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On the Semantics of Argumentation 1 Antonis Kakas Francesca Toni Paolo Mancarella Department of Computer Science Department of Computing University of Cyprus Imperial College Dipartimento di Informatica Universita di Pisa 20 April, 2012 London Argumentation Forum
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Contents 2 Part 1: Acceptability Semantics for Abstract Argumentation Generalizing old work on the Argumentation Based Acceptability Semantics for Logic Programming Part 2: Argumentation Logic Recent work on the application of Acceptability Semantics to reformulate (Propositional) Logic in terms of Argumentation
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Acceptability Semantics for Abstract Argumentation 3 Abstract Argumentation: Args: a set of arguments Attack: a binary relation on Args (a,b) Attack: the argument “a” attacks the argument “b” A attacks B iff a A and b B s.t. (a,b) Attack, for any A,B P(Args) Acceptability semantics is defined via a relative Acceptability Relation between (sets of) arguments: Acc( , 0 ): Given 0 the set can be accepted.
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Acceptability Semantics Informal Motivation 4 Acceptability Relation: Follow the “universal” intuition: An argument (or a set of arguments) can be accepted iff all its counter-arguments can be rejected. Can we formalize directly this intuition? How are we to understand the “Rejection of Argument”? As “Can not be Accepted”? The argument can play a role in rejecting its counter-arguments Hence Acceptance is a RELATIVE notion. An argument (or a set of arguments) is acceptable iff it renders all its counter-arguments non-acceptable.
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Acceptability Semantics Informal Motivation 5 An argument (or a set of arguments), , is acceptable iff all its counter-arguments, A, are rendered non-acceptable. How do we understand “non-acceptable” or more generally “non-acceptable relative to ”? Admissibility answers this by “ attacks (back) A”. This is an approximation of the negation of acceptable! Negation of Acceptance: An argument (or a set of arguments) A is non-acceptable iff there exists a set of arguments D that attacks A such that D is acceptable (relative to A).
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Acceptability Semantics Definition DEFINITION A set is acceptable relative to 0, i.e. Acc( , 0 ) holds, iff (i) is a subset of 0 or (ii) for any set A that attacks there exists a set D that attacks A – D defends against A - such that D is acceptable relative to 0 A, i.e. Acc(D, 0 A) holds. F ACC : 2 P(Args)xP(Args) 2 P(Args)xP(Args) (P(Args) is the power set 2 Args of Arg) F ACC (acc)( Δ, Δ ’) iff Δ Δ ’, or for any A s.t. A attacks Δ : there exists D s.t. D attacks A and acc(D, Δ ’ Δ A). The operator F ACC is monotonic. Acceptability, Acc(-,-), is defined as the least fixed point of F ACC Definition of SEMANTICS: Δ is acceptable iff Acc( Δ,{}) holds.
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Acceptability Semantics Some Results 7 Admissible implies Acceptable Acyclic AF: Acceptability Semantics = Grounded Semantics In general, it captures the well known semantic notions. Does it give anything else? Captures semantic notions of self-defeating (set of) argument(s): S is self-defeating iff there exists an attacking set, A, against S such that ¬Acc(A, {}) and Acc(A, S) hold. Hence S renders one of its attacks acceptable! Acceptable sets do not need to defend against such self- defeating attacking sets by counter-attacking them back. This extends Admissibility
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Acceptability Semantics Extending Admissibility 8 Example of Self-Defeating: Odd Loops Elements of (any length) odd loops are not acceptable. But also arguments that are attacked only by elements of (isolated) odd loops are acceptable. a a1a2a3 a1 a {a} is Acceptable
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Acceptability Semantics Self-defeat ↔ Reductio ad Absurdum 9 Self-defeat emerges implicitly as a semantic notion from the minimal formulation of the acceptability semantics. C.f. other semantics where this is explicit and syntactic. Self-defeating S: renders one of its attacks acceptable This is a kind of Reductio ad Absurdum Principle!
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Part2: Argumentation Logic 10 Can we understand Reductio ad Absurdum in Logic as a case of self-defeating under acceptability? Can this help to formulate (Propositional) Logic in terms of Argumentation? Originally, logic was developed to formulated human argumentation. PL can be reformulated as a realization of abstract argumentation under an acceptability type semantics. Argumentation Logic Naturally extends PL for (classically) inconsistent theories.
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Argumentation Logic 11
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Argumentation Logic = Propositional Logic Sketch Proof 12 ¬Acc({ },{}) Genuine RA derivation for Genuine RA derivations: [ . [ ’. c( ). [ .. ¬ ] ] Technical Lemma: For classically consistent theories if there exists a RA derivation for the there exists a Genuine RA derivation for . T ¬ ├ MRA ’ is necessary for the direct derivation of
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Natural Deduction (RA) as Argumentation Example: ¬Acc({ },{}) Genuine RA derivation for 13 Θ = {¬ ( θεός θνητός ), ¬ θνητός ¬ πεθάνει, πεθάνει } [ θεός ¬ (¬ θνητός ) θνητός θεός θνητός ¬( θεός θνητός ) ] ¬ θεός [ ¬ θνητός ¬ πεθάνει πεθάνει ] Θεός θνητός ¬ θνητός The argument, ¬ θνητός, that can defend against the attack θνητός cannot do so as it is self-defeating. Hence the argument, θεός, is not acceptable.
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« Φυσική Συμπερασματολογία » Ως Επιχειρηματολογία 14 [¬ (¬ β ή β ) [ β ¬ β ή β ¬ (¬ β ή β ) (copy) ] ¬ β ¬ β ή β ] ¬ β ή β Rule of the excluded middle [¬ (¬ β ή β ) [ β[ β ¬ β ή β ¬ (¬ β ή β ) (copy) ]] ¬ β ¬ β ή β ]] Rule of the excluded middle ¬ (¬ β ή β ) ¬ β β ¬ (¬ β ή β ) Το επιχείρημα, ¬ (¬ β ή β ), αποτελεί αντεπιχείρημα στο επιχείρημα, β, που το στηρίζει. Έτσι, το ¬ (¬ β ή β ) δεν είναι αποδεκτό.
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Natural Deduction (RA) as Argumentation Example: ¬Acc({ },{}) Genuine RA derivation for 15 Θ = {¬ ( θεός θνητός ), ¬ θνητός -> ¬ πεθάνει, πεθάνει } [ θνητός θεός (copy) θεός θνητός ¬( Θεός θνητός ) ] Θεός ¬ θνητός θνητός θεός Violates the Genuine property! Attack ??? [ θεός ¬ θνητός ¬ πεθάνει πεθάνει ] ¬ θεός {}
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Argumentation Logic Results (1) 16 T classically consistent AL = PL (for the restricted language of ¬ and ) AL entails iff ¬Acc({¬ },{}) holds. Interpretation of implication in AL differs from PL, e.g. Both a b and ¬ (a b) are acceptable w.r.t. to T={ ¬ a} AL distinguishes two forms of Inconsistency of T Classically inconsistent but directly consistent (under ├ MRA ) Violation of rule of «Excluded Middle». For some, φ, neither φ nor ¬ φ is acceptable, e.g. T = { φ , ¬ φ } Directly inconsistent For some φ, T has a direct argument for φ and ¬ φ, e.g. T = { φ, ¬ φ }
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Argumentation Logic Results (2) 17 AL extends PL when T is (classically) inconsistent Directly consistent AL does not trivialize AL entails iff ¬Acc({¬ },{}) and Acc({ },{}) hold. AL isolates out the non-relevant use of Reductio ad Absurdum Example: Logical Paradoxes ( T = { φ , ¬ φ } ) Directly inconsistent Use “Belief Revision Type” approach 1. Close T under direct consequence: C(T), 2. Maximally directly consistent subsets of C(T).
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Example of Argumentation Logic “A barber shaves anyone that does not shave himself” ¬ ShavesHimself(Person) ShavedByBarber(Person) ShavesHimself(Person) ¬ ShavedByBarber(Person) Self-reference: When Person = barber ShavedByBarber(barber) ShavesHimself(barber) ¬ ShavedByBarber(barber) ¬ ShavesHimself(barber)
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Example – Classical Logic ¬ SH(P) SB(P) SH(P) ¬ SB(P) SB(b) SH(b) ¬ SB(b) ¬ SH(b) SB(b) |- SH(b) |- ¬ SB(b) i.e. SB(b) |- ¬ SB(b) |- ¬ SH(b) |- SB(b) i.e. ¬ SB(b)|- Problem arises due to the excluded middle law SB(P) or ¬ SB(P), for any person P, even for P=barber. This makes the theory inconsistent and therefore non meaningful (even for any other person than the barber). Problem arises as SB(b) must take a truth value (in model theory).
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Example – Argumentation Logic ¬ SH(P) SB(P) SH(P) ¬ SB(P) SB(b) SH(b) ¬ SB(b) ¬ SH(b) ¬ ACC(SB(b)) SB(b) is a non-acceptable argument ¬ ACC( ¬ SB(b)) ¬ SB(b) is a non-acceptable argument Law of excluded middle for SB(b)? The law (SB(b) or ¬ SB(b)) is non-acceptable. Each one of SB(b) and ¬ SB(b) is directly inconsistent and so non-acceptable The negation of the law, ¬ (SB(b) or ¬ SB(b)), is acceptable (?) Gives up the law of excluded middle! Give up (two valued) model theory?
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Conclusions 21 Acceptability is a direct, minimal and natural formulation of the semantics of abstract argumentation. Approach is a Synthesis of Labelling and Extension based approaches Is it “complete”? Let the “Formalism Tell” vs “Telling the Formalism”. Acceptability “tells us” (encapsulates) a Reductio ad Absurdum Principle in argumentation. This enables a reformulation of PL in terms of argumentation => Argumentation Logic (AL) AL is a conservative extension of PL into a type of Relevance Para- consistent Logic -- Only genuine use of Reductio ad Absurdum Looking for the analogue of a “model theory” for AL.
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