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Detecting Information Pooling: Evidence from Earnings Forecasts after Brokerage Mergers by Serena Ng & Matthew Shum Discussed by David Becher FDIC Conference on Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institutions
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Research Question and Motivation Do forecasts improve after brokerage mergers? Pooling of information and information resources may improve forecast accuracy Examine stocks where target & bidder analysts retained Compare to those deals where only one analyst retained No information pooling exists Plus distinguish info. pooling from analyst selection Does analyst selection improve forecast estimates?
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Contribution of Paper Main Takeaway Interesting paper, asks important and unique questions in the literature Clear others think this is a good paper… Matthew Shum’s Vita Detecting Information Pooling: Analysts' Forecasts After Brokerage Firm Mergers (with Serena Ng) Accepted, Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions What is Driving Results? Authors examine four brokerage mergers 1994 to 2000 - market conditions very different In all deals, majority of analyst from bidder (70% – 90%) Inconsistency in firm selection Two deals involve foreign bidders (Switzerland) Plus, one firm appears as both bidder and target Inconsistency in the merger form One deal involves acquisition of assets (subsidiary) Second deal, target is majority owned by another firm Action of analysts may not be independent
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions What is Driving Results? Different results “affected” vs. “non-affected” Compare bidder MSE pre- to post-merger Significant improvement in 2/4 deals for all stocks No improvement in any deals for affected stocks ALL STOCKSAFFECTED Merger Pre-MSE Post-MSEPost vs Pre Pre-MSE Post-MSEPost vs Pre A3.934.11-0.891.29- B5.034.81-0.793.25*** C6.863.69***1.511.76- D5.913.92**1.041.78-
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions What is Driving Results? Firm-level Can we draw conclusions based on 2/4 or 0/4? Multivariate results also mixed Affected vs. both stay vs. both cover Sample sizes limiting – information pooling Only 7% of cases both analysts stay 24/2,251 cases where both stay/cover same stock (1%) Yet estimate (stder) unusually large in merger C (4 out of 744) Is this information pooling?
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions What is Driving Results? Impact of non-merging brokerage firms Control for fact accuracy could be changing for all brokerage firms (unrelated to merger) Binary variable if involved in merger plus binary variable if both analysts (target and bidder) stay after the merger Both are set to zero for non-merging firms (footnote 14) Include merge, bothstay, and merge*bothstay Appears merge*bothstay is co-linear to bothstay & merge Perhaps look at more/other deals and other variables that contribute to accuracy and analyst quality?
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Sample of Brokerage Mergers Examine SDC Pull all targets with SIC code of 621: Security Brokers, Dealers, And Flotation 622: Commodity Contracts Brokers And Dealers 623: Security And Commodity Exchanges Not 6311 (as noted in paper) - life insurance firms 2,911 potential deals
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Acquisitions of U.S. Brokerage Firms All deals announced from 1980 – 2005; exclude: Acquisitions of certain assets (29), remaining interests (156), or majority interest (496) + Acquisition of assets (1,388) 532 involve acquisition of 100% of U.S. entity PW – KP deal: 100% acquisition of assets DLJ majority owned by AXA (insurance firm) No foreign targets (must be in 50 U.S. states or DC) 289 mergers/acquisitions + 532 acquisition of assets
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Summary Statistics of 289 Deals 37% of deals between 2 brokerage firms 56 of targets are public, 49 subs of another firm 176 of bidders are public, 47 are not in U.S. At least five other deals of similar size Shearson-EF Hutton; CS-First Boston; Alex Brown- Bankers Trust; Salomon-Citi; JP Morgan-Chase… 20+ deals if include acquisition of assets Robertson Stephens-BofA, Oppenheimer-CIBC, Herzog- Merrill; Greenwich-NatWest, Spears-Goldman…
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions Other Factors Future areas of study? Compare deals by broker vs. non-broker firms Any improvements for non-brokerage bidders? Examine stocks with highest variation Do brokerages have IB relation for these firms? Examine mergers post 2000 (Reg FD) Is information sharing different afterwards What is impact of analyst recommendations? Could information pooling exist here as well?
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November 2007FDIC Conference on M&A of Financial Institutions In Summary Overall, interesting paper Attempts to address the issue of information sharing Results suggest information pooling occurs May be suspicious: small samples, issues with regressions Disagreement between univariate and multiple regression approach Frame paper as merged brokerage firms retain better employees increased analyst accuracy post-merger Many additional questions can be asked as well
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