1. Philosophy 224 Aristotle’s Vision of the Human

2. Aristotle (384-321 B.C.E.) Unlike Socrates and Plato, Aristotle was not an Athenian. ◦ He was born in Thrace (what is now northern Greece). His father served as the court physician of Amyntas II of Macedon, the grandfather of Alexander the Great. At the age of 17, Aristotle was sent to Athens to study with Plato at his Academy. He stayed there until Plato’s death. ◦ Aristotle served as a tutor to Alexander until Alexander became King. He eventually returned to Athens and set up his own school, called the Lyceum after the area of Athens in which it was located.

3. From Plato to Aristotle Though Plato had a clear influence on Aristotle’s thinking, Aristotle comes to very different metaphysical conclusions than Plato. For Aristotle, the fundamental level of reality is what he calls ‘substance’ (ousia), actually existing, particular things. Substances are unities of form and matter, which can be thought independently but never are separate from each other. ◦ Form is the ‘whatness’ of a thing; matter is what the thing is made of. ◦ Example: Statue

4. Knowing a Substance Knowing what a substance is, requires us to know its causes. For Aristotle, the unity of substance is expressed fully through a fourfold causal structure: 1.Material Cause: what the thing is made of (statue of a human being/actual human being). 2.Formal Cause: the essence of the thing (as statue/as human). 3.Efficient Cause: that which brings a thing into being (sculptor/parents). 4.Final Cause: that for the sake of which the thing is (the end or function of a thing).

5. The Nichomachean Ethics The Nichomachean Ethics belongs to what Aristotle calls ‘Practical Philosophy.’ It is concerned not with knowledge for its own sake but with action/doing. More specifically, it is concerned with the question of what sort of life is the good one for human beings. Answering this questions requires us to understand what human beings are, in particular their final cause.

6. Ends and Goods Aristotle explicitly links the notion of an end (or function) with the notion of good. The good is defined straightforwardly as, “…that which everything seeks” (50). Clearly, the good is going to differ according to the substance or action under consideration. The Ethics is concerned with the good for human beings.

7. The Highest Good This connection between ends and goods opens up the possibility of a ’best good,' one which we aim at for itself, with no other end beyond it (what we’ve called an ‘intrinsic value’). All other goods are relative to this best good. Why would we think there is such a thing? Without it, desire would be objectless (empty and futile). Aristotle then goes on to briefly consider the implications of the existence of the best good, which is central to any conception of the good life.

8. The Method Question then becomes: What is the proper methodological approach to this inquiry? A. suggests a context specific approach: given the variety of objects of our inquiry, an approximate answer may be the most appropriate one. We shouldn’t expect the same precision here as we would in the theoretical sciences.

9. The Doxa As is appropriate to an inquiry of this sort, A. begins his investigation by surveying the common opinions (doxa). In this case, there is a great deal of unanimity suggesting that happiness is the highest good (happiness = living well and doing well). But, as is to be expected, the doxa is too imprecise. There is a great deal of confusion evident over the character and content of happiness. Common definitions include: pleasure, wealth, honor.

10. Three (or Four) Lives This confusion is evident when we consider the variety of ideals of living that we are presented with. ◦ There is the life of the ‘vulgar,’ dominated by the pursuit of pleasure, which Aristotle characterizes as slavish. ◦ There is the ‘cultivated’ life dominated by the pursuit of honor, which Aristotle dismisses because of it dependency on the perception of others. ◦ There is the life of the philosopher, dominated by contemplation (study) which (no surprise) turns out to be the winner. ◦ There appears to be a fourth possibility, the ‘economic’ life dominated by the pursuit of wealth, but Aristotle insists no one would choose it for its own sake, and thus it can’t be a life ordered by the highest good..

11. The Human Good: Happiness Aristotle recognizes that we need more clarity on the nature of the good. All we've specified up to this point is that the good is connected to final causation (the end). If we take this notion seriously, however, 2 important features of the highest good become apparent: 1)Good is complete; 2)Good is self-sufficient. When we consider possible goods by these standards, it turns out that one good, happiness (Eudaimonia) satisfies them both.

12. The Human Good: Virtue This is a good start, but we still need more specificity. Aristotle proposes to satisfy this need by considering the function of a human being. ◦ He identifies three possible functions: 1)Living; 2)Perception; 3)Reason. Of these only reason, as the uniquely human, would seem to specify the function of a human being. He then makes and argument connecting reason with the character and conduct of human life (59). This is an argument that echoes the argument we saw in the Republic. The conclusion of this argument is that Eudaimonia = activity of the soul that expresses virtue (arête: excellence).

13. Defense The next step is to consider how well our provisional account of the highest good/end matches up with our experience and with the Doxa. The doxa suggests that there are three types of goods: 1)external; 2)bodily; 3)goods of the soul (these are thought to be highest, which matches up with our account so far). Happiness is commonly identified as a virtue/excellence (60). Happiness a reflection of a good life, one in which other, external goods have been achieved.

14. Do we need to be lucky? The recognition that happiness is not independent of material needs raises a question which we need to address: Is happiness a matter of luck? Aristotle insists that it’s not. Rather it is a product of cultivation ("activity of the soul"). Animals are not happy, children and the young are not happy either (they are not 'complete') (62).

15. The Virtues That leaves us with the question of the nature of virtue. We are seeking an account of the virtue of the human soul (not virtue in general). For Aristotle, the soul has two parts: Rational and Non-rational (nutritive and sensitive). Aristotle introduces here an important distinction relating to the sensitive or appetitive soul: the continent and the incontinent. ◦ An incontinent person is one whose sensitive elements of the soul resists the commands of the rational elements (contrary impulses). ◦ A continent person is one whose reason suppresses the appetites (self- controlled). ◦ There is one other sort (the soul expressing virtue) whose soul is in harmony (will and reason are working together). The two parts of the soul means that there are two sorts of virtue: Virtues of thought (wisdom, prudence) and virtues of character (generosity, temperance). ◦ This distinction is not a strict one. Prudence is required for all virtues; many Vt require the presence of Vc.

16. Hitting the Mean According to Aristotle, virtue is not the same for everyone. We all have our capacities, talents, and limitations, and the excellence each of us can exhibit is particular to these. What is common for everyone is that exhibiting virtue is a matter of hitting a mean between two extremes. All virtues, of both character and thought, are understood to be located between vices of deficiency and excess. The goal is to hit the ‘sweet spot.’