1. 1 Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results Dr. David F. Von Hippel Nautilus Institute Senior Associate DPRK Energy Expert Study Group Meeting Prepared for the “DPRK Energy Expert Study Group Meeting”, Stanford University, California June 26 - 27, 2006

2. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 2 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 ESTIMATE OF DPRK MILITARY SECTOR ENERGY USE: OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION Approach to Nautilus DPRK Military Energy Use Analysis Key Assumptions for DPRK Military Energy Use: 1990/1996/2000 and 2005 Overview of Draft Results by Subsector and Fuel  Key differences from previous results Future Energy Paths, Military Sector “What if” Analysis: DPRK Fuel Sufficiency During Combat

3. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: OVERALL APPROACH Overall Approach for Military Energy Use  Estimate number of fuel-using vessels, vehicles, aircraft, armaments from non- classified sources  Estimate hours of use for classes of equipment  Use characteristics of equipment to estimate fuel use for equipment population in each year

4. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS Number of vessels, aircraft, armaments assumed in use for the DPRK military in 2000 and 2005 similar to 1996, 1990 levels  Except additions of some naval vessels pre-2000  Ground forces in 2005 assumed ~950,000 troops Ground forces activity in 2000/2005 13-20% lower than estimated 1990 levels  Due to shortage of fuel, parts Aircraft flight hours per year 50-60% of estimated 1990 levels by 2000/2005

5. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS Naval force activity at 75% of estimated 1990 levels for 1996 through 2005 for vessels in routine use Military manufacturing assumed the same in 2000/2005 as in 1996 (80% of estimated 1990 levels)

6. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

7. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

8. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS Coal and Oil use in buildings and for other (non- vehicle/vessel/aircraft) use similar to 1990 Electricity use falls to 50% of 1990 levels in 1996, 2000, rising slightly again by 2005

9. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS Military Sector Assumptions (continued)

10. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 10 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND As of 2000, Military accounted for ~8% of total DPRK energy demand, but ~37% of oil products demand (~27% if KEDO oil used for electricity production was included) Estimated Military fraction of DPRK gasoline and diesel use is much higher (more than 50%)—most in dual-use vehicles

11. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND

12. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group D. Von Hippel 6/2006 SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND

13. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 13 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 MILITARY FUEL USE UNDER DIFFERENT FUTURE “PATHS” In ~Sept. 2002, discussions of Military downsizing in DPRK Projected reduction in military energy use, activity in Redevelopment case versus “Recent Trends” case

14. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 14 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 Based on our estimates of fuel use during routine exercises, fuel use by the DPRK military for 30 days of full-time combat would be about 130,000 tonnes  Assumes 50% of ground force equipment inoperable by the end of 30 days  Ground forces are moving (engines of vehicles and armaments running) about half the time  Aircraft cease operations in 24 hours  90% of naval forces cease operation in 5 days ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT

15. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 15 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 At 2000 fuel import/production rates, would take 3 months to restock military fuels, or ~1.5 months if refineries operate at 100% capacity (and if all supplies diverted to military) Even at equipment levels present after 30 days, 180% of import/production would be needed to sustain combat (90% if refineries operate at full capacity) Assumes fuel supply lines are not disrupted, therefore an estimate of maximum capability ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT

16. DPRK Energy Expert Study Group 16 D. Von Hippel 6/2006 THANK YOU!