1. Tor and Timing Attacks An attack within the accepted attacker model

2. Onion Routing 2 –A real system for users Only true antecedent was ZKS’s Freedom Network –A variety of system enhancements PFS, congestion control, directory servers, etc.

3. Onion Routing Initiator-chosen paths −Instead of flipping a coin, the Initiator chooses the entire path and builds an onion. I  X  Y  Z  R −Layered encryption of data using the public key of each proxy in the path. data{R,data} Kz+ {Z,{R,data} Kz+ } Ky+ {Y,{Z,{R,data} Kz+ } Ky+ } Kx+ Sending the onion I  X: {Y,{Z,{R,data} Kz+ } Ky+ } Kx+ X  Y: {Z,{R,data} Kz+ } Ky+ Y  Z: {R,data} Kz+ Z  R: data

4. Tor Goals Deployability –Cannot be too expensive –Cannot be too troublesome or risky –Cannot require websites to run something different Usability Flexibility (& Good Specs) Simple Design

5. Attack Model What is the Tor Attack Model? Why is the model important?

6. Timing Attacks Timings say if they’re on the same path “Firstness” & “Lastness” can be determined –Why? A1DeltaA2 3:12:203:12:30 3:12:373:12:47 3:12:493:12:59 I A1 R A2 X 17 ms 12 ms Y

7. A Timing Attack Danezis 2004 Model: Global Passive Eavesdropper Idea –Gather timings of packets at all end points (entry and exit points) –Given a set of entry timings, produce a model of the exit timings. Look for a match. Result: Attacker obtains many correct matches

8. Another Timing Attack Levine, et al., 2004 Model: Substantial % of Tor servers (e.g. 10%) –Passive, in a sense Idea –See 2 slides ago –Handle errors gracefully –Repeat for many rounds Result: Attacker can get many good matches over time

9. A Note On the Tor Paper A Gold Mine! –28 different attacks –15 Open Questions –9 Future Directions Problem Selection –Is it interesting? –How hard a question? –Rough guesses?

10. Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor Murdoch & Danezis, Oakland ‘05 A novel attack –within Tor’s attack model Key features under attack –Low-latency communication –Ease of entry & ability to use the system

11. M&D Attack Model What is it? How does it compare to prior models we have discussed? Is it realistic? Can it be stopped?

12. The Attack Setup T1T2T3 Resp. Init. A

13. The Attack Idea Tor uses Round Robin sending –each stream gets a turn –If a stream has no packets, it gets skipped Imagine node T2 has just two streams –A and Initiator –A is always on –What happens when Initiator sends a pkt?

14. Testing the Attack Set up a “victim” Set up the attack server Probes Correlation?

15. Results Some success –Usually higher correlation w/ pattern Limits –Some failure –Not clear where to set a dividing line Enhancements Possible

16. Defenses Cover traffic –Just filling the links is no good –Lots of traffic required? Delay –perfect interference –non-interference