1. Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + and Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School Jena 2015

2. Summary so far We can model intergroup conflict while considering the intra-group conflict Intergroup Public Goods (IPG; Rapoport & Bornstein, 1987) – conflict over step-level public good Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bornstein, 1992) – conflict over continuous public good We can disentangle the underlying motivation for participation in intergroup conflict: ingroup love and/or outgroup hate Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD; Halevy et al., 2008) – “active” outgroup hate Positive variant of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (posIPD-MD; Weisel & Böhm, 2015) – “passive” outgroup hate Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

3. Summary so far Intergroup conflict increases intra-group cooperation Intergroup conflict – intragroup cooperation hypothesis (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994) Intergroup comparison – intragroup cooperation hypothesis (Böhm & Rockenbach, 2013) Ingroup love serves as the main motivation for participation in intergroup conflict (Halevy et al., 2008) Ingroup love delevops before outgroup hate in human ontogeny (Buttelmann & Böhm, 2014) Basic biophysiological activity is associated with ingroup love rather than outgroup hate (De Dreu et al., 2010; Israel et al., 2012) Ingroup love remains dominant even after an artifical “history of conflict” (Halevy et al., 2012) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

4. Summary so far Moderators of outgroup hate Increases if it can be shown passively, at least in interaction with strong-enmity opponent groups (Weisel & Böhm, 2015) Increases in interactions with moral-based opponent groups (Weisel & Böhm, 2015) Increases in under threat, i.e. in defensive rather than offensive actions (Böhm et al., in press; Halevy et al., 2010; Weisel & Zultan, under review) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

5. Some open questions Interindividual differences? Underlying cognitive processes, e.g., intuitive vs. deliberate decision making Relation between intergroup conflict and other variables than cooperation Leadership? Punishment? Emotions? Application to other contexts? Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Special Issue in Frontiers of Psychology: “Parochial Altruism: Pitfalls and Prospects” (associate guest editors: R. Böhm, H. Rusch, B. Herrmann)

6. Interindividual differences Interindividual differences in participation (contribution yes / no) and differences in the motivation for participation (ingroup love / outgroup hate)? Social preferences Social value orientation (SVO; e.g., Murhphy & Ackermann, 2014) Honesty-humility (subscale of the HEXACO personality inventory; Ashton & Lee, 2009) Dark Triad (machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy; e.g., Paulhus, 2014) Dark tetraed (dark triad + sadism; e.g., Chabrol et al., 2009) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

7. Interindividual differences: SVO Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011 Judgm. & Dec. Mak.

8. Interindividual differences: SVO Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) De Dreu, 2010 Group Proc. & Intergr. Rel. Prosocials restrict there cooperativeness to the ingroup (e.g., Aaldering et al., 2013; Böhm et al., under review; Israel et al., 2012), however, do they also harm the outgroup? De Dreu et al., 2015 Front. Psychol.

9. Interindividual differences: Honesty-humility Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Thielmann, Böhm & Hilbig, in progress

10. Interindividual differences SVO as well as honesty-humility predict positive contributions toward the ingroup (ingroup love), but do not predict negative contributions toward the outgroup (outgroup hate). Outlook: group-level instead of individual-level social preferences Individual-level SVO slider measure: own payoff vs. unknown other payoff Group-level SVO slider measure: ingroup member’s payoff vs. outgroup member’s payoff (no self-interest) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

11. Cognitive processes: intuitive vs. deliberate decision making Applying the social heuristics hypothesis (Rand et al., 2008 Nature Comm.) to intergroup relations?! Hypothesis: outgroup hate is inhibited through deliberate moral reasoning Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) De Dreu et al., 2015 Front. Psychol. p =.32p =.03

12. Intergroup conflict and behavior of leaders Do leaders react differently in a situation of unstable leadership in the absence vs. presence of intergroup conflict (emphasizing vs. self-focused)? Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Preference to led the better skilled ingroup member perform the intergroup conflict task Low dominance motiv. High dominance motiv. Maner & Mead, 2010 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol..

13. Intergroup conflict and the preference for leaders Does the preference for female vs. male leaders differ in the absence vs. presence of intergroup conflict? Idea: male leaders are preferred over female leaders in intergroup conflict because they are more aggressive and competitive, whereas female leaders are more egalitarian (e.g., Eagly & Johnson, 1990) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

14. Intergroup conflict and the preference for leaders Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Van Vugt & Spisak, 2008 Psychol. Science

15. Intergroup conflict and the behavior of / preference for leaders Not tested in the context of Team Games yet Dynamics unexplored (preference reversals) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

16. Intergroup conflict and punishment Does (the severity of) intergroup conflict increase intragroup punishment? Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham) Symmetric group competition (PUN-PUN) Asymmetric group competition (PUN-NOPUN) Sääksvuori, Mappes & Puurtinen, 2011 Proc. Roy. Soc. B

17. Intergroup conflict and punishment Intra- vs. intergroup punishment? Direction of punishment (intra- vs. intergroup) in different situations (peaceful vs. ongoing conflict)? Endogenous choice of punishment in the absence vs. presence of intergroup conflict? Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

18. Emotions Individual-level emotions have been shown to predict cooperation in (single- level) social dilemmas (e.g., De Hooge et al., 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Miettinen & Suetens, 2008; Stouten et al., 2005, 2006) Group-based emotions have also been shown be relevant in intergroup interaction, for instance, group-based hatred (Halperin, 2008) Typically questionnaire studies Team Games may provide an interesting tool to investigate the interplay of individual- and group-level emotions in intergroup conflict Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)

19. Application to other contexts – intergeneration cooperation Typically, intergroup cooperation is modeled as an a single-level social dilemma/prosocial task In real-life, however, there are conflicts within the current generation and between current and future generations: short-term vs. long-term investments (Böhm, Lauer & Gürerk, in prep.) Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University) and Ori Weisel (University of Nottingham)