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Published byJemima Copeland Modified over 9 years ago
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Shakeel Butt @ Rutgers University Vinod Ganapathy @ Rutgers University Michael M. Swift @ University of Wisconsin-Madison Chih-Cheng Chang @ Rutgers University ACSAC 2009
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Introduction Background and scope Design Implementation Evaluation Related Work Summary
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Device drivers execute with kernel privilege in most commodity operating systems and have unrestricted access to kernel data structure. Propose a security architecture that offers commodity operating systems the benefits of executing device drivers in user mode without affecting common-case performance
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Threats at the kernel/driver interface Kernel data structures are routinely updated by device drivers, and the kernel impose no restrictions on the memory regions accessible to drivers or devices. Threats at the driver/device interface A compromised driver can maliciously modify the state of the device
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Goals Kernel data structure integrity Good common-case performance Compatibility
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Architecture
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Microdriver Consist of k-driver & u-driver Microdriver runtime Communication Object tracking RPC monitor Monitor data transfer Monitor control transfer
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Background on Microdrivers
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Microdriver split tool - DriverSlicer Splitter Code generator Invariant inference tool – Daikon Front end Inference engine
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Monitoring kernel data structure updates Training phace Inferring data structure integrity constraints Constancy of scalars and pointers Relationships between variables Ranges/sets of values Linked list invariants
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Enforcement phase Enforcing data structure integrity constraints Invariant table Vault table
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Monitoring control transfers Extracting control transfer policies Static analysis Enforcing control transfer policies Upcall Downcall
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Conduct on four drivers RealTek RTL-8139 (8139too) RealTek RTL-8139C+ (8139cp) Ensoniq sound card (ens1371) USB interface (uhci-hcd)
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Privilege separation
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Ability to prevent attacks Control hijacking via injected downcalls Control hijacking via modified function pointers Non-control data attacks
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False positives and negatives
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Performance TCP receive and send buffer sizes of 87KB and 16KB, respectively. Copy a 140MB file into a USB disk Play a 256-Kbps MP3
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Hardware-based isolation techniques Virtual machine-based techniques Language-based mechanisms Microkernels User-mode driver frameworks
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Better isolate kernel data from device drivers without sacrificing performance. Compatible with commodity operating system.
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