2. United Kingdom, USA, New Zealand, Australia & Western Europe Early Adopters Data from early adopters pushed the rest of the world forward Countries to follow: 51Countries Implemented

3. These countries have implemented legislation/polices on a national basis to database the DNA of a defined category of criminal offender Australia Austria Bahrain Barbados Belarus Belgium Brazil Canada Czech Republic Chile China Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Hong Kong Hungary Iceland Israel Japan Jordan Kuwait Latvia Lithuania Netherlands New Zealand Macedonia Malaysia Mauritius Norway Oman Panama Poland Portugal Qatar Russia Slovenia Slovakia Singapore South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay 51 COUNTRIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED NATIONAL PROGRAMS OVER 60 MILLION OFFENDER SAMPLES

4.  30 Million estimated offender samples  No legislation - Different rules for different provinces  Focusing on making standardization and quality better  Strong and successful missing person’s program  Over 500,000 offender samples  No DNA database specific legislation China Japan

5.  Asia’s most established DNA database program  200,000 offender samples  Legislation passed in 2002  Most crimes  Arrestee testing  Pursuing Y STRs as database requirement  140,000 criminal offender samples  DNA database legislation passed in 2010  Limited to violent and sexual crimes  Convicted and arrested, but courts have discretion to not collect arrestee samples  Lack of strong legislation is limiting the success of the database program South Korea Singapore

6.  Legislation passed in 2000 All convicted offenders and serious arrestees Estimated 150,000 samples  “Gold Standard” legislation passed in 2008 All crimes, convicted and arrested, homeless, detainees, drug users, and strong on privacy protections  Slow implementation National Police had to build DNA program from no experience with DNA Less than 50,000 offender samples, but significant expansion planned  Legislation passed in 1999 and expanded in 2012 Most convicted offenders and violent arrestees Problematic second offense requirement for non-violent offenses  100,000 offender samples in database Malaysia Taiwan Hong Kong

7.  Positioning to grow  Philippines National Police is developing arrestee testing program which is expected to begin in late 2016  Legislation introduced in April, 2015  CODIS installed in 2014  New DNA lab  No legislation, but regulatory authority to collect DNA from up to 500,000 convicted individuals  70,000 samples already in database. 2020 is target date to reach 500,000  Growing positive media attention with DNA database expansionmedia attention Philippines Thailand

8.  Prison pilot with an estimated 40,000 samples in database  Plans for a nationwide program of all criminal offenders over time  Aggressive war dead project in development  Over 300,000 missing soldier remains to be tested and compared to relatives  Largest war dead DNA project globally to date Vietnam

10. Discussion for whole population databases grows in the Middle East Denmark Study: “Nearly 80% say that cataloging the DNA of everyone in the country is a good idea.” -Copenhagen Post February 4, 2015) (February 4, 2015) Changing Attitudes

12. Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) Rapid DNA

13.  Many makers in one test All relevant STR (50-100?) All relevant Y-STR’s Identity SNP’s Phenotypic SNP’s (Physical Traits, Ancestry) INDELS Mito  Focus on specific panels to meet specific needs  A combined CE and NGS approach

14. Low Quality/Quantity DNA (profiles from 75% less base-pair information) Mixtures Going deeper

15.  EXAMPLE: Current Unsolved Cold Cases 200,000 unsolved murders in the USA since 1960. How many could benefit from NGS?

16.  The weak link in DNA casework testing “Mixture deconvolution is our biggest challenge in forensic DNA” Tim Kupferschmid, Chief Medical Examiner of the New York City Crime Lab.  Mixtures mistakes and concerns are building in the USA and globally “National accreditation board suspends all DNA testing at Washington D.C. Crime Lab “ - Washington Post - April 27, 2015 Texas may call into question 24,000 mixture cases since 1999 o The Texas Tribune - September 18, 2015

17. No suspects and no database match: Investigative leads with Phenotypic SNP’s will be another option  Eye and hair color  Ancestry  Facial features  Disease

18. Legislation is likely to develop in many countries to regulate the use of SNPs  Some countries have already passed legislation to limit the use of SNPs USA - Indiana, Wyoming, Rhode Island European countries are considering legislation and policies  A public vs. private SNPs analysis may develop Private SNPs (disease, etc.) Public SNPs – Eye and hair color, height, ancestry, facial structure Are these “Public” SNPs really public?

19.  A Potential Future: Further legislation is coming globally Public and non-public testing policies Warrant requirements NGS registration and audits Limits on size of panels Combined CE/NGS Approach

20. PCR amplification Library preparation STR profile Capillary electrophoresis Illumina ® MiSeq Ion Torrent™ PGM ® STRait Razor software HID STR Genotyper Plugin STR profile Sequence variations Sequence variations 1 µL remaining 24 µL discarded or stored Extraction Quantification Samples A Combined CE/NGS Workflow Approach

22. Decision Factors in Choosing Loci: Less focus on loci’s ability to deal with:  Challenging Casework Samples  Mixtures  Missing Persons/Mass Disasters/War/Dead  Familial Searching <10 STR’s UK in 1995, other early adopters, parts of China 13-15 STR’s USA and majority of other countries establishing databases after 2000 21-23 STR’s Existing gold standard What workedWhat worked Preventing adventitious hitsPreventing adventitious hits PrivacyPrivacy Time to resultTime to result Cost ConsiderationCost Consideration

23. If your goal is to get reliable hits against the database in these situations, what would you rather have in your reference database? Degraded Casework, Mixtures, Missing Persons, Mass Disaster, War Dead, Familial Searching Considerations/Drivers/Barriers: Enhanced Technology necessary to make it practical Enhanced Technology necessary to make it practical What markers should be used? What markers should be used? Quantifying the positive impact on hits Quantifying the positive impact on hits Privacy, policy, legal concerns Privacy, policy, legal concerns

24. Privacy, Legal and Legislative Issues – New Technology  CE Technology Enhancements  MPS – Technology Admissibility processes Will MPS be permitted in a compulsory DNA environment? ○ Legislation may develop to highly regulate and restrict MPS from being in the hands of police based government agencies ○ Compare the Stingray Tracking Device https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them

25.  Additional STRs  Mito  Identity SNPs  Phenotypic and Ancestry SNPs  Y-STRs Privacy, Legal and Legislative Issues – Databasing additional STRs, Mito, ID SNPs, Phenotypic SNPs, Ancestry SNPs and Y-STRs

26.  Compare to unsolved crimes database within two hours (Before Release)  Accomplish public safety and empower police Arrest Fingerprint/Photo &

27.  FBI wants the first wave of Rapid DNA devices operational in the police booking stations by 2019-2020  Challenges: Performance of technology Federal law change State information system integration State laws - crime labs vs. booking station processes State laws - arrestee laws Police department funding  Prognosis : It’s happening, the question is when

28.  Local law enforcement will control the hit. This changes everything: ControlAwarenessUtilization Additional Resources CHANGING THE POLICE”S RELATIONSHIP WITH DNA RAPID DNA

29.  Positives: Results will be fast and impressive  Challenges: Forensic testing decision making in the hands of untrained officers What samples to test? Impact on limited evidence Interpretation issues  Outcomes: Protocols will likely develop to allow police to use Rapid DNA on: Cases with excessive DNA Lower level crimes

30. Military The 117 Countries Who May Not Have Infrastructure Border Control - Detainee Immigration/Refugee Process

31. Tim Schellberg tims@gth-gov.com