1. Kathy Abbott, PhD, FRAeS Federal Aviation Administration 27 November 2015 Federal Aviation Administration Finding a Balance

2. 2 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

3. 3 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

4. “Personal” vs. “Public” Risk Assumption Skiing Scuba Diving Mountain Climbing National Defense SmokingHang Gliding & Ultralights Commercial Flight Sight Seeing Flights Private Aviation Significant Personal Choice/Freedom Public Risk Private Risk Highway Accidents Small Aircraft Accidents Large Aircraft Accidents High Public Concern/Responsibility

5. 5 5 Governmental Role Personal & Commercial Inherently Governmental National Defense Mail Air Traffic Services Commercial Aviation Safety Private Aviation Safety International Aviation Agreements Government Enables Government Oversight Government Does Ideas Free Speech Religion

6. 6 U.S. Aviation Fatal Accident Rates Annual Average from 2005 through 2009

7. 7 Society’s Safety Expectations – Circa 1945 Commercial General Aviation PHOTO: Public Domain Less Demand More Demand Public Demand for Safety Assurance

8. 8 Less Demand More Demand Public Demand for Safety Assurance Society’s Safety Expectations – Today Continuously Advancing… (2014)

9. 9 Less Deman d More Demand Public Demand for Safety Assurance Society’s Safety Expectations – 2018 Continuously Advancing…

10. 10 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

11. 11 Applying the Safety Continuum System Safety Extent of Safety Effort Figure Adapted from Figure 3-1 of FAA System Safety Handbook http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/ Risk of accidents due to inadequate safety program Risk of accidents due to lack of safety innovation Total Risk + -

12. 12 Extent of Safety Effort SEEK Too much rigor… → innovative safety enhancements don’t reach the fleet → Finite dollars that could be spent on safety enhancements go elsewhere → fatal accidents increase Establish appropriate balance in our regulatory approach Applying the Safety Continuum System Safety Too little rigor… → safety escapes → fatal accidents increase Achieve safety objectives while imposing the least burden on society. + - Risk of accidents due to lack of safety innovation Total Risk Risk of accidents due to inadequate safety program

13. 13 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

14. 14 What has changed?

15. 15 New Technologies and Operations

16. 16 Effects of Change Resistance “Change fatigue”

17. 17 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

18. Increase in number and complexity of airspace procedures 18

19. 19 Find the runway…

20. 20 Overview Regulator exists in a larger context One size does not fit all Change Complexity Balance – of what

21. 21 Finding Balance - Regulatory Prescriptive regulations Early development of standards for new technologies Standardization of regulatory material Optimizing for one segment of industry Optimize airspace procedure Performance-based regulations Mature standards based on operational experience Rapid evolution of regulatory material Accommodating the range of equipment and operations Accommodate range of capabilities and non- normals

22. 22 Finding Balance – More General Flexibility Safety Local optimum Geographic specificity Growing demands Expert based operations Personal accountability Complexity Security Global harmonization Worldwide applicability Cost and schedule Reliance on procedures and checklists Organization accountability/culture

23. 23 Organizational Culture Not “safety culture” Look at indicators Look at incentives and disincentives Look at subcultures We need better ways to evaluate and monitor organizational culture and its influence on operations and safety

24. 24 Concluding remarks Aviation is all about change Many forces at work Need to be operationally driven Fatal flaws can come from imbalance There is no “optimum” Finding a reasonable balance is hard but necessary Beware overly simple solutions to complex problems

25. 25 Thank you! Kathy.Abbott@faa.gov +1 202-369-2155 Kathy.Abbott@faa.gov