1. The Doha Round of WTO Negotiations: The U.S. Perspective Robert L. Thompson Chairman International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council and Gardner Professor of Agricultural Policy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 31 October 2005

2. There Is No ONE U.S. Perspective U.S. agriculture is large and heterogeneous across many agro-ecosystems In general U.S. agriculture is export-oriented since it produces one-third more than the U.S. consumes. –Increasing market access and expanding the total size of the world market are important priorities There are also highly subsidized products produced behind protectionist barriers to imports. –They oppose liberalization and cuts in their subsidies Exports of processed and high value agricultural exports growing faster than raw bulk commodities

3. U.S. Producer Support Estimates, 2001-2003 (Percent of producers’ gross revenue) Sugar 58 Milk 44 Rice 44 Sorghum 37 Wheat 34 Barley 30 Corn 20 Soybean 19 Wool and lamb 17 Pork, beef and broilers 4 Overall 19 Source: OECD PSE database

4. World Agriculture in Disarray Import protection and producer supports –Distort what gets produced where and, in turn, agricultural trade flows –Depress world market prices below long-term trend –Reduce price and/or income risk to one country’s farmers while increasing price volatility in world market –Largest producers and farm land owners get most of the benefits

5. OECD Producer Support Estimates, 2004, Percent of Gross Receipts Switzerland 68 Japan 56 European Union 33 Canada 21 United States 18 Mexico 17 Australia 4 New Zealand 3 30 Countries Overall 30 Source: OECD Agriculture Directorate

6. Average Producer Support, OECD Countries, 2004, Percent of Gross Revenue Rice 75 Sugar 58 Milk 36 Beef & Veal 34 Wheat 33 Corn 31 Oilseeds 27 Pork 21 Eggs 9 Overall 30

7. “A successful Doha Round will reduce and eliminate tariffs and other barriers on farm and industrial goods. It will end unfair agricultural subsidies…. We must work together in the Doha negotiations to eliminate agricultural subsidies that distort trade and stunt development, and to eliminate tariffs and other barriers to open markets for farmers around the world…. The United States is ready to eliminate all tariffs, subsidies and other barriers to free flow of goods and service as other nations do the same.” George W. Bush United Nations 14 September 2005

8. Overall Domestic Support Present: Categorizes all support policies in one of three boxes, with only amber box total (“aggregate measure of support (AMS)”) capped. U.S. proposes: –Cap blue box, trade-distorting de minimis, and non-trade distorting de minimis each at 2.5% of agricultural GDP –Cap sum of amber box + blue box + trade-distorting de minimis + non-trade distorting de minimis policies, and reduce this total 75% (less for countries with lower total subsidies). This would significantly increase maximum allowed support in US and EU! Very large cuts would be required to cause any reduction in actual support. U.S. proposes 75% for highest subsidizers, with declining percentages for lower subsidizers)

9. Amber Box Framework Agreement said “Substantial reduction in the overall level of its trade-distorting support from bound levels” U.S. proposes –Full phase out over 15 years: 60% in first 5 years; rest in last 5 years, with higher/lower % reductions in countries where higher/lower AMS. –Product-specific caps at 1999-2001 levels Open issue –Highest levels of support reduced the most? E.g., rice, cotton, sugar; dairy in the U.S.

10. Blue Box Present: Trade-distorting policies that have measures that offset their production-inducing effect, e.g. set-aside or quota on production or sales. No cap at present. Tentatively agreed in Framework Agreement: –Broaden to include “direct payments that do not require production,” e.g. counter-cyclical payments [no link to current production, but per unit payment is based on current market price; therefore, not green box]. U.S. proposal: Redefine blue box and cap at 2.5% of total value of all national ag production (including non-program crops).

11. Green Box Present: No cap. Doha Round likely to encourage shifting as much money as possible from amber to green box payments. –Essential not to cause a land price collapse Brazil cotton case affirmed that direct payments are “green” only if there are no constraints whatsoever on what can be grown on land receiving payments. –U.S. must either delete fruit & vegetable exclusion or include direct payments in amber box Open issue: Tighten definition of “minimally trade-distorting”

12. Market Access The most difficult pillar on which the least has been agreed to date Framework Agreement says: –Substantial increase in market access though tariff cuts or tariff rate quota (TRQ) expansion –Categorize all tariffs into “bands,” each with a different reduction formula, with the highest tariffs to be reduced the most. –Allow each country to designate an “appropriate number” of (politically) “sensitive products” on which smaller cuts can be made. –Increase tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on “sensitive products” on which tariffs are cut less than formula would otherwise require. –Make cuts from bound rates. –Allow developing countries to use “special safeguard” –Developing countries can make smaller cuts over longer period

13. Market Access (cont’d.) U.S. proposal would –Reduce tariffs by 55-90% (highest tariffs cut the most) –Cap tariffs at 75% in high income countries (a little higher cap elsewhere) –Limit “sensitive products” to less than 1% of tariff lines “with full compensation” via TRQ expansion –Allow “developing countries” Special Safeguard and Special Products –Internationally competitive developing countries must provide meaningful increase in access to their markets FYI: U.S. has TRQs on sugar, dairy, cotton, peanuts, and beef.

14. Export Subsidies Present: Cap on volume and value of export subsidies on agricultural policies. The E.U. has agreed to eliminate all direct agricultural export subsidies by a (yet to be agreed) date certain WTO Cotton Case mandated that the U.S. must eliminate subsidy component in export credits and export credit guarantees (marketing loans?) Conditions yet to be agreed: –Date: U.S. proposes 2010. –Eliminate subsidy element in U.S. food aid –Mode of operation of state-trading enterprises (STEs), e.g. Canadian Wheat Board, must preclude possibility to subsidize exports.

15. Special & Differential Treatment of Developing Countries Allow smaller cuts phased in over a longer period Allow each developing country to designate a (yet to be defined) number of “special products” that can be protected Exempt LDCs completely from adjustment ???? There remains politically divisive issue of definition of “developing country” (as opposed to a least developed country (LDC)).

16. Conclusions Writing the next U.S. Farm Bill and completing the Doha Round negotiations are on the same time table – mid-2007. Changes in U.S. farm policy are generally evolutionary, not revolutionary BUT, there are a number of forces that could bring bigger changes in 2007: –Federal budget deficit –WTO trade negotiations –Public perception that farm programs are not achieving their objectives The most-discussed alternatives involve moving dollars from the amber box to the green box, e.g. –Some form of subsidized gross income insurance –Payments for conservation or environmental services –Rural infrastructure investments

17. www.agritrade.org