“nothing”?

42. 23. (687) In consideration of the following comments:
“objective necessity”, “nothing”, and “big effort”
What kind of personalities were involved in these
negotiations? Did you find these anecdotes
amusing, disconcerting, or boring?

43. 24. (687/8) How large and effective was the
peace movement by 1970?

44. 25. (688/9) Explain why the peace movement
and the Nixon administration could never
find common ground? What single issue
seemed to highlight this gap?

45. 26. (691) What were terms of the agreement
between the United States and North
Vietnam in 1972?

46. 27. (692) What caused North Vietnam to finally
grant the terms of American negotiators?