1. The Surprising Science of Ethics Scott Truelove Austin Energy Organization Development

16. 16 In ethics the challenge is aimed at a method that has been widely used by philosophers since antiquity The method uses the spontaneous judgments about thought experiments as evidence in arguments about ethics These judgments are often called “ethical intuitions”

17. 17 typical episode philosophically interesting aspects In a typical episode, a philosopher will describe a situation and look for philosophically interesting aspects such as: morally wrong Is the action described morally wrong?

18. 18 intuitively obvious When things go well, both the philosopher and his audience will agree that the answer is intuitively obvious… evidence …and that will be taken to be evidence for or against some philosophical thesis.

19. 19 Well said, Cephalus, I replied: but as concerning justice, what is it? – to speak the truth and to pay your debts – no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to given them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates.

20. 20 Suppose a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to given them back to him? Well said, Cephalus, I replied: but as concerning justice, what is it? – to speak the truth and to pay your debts – no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to given them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates. the thought experiment

21. 21 No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. Well said, Cephalus, I replied: but as concerning justice, what is it? – to speak the truth and to pay your debts – no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to given them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates. the intuitions

22. 22 Well said, Cephalus, I replied: but as concerning justice, what is it? – to speak the truth and to pay your debts – no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to given them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates. the conclusion

24. 24 Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian Flu which will kill 600 people if we do nothing.

25. 25 If program A is adopted, 200 people are saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance of saving 600 and a 2/3 chance of saving nobody.

26. 26 If program A is adopted, 200 are saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance of saving 600 and a 2/3 chance of saving nobody.

27. 27 If program A is adopted, 200 are saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance of saving 600 and a 2/3 chance of saving nobody. If program C is adopted, 400 people die. If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that nobody dies and a 2/3 chance that 600 will die.

28. 28 If program A is adopted, 200 are saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance of saving 600 and a 2/3 chance of saving nobody. If program C is adopted, 400 people die. If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that nobody dies and a 2/3 chance that 600 will die.

29. 29 If program A is adopted, 200 are saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 are saved and a 2/3 probability of saving nobody. If program C is adopted, 400 people die. If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that nobody dies and a 2/3 chance that 600 will die.

32. Medial Frontal Cortex Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (PFC) Superior Temporal Sulcus Posterior Cingulate/ Precuneus Personal Moral Dilemmas Impersonal Moral Dilemmas Non-moral Dilemmas Brain Activity % change MR signal Personal vs. Impersonal Moral Judgment Inferior Parietal Lobe (Bilateral; Not shown) Emotion/Social Cognition Areas “Cognitive” Areas Greene et al., Science, 2001 (Bilateral)

33. 33 moral intuitions profoundly morally irrelevant Lingering sense of unease about our moral intuitions since they are often profoundly influenced by things seem morally irrelevant. Look a bit differently about advice that relies or appeals to our moral intuitions.