2. 1 SNAP and SPAN Barry Smith

3. 2 http://ifomis.de Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science Faculty of Medicine University of Leipzig

4. 3 Reality

5. 4

6. 5

7. 6

8. 7 is complicated

9. 8 What is the best language to describe this complexity?

10. 9 Formal ontology formalized + domain-independent

11. 10 Formal Ontology Examples of categories: Substance, Process, Agent, Property, Relation, Location, Spatial Region Part-of, Boundary-of

12. 11 Material Ontology = regional or domain-specific e.g. GeO Examples of categories: River, Mountain, Country, Desert … Resides-In, Is-to-the-West-of

13. 12 Realist Perspectivalism There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical i.e. transparent to reality vs. Eliminativism: “Only my preferred perspective on reality is veridical”

14. 13 Need for different perspectives Double counting: 3 apples on the table 7 x 10 16 molecules at spatial locations L1, L2 and L3 Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies

15. 14 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Micro- vs. Meso- vs. Macro SNAP vs. SPAN

16. 15 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO BFO = Basic Formal Ontology

17. 16 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedO

18. 17 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeO

19. 18 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexO

20. 19 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexOMilO

21. 20 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexOMilOEcO

22. 21 AgrO PsychO

23. 22 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) SNAP vs. SPAN

24. 23 Ontological Zooming

25. 24 Ontological Zooming medicine cell biology

26. 25 Ontological Zooming both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality

27. 26 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) Time: SNAP vs. SPAN

28. 27 Ontology seeks an INVENTORY OF REALITY Relevance of ontology for information systems, e.g.: terminology standardization taxonomy standardization supports reasoning about reality

29. 28 Semantic Web Ontoweb OWL DAML+OIL … these are standardized languages only – not themselves ontologies

30. 29 Ontology research marked by ad hoc-ism

31. 30 IFOMIS Strategy get real ontology right first and then investigate ways in which this real ontology can be translated into computer- useable form later DO NOT ALLOW ISSUES OF COMPUTER- TRACTABILITY TO DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF THE ONTOLOGY IN ADVANCE

32. 31 a language to map these Formal-ontological structures in reality

33. 32 a directly depicting language ‘John’ ‘( ) is red’ Object Property Frege

34. 33 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Propositions States of affairs are pictures of

35. 34 The Oil-Painting Principle in a directly depicting language all well-formed parts of a true formula are also true A new sort of mereological inference rule – the key to the idea of a directly depicting language – presupposes that parthood is determinate

36. 35 

37. 36 A directly depicting language may contain an analogue of conjunctio n p and q _______ pp

38. 37 but it can contain no negation pp _______ pp

39. 38 and also no disjunction p or q ______ pp

40. 39 The idea of a directly depicting language suggests a new method of constituent ontology: to study a domain ontologically is to establish the parts of the domain and the interrelations between them

41. 40 Basic Formal Ontology = a formal ontological theory, expressed in a directly depicting language, of all parts of reality (a great mirror) BFO

42. 41 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years

43. 42 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years substances, things, objects PARTHOOD NOT DETERMINATE

44. 43 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years process state

45. 44 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways substance t i m e process

46. 45 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways

47. 46 A Popular Solution

48. 47 Fourdimensionalism – time is just another dimension, analogous to the three spatial dimensions – only processes exist – substances are analyzed away as worms/fibers within the four- dimensional process plenum

49. 48 Parts of processes (1) c c: boundary a a a: scattered part b b: temporal slice

50. 49 Parts of processes (2) a a: sub-process b b: phase

51. 50 There are no substances Bill Clinton does not exist Rather: there exists within the four- dimensional plenum a continuous succession of processes which are similar in Billclintonizing way

52. 51 4-Dism –>There is no change That the water boils means: Not: the water is colder at one time and hotter at another time Rather: that one phase of the boiling process is cold and another hot as one part of a colored ribbon is red and another blue

53. 52 The Parable of Little Tommy’s Christmas Present

54. 53 Eliminativism 1.a sort of adolescent rebellion 2.a product of physics envy 3.we must simplify reality for the sake of the software

55. 54 Fourdimensionalism rests on a misunderstanding of physics (both of relativity theory and of quantum mechanics) and on a misunderstanding of the status of Newtonian physics

56. 55 Confession Some of my best friends are fourdimensionalists Fourdimensionalism is right in everything it says But incomplete

57. 56 Realist Perspectivalism There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical = transparent to reality

58. 57 Need for different perspectives Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies

59. 58 Two Orthogonal, Complementary Perspectives SNAP and SPAN

60. 59 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways substance t i m e process

61. 60 Snapshot Video ontology ontology substance t i m e process

62. 61 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways

63. 62 SNAP and SPAN stocks and flows commodities and services product and process anatomy and physiology

64. 63 SNAP and SPAN the lobster and its growth the nation and its history a population and its migration the ocean and its tide(s)

65. 64 SNAP and SPAN SNAP entities - have continuous existence in time - preserve their identity through change - exist in toto if they exist at all SPAN entities - have temporal parts - unfold themselves phase by phase - exist only in their phases/stages

66. 65 SNAP vs. SPAN 1.SNAP: a SNAPshot ontology of endurants existing at a time 2.SPAN: a four-dimensionalist ontology of processes

67. 66 SNAP vs. SPAN Substances vs. their lives

68. 67 You are a substance Your life is a process You are 3-dimensional Your life is 4-dimensional

69. 68 Change Adding SNAP to the fourdimensionalist perspective makes it possible to recognize the existence of change (SNAP entities are that which endure, thus providing identity through change) SNAP ontologies provide perspective points – landmarks in the flux – from which SPAN processes can be apprehended as changes

70. 69 Substances do not have temporal parts The first 5-minute phase of my existence is not a temporal part of me It is a temporal part of that complex process which is my life

71. 70 How do you know whether an entity is SNAP or SPAN?

72. 71 Three kinds of SNAP entities 1.Substances 2.SPQR… entities 3.Spatial regions, contexts, niches, environments

73. 72 SPQR… entities States, powers, qualities, roles … Substances are independent SPQR entities are dependent on substances, they have a parasitic existence: a smile smiles only in a human face

74. 73 Other SPQR… entities: functions, dispositions, plans, shapes SPQR… entities are all dependent on substances one-place SPQR entities: temperature, color, height

75. 74 Substances and SPQR… entities Substances are the bearers or carriers of, SPQR… entities ‘inhere’ in their substances

76. 75 one-place SPQR… entities tropes, individual properties (‘abstract particulars’) a blush my knowledge of French the whiteness of this cheese the warmth of this stone

77. 76 relational SPQR… entities John Mary love stand in relations of one-sided dependence to a plurality of substances simultaneously

78. 77 Ontological Dependence Substances are that which can exist on their own SPQR… entities require a support from substances in order to exist Dependence can be specific or generic

79. 78 Generic dependence of relational SPQR… entities legal systems languages (as systems of competences) religions (as systems of beliefs)

80. 79 Ontological Dependence Substances are such that, while remaining numerically one and the same, they can admit contrary qualities at different times … I am sometimes hungry, sometimes not

81. 80 Substances can also gain and lose parts … as an organism may gain and lose molecules

82. 81 Dependence cannot exist without a thinker a thought process substance

83. 82 Spatial regions, niches, environments Organisms evolve into environments SNAP Scientific Disciplines Atomic physics Cell biology Island biogeography

84. 83 SPAN scientific disciplines Thermodynamics Wave Mechanics Physiology Also FIELD disciplines: Quantum Field Theory

85. 84 each SNAP section through reality includes everything which exists (present tense)

86. 85 each section through reality is to be conceived in presentist terms each section includes everything which exists at the corresponding now

87. 86 mereology works without restriction in every instantaneous 3-D section through reality

88. 87

89. 88 Problem of identity over time for substances What is it in virtue of which John is identical from one SNAP ontology to the next?

90. 89 Many SNAP Ontologies t1t1 t3t3 t2t2 here time exists outside the ontology, as an index or time-stamp

91. 90 SNAP ontology = a sequence of snapshots

92. 91 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies space

93. 92

94. 93

95. 94 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies

96. 95 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies

97. 96 The SPAN Ontology t i m e

98. 97 here time exists as part of the domain of the ontology The SPAN ontology

99. 98 Processes demand 4D-partonomies t i m e

100. 99 SNAP ontology many sharp boundaries SPAN ontology many smeered boundaries

101. 100 Substances Mesoscopic reality is divided at its natural joints into substances: animals, bones, rocks, potatoes

102. 101 The Ontology of Substances Substances form natural kinds (universals, species + genera)

103. 102 Processes Processes merge into one another Process kinds merge into one another … few clean joints either between instances or between types

104. 103 boundaries are mostly fiat t i m e everything is flux

105. 104 mereology works without restriction everywhere here t i m e clinical trial

106. 105 Some clean joints derive from the fact that processes are dependent on substances (my headache is cleanly demarcated from your headache)

107. 106 Some clean joints in realms of artefactual processes: weddings chess games dog shows ontology tutorials sharp divisions imputed via clocks, calendars

108. 107 Clean joints also through language = fiat demarcations Quinean gerrymandering ontologies are attractive for processes not for substances Quine: there are no substances

109. 108 SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation/segmentation for SPAN entities No change without some THING or QUALITY which changes identity-based change

110. 109 Processes, too, are dependent on substances One-place vs. relational processes One-place processes: getting warmer getting hungrier

111. 110 Examples of relational processes kissings, thumps, conversations, dances, Such relational processes join their carriers together into collectives of greater or lesser duration

112. 111 Example: the Ontology of War needs both continuants (army, battle- group, materiel, morale, readiness, battlespace …) and occurrents (manoeuvre, campaign, supply, trajectory, death …)

113. 112 t i m e invasion Battalion moves from A to B

114. 113 Processes, like substances, are concrete denizens of reality My headache, like this lump of cheese, exists here and now, and both will cease to exist at some time in the future. But they exist in time in different ways

115. 114 Each is a window on that dimension of reality which is visible through the given ontology SNAP and SPAN ontologies are partial only (Realist perspectivalism)

116. 115 SNAP: Entities existing in toto at a time

117. 116 Three kinds of SNAP entities 1.Substances 2.SPQR… entities 3.Spatial regions, Contexts, Niches

118. 117

119. 118

120. 119 SNAP

121. 120 SPAN: Entities extended in time

122. 121 SPAN: Entities extended in time

123. 122 SPAN: Entities extended in time

124. 123 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional environments “Lobsters have evolved into environments marked by cyclical patterns of temperature change” The Afghan winter The window of opportunity for an invasion of Iraq

125. 124 Relations between SNAP and SPAN SNAP-entities participate in processes they have lives, histories

126. 125 Participation x y substances x, y participate in process B time B x y SNAP-t i. time SPAN B

127. 126 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations the expression of a function the exercise of a role the execution of a plan the realization of a disposition the application of a therapy the course of a disease

128. 127 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations function role plan disposition therapy disease SNAP

129. 128 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations expression exercise execution realization application course SPAN

130. 129 instruction and operation score and performance algorith and execution

131. 130 SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation for SPAN entities

132. 131 Movement from location x ends begins movement to location y

133. 132 Creation t1 R SNAP-t 1 t2>t1 R SNAP-t 2 process P initiates a, a's birth at t2 a's life overlaps process P

134. 133 Some ontological consequences

135. 134 Granularity spatial regionsubstance parts of substances are always substances

136. 135 Granularity spatial regionsubstance parts of spatial regions are always spatial regions

137. 136 Granularity process parts of processes are always processes

138. 137 MORAL Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations

139. 138 Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations John’s life substance John physiological processes sustaining in existence

140. 139 problem cases traffic jam forest fire anthrax epidemic hurricane Maria waves shadows

141. 140 forest fire: a process a pack of monkeys jumping from tree to tree the Olympic flame: a process or a thing? anthrax spores are little monkeys

142. 141 hurricanes why do we give an entity a proper name? because it is 1) important, 2) such that we want to re-identify it when it reappears at a later time

143. 142 How do we glue these two different sorts of entities together mereologically? How do we include them both in a single inventory of reality

144. 143 How do we fit these two entities together within a single system of representations? within a directly depicting language?

145. 144 Substances and processes form two distinct orders of being Substances exist as a whole at every point in time at which they exist at all Processes unfold through time, and are never present in full at any given instant during which they exist. When do both exist to be inventoried together?

146. 145 Main problem English swings back and forth between two distinct depictions of reality … imposing both 3-D partitions (yielding substances) and 4-D partitions (yielding processes) at the same time

147. 146 Main problem There is a polymorphous ontological promiscuity of the English sentence, which is inherited also by the form ‘F(a)’ of standard predicate logic

148. 147 Against Fantology For the fantologist “(F(a)”, “R(a,b)” … is the description language for ontology The fantologist sees reality as being made up of atoms plus abstract (1- and n-place) ‘properties’ or ‘attributes’ … confuses logical form with ontological form

149. 148 Formalizing time F(a,b) at t F(a,b,t) F(a@t,b@t)

150. 149 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years

151. 150 Formalizing time F(a,b) at t – SNAP F(a,b,t) – Eternalism(?) F(a@t,b@t) – stage ontology

152. 151 Two alternative basic ontologies both of which are able to sustain a directly depicting language plus a system of meta-relations for building bridges between the two ontologies via: dependence participation initiation etc.

153. 152 Three views/partitions of the same reality

154. 153 siamese mammal cat organism substance species, genera animal instances frog

155. 154 Common nouns pekinese mammal cat organism substance animal common nouns proper names

156. 155 siamese mammal cat organism substance types animal tokens frog

157. 156 Accidents: Species and instances substance animal mammal human Irishman types tokens this individual token man

158. 157 There are universals both among substances (man, mammal) and among processes (run, movement)

159. 158 Substance universals pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists: cow man rock planet VW Golf

160. 159 Note use of ‘substance’ in the sense of ‘thing’, ‘object’ count sense of substance vs. mass sense of substance (‘milk’, ‘gold’)

161. 160 Quality universals pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists: red hot suntanned spinning Clintophobic Eurosceptic

162. 161 Qualities, too, instantiate genera and species Thus quality universals form trees

163. 162 quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24

164. 163 qualities too are distinguished as between tokens and types which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand,... and instances on the other

165. 164 Accidents: Species and instances quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24 this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)

166. 165 One plus Nine Categories (AQL) quid? substance quale? quality quantum? quantity ad quid? relation ubi? place quando? time in quo situ? status/context in quo habitu? habitus quid agit? action quid patitur? passion

167. 166 Not in a Subject Substantial In a Subject Accidental Said of a Subject Universal, General, Type Second Substances man, horse, mammal Non-substantial Universals whiteness, knowledge Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual, Token First Substances this individual man, this horse this mind, this body Individual Accidents this individual whiteness, knowledge of grammar

168. 167 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

169. 168 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

170. 169 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

171. 170 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

172. 171 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

173. 172 Refining the Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

174. 173 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants

175. 174 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Moments (Dependent) Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants

176. 175 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Processes? Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Moments? Occurrents Continuants

177. 176 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D Occurrents Continuants

178. 177 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants

179. 178 A Refined Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants

180. 179 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

181. 180 Some philosophers accept only part of the Aristotelian multi-categorial ontology

182. 181 Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b)... SubstantialAccidental Attributes F, G, R Individuals a, b, c this, that Universal Particular

183. 182 Bicategorial Nominalism SubstantialAccidental First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

184. 183 Process Metaphysics SubstantialAccidental Events Processes “Everything is flux” Universal Particular

185. 184 An adequate ontology of geography has to have three components: SNAP GeO SPAN GeO FIELD GeO

186. 185 GeO

187. 186 SNAP GeO

188. 187 SPAN GeO

189. 188 FIELD GeO

190. 189 A good formal ontology must divide into two sub-ontologies: 1. a four-dimensionalist ontology (of processes) cf. Quine 2. a modified presentist ontology cf. Brentano, Aristotle, Chisholm (takes tense seriously)

191. 190 These represent two views of the same rich and messy reality, the reality captured promiscuously by natural language sentences