1. The evolution of cooperation

2. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor

3. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor n `get the altruism out of altruism...´ (Trivers)

4. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor n `get the altruism out of altruism...´ (Trivers) n kin selection n Hamilton´s rule: c< b.r

5. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor n `get the altruism out of altruism...´ (Trivers) n kin selection n Hamilton´s rule: c< b.r n in humans co-operation among non- relatives

6. Darwin: n The small strength and speed of man, his want of natural weapons, etc., are more than counterbalanced... by his social qualities, which led him to give and receive aid from his fellow men.

7. Cooperation among non-relatives n Direct reciprocation and the Prisoner´s Dilemma n Indirect reciprocation n Public Goods

8. n Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the mind as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the dignity of the person.

10. Reciprocity n Reciprocal altruism...the trading of altruistic acts in which benefit is larger than cost, so that over a period of time both parties enjoy a net gain. (Trivers)

11. The Prisoner´s Dilemma game n To cooperate or to defect n (example: cooperate means to give a gift of value b at cost -c)

12. Prisoner´s Dilemma

14. The iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma n probability w for another round n (for instance, toss a coin, stop game if 6) n shadow of the future (Axelrod)

15. The iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma

25. n Generous Tit For Tat n p close to 1 n q sizeable n two zones

26. The iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma

28. n Heteroclinic network n A = Tit or Tat n B = Firm But Fair n C = Bully n D = AllD

29. The iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma

31. Pavlov n Cooperate if other player used same move as yourself in previous round n reinforcement principle: repeat former move after high payoff n Pavlov is error-correcting n Pavlov is stable n Pavlov cannot invade population of defectors

32. Pavlov

35. n Simple learning rule n stable, error-correcting n but needs retaliator to prepare the ground

36. Indirect reciprocity n few rounds, as donor or receiver n never with the same partner twice

37. Indirect reciprocity n R. Alexander: Indirect reciprocity.. involves reputation and status, and results in everyone in the group continually being assessed and reassessed.

38. Indirect reciprocity n R. Alexander: Indirect reciprocity.. involves reputation and status, and results in everyone in the group continually being assessed and reassessed. n Cooperation channelled towards cooperative members

39. Indirect reciprocity n score: increases by 1 if help is given, decreases by 1 if help is withheld n score 0 at birth

40. Indirect reciprocity n score: increases by 1 if help is given, decreases by 1 if help is withheld n score 0 at birth n strategy k: give only if recipient has score at least k n k>5: always defect n k<-5: always help

41. Indirect reciprocity

43. n cooperation based on discrimination n but not stable (can occasionally break down)

44. Indirect reciprocity

45. Indirect Reciprocity

46. William D. Hamilton The theory of many-person games may seem to stand to that of two-person games in the relation of sea-sickness to a head-ache!