1. POLAND: How successfully did Solidarity and new Polish state manage the transition? Rosie, Yasmin and Sonja

2.  April 1989: overriding opposition from the military and the communists Jaruzelski legalised Solidarity. He agreed to introduce a multiparty system, removed censorship of the press and broadcasting and hold elections for the senate and the Sejm.  May 1990: the first free local elections held, confirmed Solidarity’s domination.  July 1990: the coalition cabinet was reshuffled to remove the last remaining communists.  12 Sept 1990: the Sejm voted to accept Mazowieki and his government – first non-communist led government in 40 years.  United Peasants’ Party withdrew its support from the coalition government.  New elections in Oct 1990, the constitution was amended so that Jaruzelski could be replaced by a new president.  1991: A new system of proportional representation was introduced.  1991: another election with a large number of parties competing for seats.  A coalition of six parties emerged. 67 parties took part, 29 won seats. Mazowiecki’s Democratic Union and the (ex- communist) SLD were the first and second place. Walesa failed to make himself both prime minister and president.  Oct 1991: much delayed parliamentary election took place and gave further evidence of divisions in Poland.  There followed a series of weak and short-lived coalitions governments.  Eastern Europe’s first female president, Hanna Suchocka, emerged as leader of a disorganised sejm government under a hostile president, Lech Walesa.  Suchocka created a programme for full scale privatisation.  She made a deal with organised labour called the Pact of Enterprises – a transfer of the remaining large-scale sectors of the polish economy to private ownership.

3.  Walesa began to politicise Solidarity due to frustration at the pace of reforms.  Solidarity was slowly collapsing in new political environment. It had previously held together as it was the primary opposition group to communism, now that role of completed it began to crumble.  Solidarity’s supporters increasingly began to oppose the government and this led to divisions and the creation of new political parties.  Although Walesa defeated Mazowiecki in the 1990 presidential elections, the election contest had been better and Solidarity became more divided.  Sep 1993: elections showed the continuing disintegration of Solidarity. Solidarity received less than 5% necessary to obtain representation in the new parliament.  Capitalist economy shock therapy and Walesa had done what Jaruzelski and martial law had failed to do – destroy solidarity.

4.  Walesa did not adapt to parliamentary democracy.  Walesa sacked the head of the Citizens’ Committee, Wujec, prompting a political crisis.  Dec 1990: Walesa became first post-communist Polish president, elected with 40% of the popular vote.  Outcome of the election not decisive enough to prevent Walesa being overruled on reforms to the electoral system.  1995: ex-communist Aleksander Kwasniewski defeated Walesa by a narrow margin in the presidential elections.

5.  ‘Big bang’ – rapid privatization of the economy, intended to catapult into global market.  Phase 1- currency stabilised + inflation brought under control  Phase 2- mass privatization would take place  Western companies offering loans + small business's flourishing.  Its success was in part due to bourgeois farming class  Black market came into open  Exports expanded  Negative effects:  state subsidies removed  Industrial output fell 30%, wages fell by 40% and unemployment rose from virtually 0 to 1 million by the end of the 1990.  Almost half of all small firms were in private hands, but reluctance to privatize large scale economies was still a concern (communist past).  An attempt to broaden the privatization plan by offering vouchers (shares) to Polish citizens failed.

6.  In the early 1990s the economy plummeted so disastrously that the European Community established a special emergency fund to buy food for Poland and provide 3 years subventions (grants) from the EC itself.  During the 1908s wages had lost a 1/5 of their purchasing power, inflation cam near to 500% year, and Poland's debt to the west of $35.5 billion was the largest of the satellites.  Shock therapy for the economy imposed all but intolerable burdens in order to cope with the huge debts incurred in the 1970s and 1980s to the Paris Club of western leaders and private bankers.  However the US (followed by the UK and France) wrote off 2/3 of its debt as a contribution to helping the newly developing democratic country.  After the initial ‘big bang’, the economy grew at about 6% per year, unemployment fell, foreign investment was encouraged and hyperventilation was reduced.

7. SUCCESS IN RELATIONS WITH WEST DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH NEIGHBOURS TO EAST Poland began to enter European mainstream, not just politically and economically, but also culturally By 2000, Poland fully integrated with capitalist nations in West An extreme expression of the development of the country was its entry into NATO in 1999, and the large trans-national organisation, EU in 2004 Heavily under influence of capitalist globalisation Self determination after 1989 – Before this country had not been independent since 18 th C apart from short period in the inter-war years Economy more stable and efficient. 1996- Joined OECD and hoped to join EU soon after 2000 Kohl wanted membership despite German fears of a substantial flood of Polish workers into a difficult German Labour market. By recognising Poland’s existing frontiers Walesa and his successors removed contentions to the East and hoped to secure Poland’s post-war gains in the West Russian frontiers reduced, no Germans left and ethnically become singularly homogenous Olive branches- Russia but concerns over Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine Lithuania- Historic conflicts were overcome by mutual awareness of struggle but economic failures in Belarus and Ukraine constricted their trade with Poland and the opportunities for profitable relations while also raising possibility of reconstituted and nationalistic European Russia with which Polish relations could be at least difficult.