1. Adoption of SSG-25 “Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants” for Research Reactors Group 2 Mr. Niyazi Novruzov (AZB), Mr. Philip Speransky (BYE), Mr. Nuno Barradas (POR), Mr. Miguel Ferro (POR), Ms. Teresa Pena (POR), Mr. Vladimir Bondar (RUS), Mr. Borut Smodis (SLO), Ms. Nikolic Dragana (SRB), Mr. Oleksii Diakov (UKR)

2. Safety factor 5: Deterministic safety analysis Scope and tasks 5.54 accident management program probably should be implemented using graded approach in dependence of power of RR tipe. Methodology 5.60 It should be more profitable to use beyond design basis condition instead of design extension conditions or new terminology should be clarified for the case of RR.

3. Safety factor 6: Probabilistic safety assessment It could be only complimentary but not requirement because of luck of statistical data for RR.

4. Safety factor 7: Hazard analysis Scope and tasks 5.77 (internal hazards list) – List of hazards is not applicable to RR (steam release, loss or low capacity of air conditioning) directly and should be reviewed and harmonized in accordance with Appendix “Selected Postulated Initiating Events for Research Reactors” to NS-R-4 “Safety of Research Reactors”. 5.77 (internal hazards list), 5.78 (external hazards list) – It should be profitable to analyze additional external and internal hazards such as program or electronic harm made by mistake (USB virus, programs with dangerous architecture).

5. Safety factor 8: Safety performance Scope and tasks 5.86 The review of safety performance should evaluate whether the plant has in place appropriate processes for the routine recording and evaluation of safety related operating experience, including: …. – Graded approach should be used during applying this list in practice. Probably it is possible to add a link to IAEA’s Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors (IRSRR) in this chater.

6. Safety factor 8: Safety performance Scope and tasks 5.91. Data on the generation of radioactive waste should be reviewed to determine whether operation of the plant is being optimized to minimize the quantities of waste being generated and accumulated, taking into account the national policy on radioactive discharges and international treaties, standards and criteria, etc. – It is a point of low relevance for RR.

7. Safety factor 8: Safety performance Methodology 5.92 Where available, the review should utilize a set of safety performance indicators, which should cover in a systematic manner all aspects of operation important to safety. – The strong obligation “should cover in a systematic manner” is not applicable in this case for RR. There is a question of discussion for applying this item for RR using graded approach.

8. Safety factor 8: Safety performance Methodology 5.97 Reference [2] establishes the requirements for a radiation protection programme, including requirements on the assessment of occupational exposure and on the management of radioactive waste and effluents arising from the operation of a nuclear power plant. References [29, 30] provide relevant recommendations and further guidance. These IAEA safety standards should be 38considered when reviewing records relating to radiation doses, the generation of radioactive waste and the discharge of radioactive effluents. – Here and along the document the references should be changed for appropriate for RR. For example ref. 2 is INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/2, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

9. Safety factor 8: Safety performance Methodology 5.98 The PSR should include a review of the effectiveness of the operating organization’s process for the routine evaluation of operating experience. However, where a common process is applied by the operating organization at several plants, and this process has been reviewed by a recent PSR at another plant, this element of the review could be confined to reviewing how the process is applied at the plant under review (see para. 4.3 for further details). Reference [31] provides detailed recommendations on reviewing the effectiveness of the process for the feedback of operating experience. – It is appropriate to leave only the first and the last sentence from this item because the rest of paragraph is not applicable for RR.

10. Safety factor 9: Use of experience from other plants and research findings Safety factor 9 section cant be applied directly to RR because there is no official system of experience collection and the difference between the RR (even typical project of RR are differ from each other). IAEA’s Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors (IRSRR) database could be implemented to this chapter, but there still a lack of information in comparison with NNPs. It is not possible to collect and analyse this information in a systematic and formalised manner. Regarding the graded approach and taking in to account the difference between RR official experience collection system is not applicable to RR.

11. Safety factor 9: Use of experience from other plants and research findings Methodology 5.103 Experience from other nuclear power plants, and sometimes from non-nuclear facilities, together with research findings, can reveal previously unknown safety weaknesses or can help in solving existing problems. Reference [2] requires the operating organization to obtain and evaluate information on operating experience at other plants and to derive lessons for its own operations. This should include information from other plants for which the 39 operating organization is responsible and wider experience in the State and in other States, including relevant information from non-nuclear facilities. – It is appropriate to exclude the second sentence of paragraph as soon as it is not applicable for RR. In the third sentence the collocation “This should include” is better to change to “This could include”.

12. Safety factor 5: Deterministic safety analysis Proposal The methodology of prescribing of RRs core characteristics through the operational limits and conditions in license condition should be implemented to this chapter. It is connected with unavailability to make request to RB each time passing the procedure of safety analysis report and independent safety assessment.

13. Thank You for Your Attention!

14. Safety Factors interfaces Group 2 Mr. Niyazi Novruzov (AZB), Mr. Philip Speransky (BYE), Mr. Nuno Barradas (POR), Mr. Miguel Ferro (POR), Ms. Teresa Pena (POR), Mr. Vladimir Bondar (RUS), Mr. Borut Smodis (SLO), Ms. Nikolic Dragana (SRB), Mr. Oleksii Diakov (UKR)

15. Task 3 Additions to the list of SF (Safety Factors) SF15 is “utilisation and safety of experiments” – Analysis of interface of the new SF with the one presented in Appendix I “INTERFACES BETWEEN SAFETY FACTORS” of SSG-25 “Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants”.

16. Total pairing of new SF with an old ones SF1SF2SF3 SF4SF5SF6SF7SF8SF9SF10SF11SF12SF13SF14SF15 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx SF14 x SF13 x SF12 x SF11 x SF10 x SF9 x SF8 x SF7 x SF6 x SF5 x SF4 x SF3 x SF2 x SF1 x

17. Analytics The presence of interfaces of new safety factor with all of the existing ones shows that it could be obtained by the internal group operations and doesn’t has an independent properties. That means that this SF is the element which is already presented in the group.

18. Analytics All participants of the group came to the opinion that the definition of the new SF has a very high level. In such hierarchy the definition “utilisation and safety of experiments” includs Actual condition of SSCs important to safety, Human factors, Deterministic safety analysis and others.

19. Proposals The participant agreed that it should be very profitable for all IAEA RR Safety Standards users to include in Safety Standards the definition of the term experiment.

20. Task 4 Proposal Republic of Belarus – The Decree of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Belarus №72 issued on December 30, 2006 “On approval of normative legal acts in the field of nuclear safety” together with the “Rules on the safety of research nuclear installations” needs to be reviewed for improvement in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors statements from the point of view of periodic safety assessment, human factors and extended shutdown requirements enhance.

21. Cooperation Experience of cooperation: – Research Reactor Coalition of Commonwealth of Independent States Has a meeting in July of 2015 – Europe Region Advisory Safety Commeety Has a meeting in June 2015

22. Thank You for Your Attention!