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Shakeel Rutgers University Vinod Rutgers University Michael M. University of Wisconsin-Madison Chih-Cheng Rutgers University.

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Presentation on theme: "Shakeel Rutgers University Vinod Rutgers University Michael M. University of Wisconsin-Madison Chih-Cheng Rutgers University."— Presentation transcript:

1 Shakeel Butt @ Rutgers University Vinod Ganapathy @ Rutgers University Michael M. Swift @ University of Wisconsin-Madison Chih-Cheng Chang @ Rutgers University ACSAC 2009

2 Introduction Background and scope Design Implementation Evaluation Related Work Summary

3 Device drivers execute with kernel privilege in most commodity operating systems and have unrestricted access to kernel data structure. Propose a security architecture that offers commodity operating systems the benefits of executing device drivers in user mode without affecting common-case performance

4 Threats at the kernel/driver interface Kernel data structures are routinely updated by device drivers, and the kernel impose no restrictions on the memory regions accessible to drivers or devices. Threats at the driver/device interface A compromised driver can maliciously modify the state of the device

5 Goals Kernel data structure integrity Good common-case performance Compatibility

6 Architecture

7 Microdriver Consist of k-driver & u-driver Microdriver runtime Communication Object tracking RPC monitor Monitor data transfer Monitor control transfer

8 Background on Microdrivers

9 Microdriver split tool - DriverSlicer Splitter Code generator Invariant inference tool – Daikon Front end Inference engine

10 Monitoring kernel data structure updates Training phace Inferring data structure integrity constraints Constancy of scalars and pointers Relationships between variables Ranges/sets of values Linked list invariants

11 Enforcement phase Enforcing data structure integrity constraints Invariant table Vault table

12 Monitoring control transfers Extracting control transfer policies Static analysis Enforcing control transfer policies Upcall Downcall

13 Conduct on four drivers RealTek RTL-8139 (8139too) RealTek RTL-8139C+ (8139cp) Ensoniq sound card (ens1371) USB interface (uhci-hcd)

14 Privilege separation

15 Ability to prevent attacks Control hijacking via injected downcalls Control hijacking via modified function pointers Non-control data attacks

16 False positives and negatives

17 Performance TCP receive and send buffer sizes of 87KB and 16KB, respectively. Copy a 140MB file into a USB disk Play a 256-Kbps MP3

18 Hardware-based isolation techniques Virtual machine-based techniques Language-based mechanisms Microkernels User-mode driver frameworks

19 Better isolate kernel data from device drivers without sacrificing performance. Compatible with commodity operating system.


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