1. Today’s Lecture One more thing about your first assignment Gaunilo Anselm Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments

2. One more thing about your first assignment I need your first assignments back. It won’t take long, but I forgot to do something with them. I’m afraid that I won’t be able to return your second assignment until I see your first assignment. Sorry about the inconvenience.

3. A second possible argument in the reading Some questions that fall out this discussion: (1) Should we grant that it is possible that God does exist? What if the concept of God is incoherent? (2) What if we deny that God exists based on, say, the problem of evil? Wouldn’t that entail, given the form of this argument that it isn’t possible that God exists?

4. A second possible argument in the reading A classic response to Anselm’s arguments, derived from Kant, is to deny that existence is a predicate (or a property) (see FP, pp.22- 23). If existence is not a property, then it is not something which that-than-which-a-greater- cannot-be-thought possesses as a maximal property. Is existence a property?

5. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 1 Note that “Paragraph 1” is a nice summary of Anselm’s argument (FP, p.26). Each of the subsequent paragraphs is directed towards the summary Gaunilo has provided in Paragraph 1. (If you get lost in Gaunilo’s arguments, make sure to look back at the summary.)

6. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 2 1. Gaunilo points out that it can’t be the case that that than which nothing greater can be conceived, when spoken or heard of, cannot conceivably not exist. After all, the very audience to whom this argument is directed are unbelievers (i.e. “[t]o one doubting whether there is, or denying that there is” [FP, p. 26]). Since they are unbelievers, they do not admit that such a being, anymore than God, must exist (FP, p.26).

7. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 2 2. Anselm, argues Gaunilo, threatens to confuse existence in the mind and existence in reality in at least two ways. (i) Anselm seems to think that to even consider an idea is to have that object exist in the mind, which is properly regarded as some kind of state of being. But this would have us hold that certain unreal things have a state of being if I understand the idea of them (FP, p.26), which is absurd. (ii) Anselm seems to think that our idea of God is such that by understanding it (by forming a belief about it in my mind) I must acknowledge that it exists. This threatens to confuse the distinction between belief (e.g believing that something exists), and reality (e.g. it actually exists) (FP, pp.26-27).

8. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 4 Can we truly say that, upon hearing of this being (i.e. “that which is greater than all those others that are able to be thought of” [FP, p.27]), that it exists in our understanding? Consider the case of understanding God, which is supposed to be that than which nothing greater can be conceived. God’s nature and existence are so far beyond anything with which we are familiar that there is no comparison with what we do understand. Without such a comparison, we have nothing with which to conjecture about either God’s nature or His existence. Thus, it cannot be said that we understand either His nature or His existence. What’s more, this allows us to conceive of His non-existence (FP, p.27).

9. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 5 Anselm, argues Gaunilo, seems to forget to whom he is writing when he moves from talking of a belief about that- than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived to an existential claim about It existing in reality to avoid the absurdity of there being that than which nothing greater can be conceived (albeit just in thought) and something greater (that which exists as an object of thought and an object in reality). After all, argues Gaunilo, the audience for Anselm’s tract will not yet grant that it really exists, or that it exists in the understanding as anything more than a vague string of words with associated devotional or spiritual practices (FP, p.28).

10. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 5 (Perhaps) in other words, they lack the commitment to a belief in God to be moved by the alleged absurdity that Anselm attempts to trap them in (FP, p.28). “How then can it be proved to me on that basis that that which is greater than everything truly exists in reality (because it is evident that it is greater than all others) if I keep on denying and also doubting that this is evident and do not admit that this great [than everything] is either in my mind or though, not even in the sense in which many doubtfully real and unreal things are?” (FP, p.28).

11. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 6 Given that we can so easily imagine objects existing which we nonetheless doubt exist, we need more grounds than that we can imagine (albeit badly) that than which nothing greater can be conceived existing, before we can justifiably believe It does. Consider the belief in “the ‘Lost Island’” (FP, p.28).

12. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 6 This is an island “that... is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance... and having no owner or inhabitant, it is superior everywhere in abundance of riches to all those other islands that men inhabit” (FP, p.28). Gaunilo suggests that this island may be characterized as an “island that is more excellent than all other lands” (FP, p.28). But it is no more convincing to argue that we are committed to its existence on these grounds (in order, that is, to avoid the absurdity of such an island in thought being of a lesser kind than an analogous island existent in both thought and reality) than it is to argue the same for That than which nothing greater can be conceived (FP, p.28).

13. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 6 1. We can understand the idea that there is an island more excellent than all other lands. 2. It is more excellent to exist in reality and the understanding than in the understanding alone. 3. Suppose this most excellent island does exist in the understanding alone. 4. Then, any island that exists in reality would be more excellent than the most excellent island. 5. But 4 contains a contradiction 6. Thus, the most excellent island must exist.

14. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 6 7. This argument (2-6) does not prove the existence of a most excellent island. 8. The ontological argument for the existence of God shares the same form as this argument (2-6). 9. Therefore, the ontological argument does not prove the existence of God (FP, p.28).

15. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 7 1. Suppose we can form some idea of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. This does not commit us to holding that this object cannot but exist. After all, we weren’t talking of that which, among those objects which exist, is the greatest, but only of those objects which we might imagine exist (FP, p.28).

16. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 7 2. Gaunilo points out that (i) what we cannot conceive of not existing does not necessarily exist, and (ii) even if we cannot conceive of God as not existing, this is not clearly a unique characteristic of God. Re (i): Consider our own existence. As I think of my existence I cannot imagine not existing. But it does not follow from this that I necessarily exist. Therefore, even though I cannot imagine God not existing, it does not follow from this that He necessarily exists (FP, p.29).

17. Some of Gaunilo’s responses: Paragraph 7 Re (ii): I do not know that I can’t imagine myself not existing while I am absolutely certain that I do exist. But if it is true that I can’t, and it may be true, then God is not the only being that cannot be thought not to exist. This means that this is not a distinguishing characteristic of God. This means it is not a characteristic that sets Him apart from all other things or objects or beings that can be conceived (FP, p.29).

18. Some of Anselm’s replies: The intro Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo contains a great deal of repetition, both of new material and material from his original tract. Consequently, I’ll only highlight some points or arguments of interest. Importantly, Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo purposefully limits the scope of discussion to those who already believe in the Christian God (FP, p.29). Is this an innocent move? Is Anselm conceding Gaunilo’s point that his Ontological Argument does not work against agnostics and atheists?

19. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 1 (Argument 1) Note, as an addendum to the previous slide, that Anselm contends that (1) Gaunilo’s response that that-than-which-a-greater- cannot-be-thought does not exist in the mind or thought is not true. (2) If it were true, then it must be the case either that God is not that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought or God does not exist in the mind or thought. (3) The former consequence is, by implication, absurd. (4) The latter consequence is falsified by the presence of a belief in God in the mind of Gaunilo and other believers (FP, p.29).

20. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 1 (Argument 3 [I’ll skip Argument 2]) (1) No one who doubts or denies that ‘that-than-which-a- greater-cannot-be-thought’ exists denies that IF it did exist, it would not be capable of not existing in reality or the mind. (2) After all, to deny that if it did exist, it would not be capable of not existing would be to deny that it was ‘that- than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought’, which is contradictory. (3) Whatever can be thought of as existing and does not actually exist, could, even when it actually exists, not have existed either in reality or in the mind.

21. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 1 (4) Consequently, if ‘that-than-which-a- greater-cannot-be-thought’ can be thought of, it cannot not exist (i.e. it necessarily exists) in reality and the mind (FP, pp.29- 30).

22. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 1 (Argument 4) (1) Now suppose that ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be- thought’ does not exist, even though we can think of it. (2) Whatever can be thought and does not actually exist would not be ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought’ when it did actually exist. (3) Given (1) and (2), if ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot- be-thought’ exists in actuality it would not be that-than- which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. (4) But this is contradictory. (5) It is false that ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be- thought’ does not exist, even though we can think of it (FP, p.30).

23. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 3 In Reply 3 Anselm seems to suggest to Gaunilo that God alone is the proper subject of his argument form. Thus he writes that if Gaunilo could “discover for me something existing either in reality or in the mind alone... to which the logic of my argument would apply, then I shall find that Lost Island and give it, never more to be lost, to that person” (FP, p.31).

24. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 4 Here Anselm replies to Gaunilo’s argument against using inconceivability of existence as a ground for ascribing necessary existence. Anselm contends that though we cannot understand ourselves not to exist within contexts in which we know we exist, we can nevertheless think of ourselves as not existing. Whereas with God, contends Anselm, we can neither understand that He does not exist nor think of Him as not existing. Accordingly, God is relevantly different than those objects that, when we know they exist, cannot be understood not to exist (FP, pp.31-32).

25. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 7 In this reply, Anselm contends that there is an important difference between the idea of God and ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought’. Though an agnostic or atheist might deny that God exists, as they do not understand God, they cannot deny the existence of ‘that-than-which-a-greater- cannot-be-thought’ based on what understanding they have of it (no matter how little their understanding of it is) (FP, pp.33-34).

26. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 8 In this reply Anselm responds to Gaunilo’s contention that ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot- be-thought’ is beyond comprehension, because the referent of such an idea is beyond anything we can observe or imagine (as imagination is, in an important sense, based on experience). Anselm contends that we can build an understanding of this idea cumulatively from adding perfections to objects within the scope of our experience or imagination until we get to something approximating that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be- thought (FP, p.34).

27. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 8 “Who, for example, cannot think of this (even if he does not believe that what he thinks of actually exists) namely, that if something that has a beginning and end is good, that which, although it has had a beginning, does not, however, have an end, is much better? And just as this latter is better than the former, so also that which has neither beginning nor end is better again than this, even if it passes always from past through the present to the future. Again, whether something of this kind actually exists or not, that which does not lack anything at all, nor is forced to change or move, is very much better still. Cannot this be thought? Or can we think of something greater than this?” (FP, p.34).

28. Some of Anselm’s replies: Reply 8 This is an important point as it leads into Reply 9 which contends that even a little understanding of that-than-which-a-greater- cannot-be-thought is enough, according to Anselm, for his original argument to work (FP, pp.34-35). So, are you now convinced?

29. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments There are four arguments for the existence of God traditionally discussed in literature: (1) Ontological Arguments, (2) Cosmological Arguments, (3) Teleological Arguments and (4) Moral Arguments. Each of these arguments is taken to meet the conditions laid down by Strong Rationalism (e.g. if we are to properly adopt a given belief-system it must be shown to be true in a way that is convincing to any reasonable person).

30. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments As you have seen the Ontological Argument is a conceptual argument that moves from the very idea of a maximally perfect being to Its necessary existence. Many philosophers, religious or not, have the sense that they are being tricked in arguments of this type. Not many philosophers would contend that this type of argument ends the debate on either the existence of God or the rationality of the belief that God exists.

31. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments As with the Ontological Arguments, Cosmological Arguments purport to provide demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence.

32. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments Cosmological Arguments are importantly different from Ontological Arguments in two respects. (1) They move from some very general features of the universe to the necessary existence of a Prime Mover, Creator, or Necessary Ground of Being. They are not, in contrast to Ontological Arguments, a priori arguments. (2) They do not yield any more of a description of what such an entity is than that it is a Prime Mover or Creator. So unlike the Ontological Argument, the Cosmological Argument does not pretend to be an argument for theism per se.

33. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments The following is a typical Cosmological Argument. (1) The universe is a series of contingent events, processes or objects (broadly construed). (2) The universe is itself in some sense contingent. (3) If it is contingent, it could have not existed. (4) There must then be a reason or explanation for its existence. Step 4 arises from the Principle of Sufficient Reason: That for any fact of the matter there is some sufficient reason for it, or there is something that makes it a fact of the matter or is an explanation of its existence.

34. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments (5) If this reason was to be found in itself, it would be a self- existent, necessarily existing, thing. (6) But this is false. (7) So the reason for its existence must be outside of the universe. (8) The reason for the universe’s existence must itself either necessarily exist or depend on something else that necessarily exists, or, alternatively, depends itself on something that necessarily exists.

35. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments (9) Such a chain of explanatory causes cannot go on to infinity. (10) Therefore, there must be an ultimate cause which is itself a necessary existent and explains the existence of everything else.

36. Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments Several problems plague this kind of argument. (i) Though the Principle of Sufficient Reason is an important methodological principle, it may actually be false. (ii) The argument treats the universe as if it is a thing, rather than short hand for a perhaps infinite, number of things. (iii) There is no compelling reason to think that a causal chain of succeeding events in this universe could not go backwards infinitely (i.e. not have a beginning).