1. Hume on Ethics and the Passions The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment, IV Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015. 1

2. Revista de la Universidad de México David Hume. El más subversivo de los filósofos. (The most subversive philosopher). By Gerardo Laveaga http://www.revistadelauniversidad.unam.mx/articulo.php?publicacion=792 &art=16769&sec=Art%C3%ADculos Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 2 The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment, IV

3. 1. Moral sense 2. Natural virtues 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 3 The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment, IV

4. 1. Moral sense “An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous… Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us.” (T3.1.2.3) Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 4

5. 1. Moral sense Hume talks of moral sentiment or moral taste (T3.3.1.15). His claim is that we feel virtues, meaning that we find something pleasing in the action or character. 1.Why do not we blame/praise every thing we find pleasing/painful? Let us say, an annoying stone obstructing my way. 2.What is the difference between aesthetics and ethics? Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 5

6. 1. Moral sense Hume replies: First part (T3.1.2.4) -“Pleasure” covers a variety of sensations. -The distinction of the source of pleasure is too obvious -It is a misunderstanding that pleasure equals praise straightforwardly. We praise the good qualities of the enemy. (However, in T3.3.1.3, Hume says that Virtue is equivalent to the power of producing love or pride) Second part (T3.1.2.5) - Virtue and vice arise from the double relation; therefore, they imply either “the self” or “the other”. As a consequence, virtue is related to either love or pride; vice, to either hatred or humility. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 6

7. 1. Moral sense Obscurities: 1. How do we -Distinguish different meanings of “pleasure”? -Put together all those different meanings into one single “concept” or idea? 2. How about the enemy? -We are pleased by its qualities and yet we do not love our enemies. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 7

8. 2. Natural virtues If feelings of pleasure and pain are so inherently part of us, and they give rise to morality, is morality natural? Hume wants to argue against philosophers who think that virtue is what is according to nature whereas vice is what is not according to nature. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 8

9. 2. Natural virtues Hume replies: it depends on what we mean by nature… (T3.1.2.7-10) -Nature as opposed to miracles and objects of religion. Virtue is as opposed to a miracle as vice. -Nature as opposed to what is rare or unusual. It is not the case that people tend to be rather virtuous. -Nature as opposed to artifice. If by “artifice” we understand “involving some kind of goal or design”, then actions are artificial. But goals are as constitutive parts of actions as cold or heat. Conclusion: it depends on the particular virtue we think of. * Nature as opposed to civil; as opposed to moral. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 9

10. 2. Natural virtues Obscurities: Hume seems to think that virtue and good taste are NOT the commonest cases. So we have many, many good examples of extreme situations, but those are not standard situation. We do not experience the standard (at least not the positive standard). Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 10

11. 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality First part. We agreed in that we neither blame nor praise inanimate things; we do not consider them “the other” as opposed to “the self”, because we do not grant them internal states (intentions, feelings and the like). How do we perceive the internal state? All we see is a matter of fact. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 11

12. Hume replies: by means of sympathy. 1.We perceive either the cause or the effect. Reason tells us that something is the cause for a given effect. 2.Imaginations goes easily from one to the other, in both directions. 3.Imaginations “…forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself.” (T3.3.1.6) Hume has an important axiom here: “The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations…” (T3.3.1.6) Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 12 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

13. Obscurities: If the cause of pleasure belongs to either a stranger or an enemy, am I to be sympathetic to him? NB. Hume’s notion of sympathy is not a feeling; it implies not any kind of approval or liking. It is more of a “mechanical” stepping into the shoes of the other person. Under the assumption* that the cause of my feelings is unequivocally the cause of a similar feeling for any other person, my imagination puts me in his place, i.e., gives me a lively idea of the passion. Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 13 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

14. Second part. Sympathy is the principle of moral judgment, it requires us to witness either the cause or the effect. We judge as beautiful something related to pleasure. First problem: I see my toddler “performing” the Swan Lake at her dancing class; obviously, I do not consider hers artistically more beautiful than Zakharova’s performance, even though I am more intensely moved towards my child. Why? Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 14 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

15. Hume replies: due to the Principle of correction -Particulars move us more than generalities. To favour a particular person is more intense for our feelings than favouring the mankind; however, we esteem greater the latter. (T.3.3.1.9-13) -There is a difference between the sentiment and the esteem. The latter is a thought arising from the consideration of us fixed in a general situation. -General concepts that describe feelings, sentiments and sensations* are products of corrections: “… did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation?” (T3.3.1.18). -Corrections arise from a collection of experience, if I may say, and are founded on some distant view or reflection (i.e., calm passion).** Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 15 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

16. Second part. Effects move our imagination stronger than causes. Second problem: If I judge people and actions as morally good considering the social benefit, what happens when somebody finds an obstacle for his purposes? Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 16 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

17. Hume replies: due to the Principle of separation Since our imagination goes easily from the cause to the effect, if the object is internally complete and ready to fulfil a purpose, if it is naturally fitted to give us pleasure, it does not matter that an external circumstance might prevent the outcome. (T3.3.1.20) Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 17 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

18. Hume replies: due to the Principle of separation “Virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love, which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or desart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to all the world.” (T3.3.1.19) Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 18 3. Sympathy as a principle of morality

19. Happy Thanksgiving Day! Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015 19

20. Hume on Ethics and the Passions The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment, IV Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015. 20