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Heuristic Strategy and Incentives in Distribution Networks of Competitive Agents STIET Fall Workshop, 2003 Presenter: Thede Loder.

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Presentation on theme: "Heuristic Strategy and Incentives in Distribution Networks of Competitive Agents STIET Fall Workshop, 2003 Presenter: Thede Loder."— Presentation transcript:

1 Heuristic Strategy and Incentives in Distribution Networks of Competitive Agents STIET Fall Workshop, 2003 Presenter: Thede Loder

2 The Problem Agents (peers) provide or receive services Goal is to acquire valuable objects (assets) Agents have varying taste in assets Agent resources are constrained Free for all environment: –No contracts, no numeraire, no centralized or trusted entities Decision problem: what services, to which agents, and when?

3 Asset Exchange as a Game Roles: Provider and Initiator Game: iterative, half-step Prisoner’s Dilemma Agent controlled finite horizon (either agent may leave game at any time) Provider takes risk: initiator can get payoff and leave Nash Equilibrium: provide nothing

4 Heueristic Insight: Axelrod and the Evolution of Cooperation Context: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tit for Tat (with bluffing): –“exploitive cooperation”, but still cooperation Key insight: cooperation requires expectation of future interaction Bottom line: –No identity  No trust  No cooperation

5 Solution Reputation System –Add Identity (cheap by strong) –Add History (agent gets “memory”) Determine reputation by direct and shared experience Make sticky with incentives: differentiated service

6 Credibility Ratings Simple online learning Use relationship history (actions, outcomes) and value weights Two ratings: –Desirability, influences proactive actions –Credibility, influences reactive actions Ratings effect actuator operation: –Prioritized service queues –introductions and referrals –proactive connection initiation (for network clustering)

7 A Candidate Function Properties (Axelrod): –Nice, provokable, forgiving Credibility C for an agent is function of: –Net Exchange Volume V n = events * value/event –Correction Factor f(b), function of flow bias b (relative direction of flow) C = V n * f(b) 100% out 100% in symmetric f(b) flow bias

8 Progress and Next Steps Progress: –Simulator kernel completed –Dummy Agent completed Next Steps: –Parameterize Strategy –Develop ‘smart’ agent code –Run evolutionary search trials


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