1. 1 Towards evolving specs of security protocols March 7, 2002 Dusko Pavlovic Kestrel Institute

2. 2 Claim Security Engineering is a part of Software Engineering

3. 3 Claim it is helpful to analyze: protocols in context of architectures security as a part of of high assurance malicious attackers on connectors together with unspecified environments of components both SE and SE are concerned with distributed, multi-layered, heterogenous complex systems…

4. 4 Outline Mobile proposals: –IPv4 vs IPv6 Problem: –remote redirection (traffic hijacking) Adding authentication: –espec transformation Variations and ongoing work

5. 5 Papers Authentication for Mobile IPv6 –with A. Datta, J. Mitchell and F. Muller Composition and refinement of behavioral specifications –with D. Smith Guarded transitions in evolving specifications –with D. Smith http://www.kestrel.edu/users/pavlovic/

6. 6 Mobile IPv4 HA MN FA CN initial architecture

7. 7 Mobile IPv4 HAMN FA CN

8. 8 Mobile IPv4 HA MNFA CN

9. 9 Mobile IPv4 HA MNFA CN

10. 10 Mobile IPv4 HA MNFA CN

11. 11 Mobile IPv4 HA MNFA CN triangle routing!

12. 12 Mobile IPv4 HA MN FA CN session architecture

13. 13 Mobile IPv6 avoid triangle routing: –use IPv6 Routing Header and tunneling minimize –network partitioning –computational load on: »routers »nodes: no expensive encryptions or decryptions –number of messages –need for infrastructure: no global PKI maximize –performance and availability: no DoS –end-to-end security: authenticate location information

14. 14 Mobile IPv6 home address –the node is always addressed by the same IP number care-of addresses (one or more) –bind dynamically to different subnet IP numbers »all packets containing the binding information must be authenticated »authentication relies upon previously established security associations Binding Update/Acknowledgement –realized through Destination Options Headers –Binding Cache integrated with Destination Cache

15. 15 Mobile IPv6 proposal HA MN CN initial architecture

16. 16 HAMN CN

17. 17 Mobile IPv6 HA MN CN g y k = g xy g x g y {BU} k

18. 18 Mobile IPv6 HA MN CN

19. 19 Mobile IPv6 HA MN CN

20. 20 Mobile IPv6 proposal MN CN session architecture

21. 21 E E E E E E Mobile IPv6 proposal HA MN CN E E actual initial architecture

22. 22 Mobile IPv6 HA MN CN g x g v g v E k = g uy EC k = g ME xv g u g y

23. 23 Mobile IPv6 proposal MN E E CN possible session architecture

24. 24 Task Use especs to add authentication!

25. 25 Task Assess tradeoff between maximizing strength of authentication minimizing need for infrastructure

26. 26 MN’s view  (u) (u x /k )  g x  (u)  u x /k  ( x)  g x  (u)  u x /k  espec MN

27. 27 CN’s view   g y  (w y /k) ( y)  g y  (w y /k) (w) ( y)  g y  (w y /k) espec CN

28. 28 BU architecture espec CN espec MN espec HA espec Netespec BU

29. 29 (aspects of especs) genericity –all agents are instances of cord espec automated –composition of agents –trace generation support for formal analysis –model checking –theorem proving –invariant generation

30. 30 BU architecture espec CN espec MN espec HA espec Netespec BU

31. 31 BU architecture espec CN espec MN espec HA espec Net diag BU

32. 32 (aspects of especs) adjustable abstraction level stratification: –agents: process calculus –protocols: especs –architectures: diagrams »network connectors and components »infrastructure and chain of trust »information flow »…

33. 33 BU architecture diag BU

34. 34 BU refinement diag BU diag AuthKeyExch diag KeyExch diag AuthBU Lib

35. 35 (aspects of especs) development (programming, generation) –top-down: refinement »morphisms: inheritance, genericity –bottom-up: composition »pushouts »emergent and vanishing properties »game theory, linear logic (strategies) –program transformation »authentication compiler (Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk) »optimization –adaptation »specification-carrying software

36. 36 BU refinement diag BU diag AuthKeyExch diag KeyExch diag AuthBU Lib

37. 37 AuthBU architecture espec AuthCN espec AuthMN espec HACN espec Net espec HAMN diag AuthBU

38. 38  g x  (u,v) (v/{g x,u} hm ) (u x /k) (u,v) (v/{g x,u} hm ) (u x /k) (v/{g x,u} hm ) (u x /k)  ( x)  g x  (u,v) (v/{g x,u} hm ) (u x /k) espec AuthMN AuthMN’s view

39. 39 E E E E E E Authenticated MIPv6 HA MN CN E E HA initial architecture

40. 40 MNCN k = g xy HA MN HA CN g x g, {g, g } xy hc xy g, {g, g } xy sg xy g, {g, g } xy hm y

41. 41 MNCN HA MN HA CN { i MN, g y, s } hc s {i CN, i MN, g y, s} pk {i CN, i MN, g y, s} sg s = {i CN, i MN, g x, g y } k { i MN, g y, s } hm k = g xy g x

42. 42 MNCN HA MN HA CN { i MN, g y, s } hc s {i CN, i MN, g y, s, {i CN, i MN, g y, s} sg } pk s = {i CN, i MN, g x, g y } k { s, g y, i MN } hm k = g xy g x

43. 43 Authenticated MIPv6 MN CN assured session architecture

44. 44 Variations weaker authentications: –one-way: no PKI, just certificates, or AAA - no anonymity –first time unauthenticated (like SSH), then chained hashing stronger authentications: –privacy –anonymity, non-repudiation dynamic infrastructure –no shared secret: databases of “fingerprints” –authenticating by non-forgeable capability –authenticating by divided secret

45. 45 (aspects of especs) additional aspects: –information flow –information hiding –cryptography –…

46. 46 Ongoing work IMPLEMENT the tool!

47. 47 Papers Authentication for Mobile IPv6 –with A. Datta, J. Mitchell and F. Muller Composition and refinement of behavioral specifications –with D. Smith Guarded transitions in evolving specifications –with D. Smith http://www.kestrel.edu/users/pavlovic/

48. 48 (cord spaces) (names)N ::= X | A (terms)t ::= x | a | N | t,...,t | {t} N (strands)S ::= aS (cords)C ::= [S]  (actions) a ::=  t  | (x) | ( t/p(x) ) (interaction) [(x)R]  [  t  S]...   [R(t/x)]  [S]... (reaction) [ ( p(t)/p(x) ) R]...   [R(t/x)] ... FV(t) = 

49. 49 What are especs? diagrams of specs specification-carrying programs in a development environment supporting –refinement (top-down) –composition (bottom-up) –synthesis of verified code programming language with –guarded commands –logical annotations as first-class citizens (available at runtime) –procedural abstraction and refinement

50. 50 What are specs? spec Poset is sort X op Bool ax trans is x x<z ax sym... end-spec spec Semilattice is sort X op V in : X*X -> X cons b : X ax assoc is (xVy)Vz = xV(yVz)… end-spec x<y xVy=y spec BinR spec AsymRspec RefRspec TranR spec BinO spec Commspec Involspec Assoc

51. 51 What are especs? espec Basic_Acct is spec … end-spec prog stad Create init[X] is… stad Amount[self] is… … step Depos[self,d]: Amount[self] -> Amount[self,d] cond d>0 balance(self)|-> balance(self)+d end-step end-prog end-espec Create Amount Depos espec Savings_Acct is spec … end-spec prog stad Create init[X] is … stad Accum… step Transfer… … end-step … end-prog end-espec Create Amount Depos Accum