1. Enforcement of the Icelandic cod fishery – A two management control, two enforcement tool fishery – Ragnar Arnason Icelandic Case study for the COBECOS Project (WP 5, 8 & 9) Presented at the COBECOS mid-term meeting San-Sebastian, September 2-3, 2008

2. Background Icelandic cod fishery –Quite sizable (MSY  0.330 m.mt; landed value  600-900 m.US$) –Currently depressed (biomass  0.7 m.mt.; OSY  1.2 m.mt) –Capitalistic fishery- fishers are profit maximizers About 700 fishing vessels (some multi-purpose) About 70 landing places –Managed on the basis of ITQs Individual harvest restrictions Also area/time/gear restrictions –Quite profitable (quota rental values 2-3 US$/kg)

3. Icelandic cod: Sustainable fishery

4. Enforcement Situation Enforcement agencies –The Fisheries Directorate (the key agency) –Assisted by the Coast Guard Two management tools –The quota constraint ─ the key management control –Fishing area/time/gear restrictions ─ mix of controls Two enforcement tools –Enforcement of harvest or quota –Enforcement of area/time/gear restrictions

5. Modelling the situation Private Benefits Social Benefits Constant

6. Functional specifications Profit function: Cost coefficient: Biomass growth function:

7. Functional specifications (cont.) Probability function 1: Probability function 2: Cost of enforcement:

8. Empirical specifications

9. Empirical Specifications

10. Biomass growth (million metric tonnes)  =1  =0.5 Probably an exaggeration

11. Profit function  =1  =0.5 Probably an upper capacity bound

12. Benefits from harvest (  =0.5) Private benefits Social benefits

13. Private benefits Social benefits Benefits from alpha (Harvest=0.215)

14. Sustainble benefits (  =0.5) Costs Sustainble benefits Sustainble revenues

15. Probability of penalty Enforcement of harvests Enforcement of “mesh-size” Probably too optimistic

16. Results

17. Optimizing surfaces

18. Sensitivity to fines

19. Sensitivity analysis

20. Findings 1.Application of enforcement theory to real fisheries enforcement situations is quite feasible –N actions and M enforcement tools –Data is the main constraint 2.Benefits of enforcement may be great compared to the costs –Depends on the fishery and the fisheries management system 3.Optimal enforcement complicated –Few simple rules of thumb

21. END

22. Figure 3 Private benefits Social benefits Private benefits Social benefits