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BlindLocation: Supporting User Location Privacy in Mobile Database Using Blind Signature Source: Journal of Computer Science and Technology, reviewing Imact Factor: 0.632 Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu ( 呂勇志 ) Date: 2010/12/31 1
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Outline Introduction Related work Proposed Scheme Security Analysis Performance Evaluation Conclusion Comment 2
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Introduction (1/3) Mobile Database 3
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Introduction (2/3) Location Privacy Location Privacy 4 User Database Location-dependent queries Ex: find a restaurant The answer depends on user’s location.
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Introduction (3/3) Goal ◦ BlindLocation ◦ Mutual Authentication ◦ Prevention Insiders Attacks Outsiders Attacks ◦ Low computation time 5
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Related work ECC Blind signature 6 Min-Shinang Hwang and Pei-Chen Sung, "A study of micro- payment based on one-way hash chain," International Journal of Network Security, vol.2, no.2, pp.81-90, 2006.
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Proposed Scheme (1/2) Acquiring the anonymous token 7 User Database A, t, c(x), HMAC(c(x), t, K sh ) calculate x = h(Q) HMAC(c(x), t, k sh ) Verify S B (S’ B (c(x)))?=c(x) calculate S’ B (x)=c’(S’ B (c(x))) S’ B (c(x)) Verify HMAC(C(x), t, k sh ) ?= HMAC(C(x), t, k sh ) calculate S’ B (c(x)) A: User’s ID t: timestamp K sh : secret shared key Q: Location based query S’ B : DB’s private key c(.): blind signature
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Proposed Scheme (2/2) Anonymous authentication using the token 8 User Database S’ B (x),Q calculate S B (S’ B (Result,S’ B (x))) S’ B (Result,S’ B (x)) Verify S B (S’ B (x))? = h(Q) A: User’s ID t: timestamp K sh : secret shared key Q: Location based query S’ B : DB’s private key c(.): blind signature
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Security Analysis (1/2) Insiders Attacks ◦ Location privacy violation Solution: Psc = 1/m! ◦ Embedding a known symbol Solution: verification ◦ Information theft Solution: meaningless ◦ Impersonation attack: Solution: secret shared key 9
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Security Analysis (2/2) Outsiders Attacks ◦ Denial of Services (DOS) attack Solutions memory : stateless CPU: limit the number of valid token requests ◦ Replay attack: Solution: timestamp ◦ Snooping attack: Solution: blind signature & encryption ◦ Man-In-The-Middle Solution: verification 10
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Performance Evaluation (1/2) Computation time 11
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Performance Evaluation (2/2) Comparison summaries 12
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Conclusion Solve the location privacy problem The quality of service is not forfeited 13
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Comment (1/2) 本文主要貢獻簡述 : ◦ 提供一個機率上有效的 location privacy 優點: ◦ 適切的應用 blind signature, 達到 location privacy 又不損資料庫提供查詢服務的能力 缺點: ◦ 在 Computation time 中未與它篇論文比較 14
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Comment (2/2) 明顯錯誤 ( 含 typos): ◦ 第5頁表1,reslut 應改成 result. ◦ 第19頁表3, 符號 Q 定義混淆. ◦ 論文架構有誤, Related work 應移至 Introduction 之後. ◦ 論文章節未標示清楚 15
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