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ESCG\L. D. Hill AMS-02 Permanent Magnet Safety Impact 1 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill General Safety Approach Building on Existing AMS-02 Safety Analysis and documentation Following Order of Precedence of Hazard Control in New Hazard Analysis Remove Hazards Eliminated by design change. Establish if New Hazards Created Examine Rationale for Design for Minimizing Risk New and altered DFMR Examine Active/Automatic Control Methodologies for Hazards for Impact Examine use of Procedural Controls/Warnings 2AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill General Safety Approach Update to Hazards Review Validity of Existing Causes Look for New/Changed Causes Review Validity of Existing Controls Look for New/Changed Controls Review Validity of Existing Verifications Look for New/Changed Verifications AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 20103
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F01 – Structures New/Changed Structures and Loading Conditions Control 1.1 may require update VC becomes Vented Structure Control 1.5 may require update New Materials New Composite Structural Elements Control 10.1 may need updating to reflect protection methodology of new carbon fiber planes/containment Plane 1N to use heaters in conjunction with composite structures. Add Control 1.7 for heater control methodology. 4AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F01 (cont) New Fasteners/Heritage Fasteners Control 4.1 may require update (Quality) Control 5.1 may require update (Backoff) No Welding of Structures with PM Change Controls of Cause 6 (Welding) to address heritage welded structure of permanent Magnet Removal of Non-linear Straps Remove Control 1.2 Remove Cause 8 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 20105
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F02 – Offgassing No changes made to DDRS-02 in Orbiter DDRS ISS will be documented separated from AMS-02 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 20106
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F03 – Cryogenic System Cryomagnet System Removed Withdraw Hazard Report AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 20107
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F04 – Over P Payload Bay Super Fluid Helium Tank Removed Remove Cause 1 Remove Cause 2 Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed Remove Cause 3 TTCS fill quantity may change Control 5.1 will require modification to reflect change. TTCS will have new components and unwelded connections. Cryocoolers and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed Remove Control 5.2, 5.6 Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) Loop Heat Pipe Removed Remove Control 5.5 Alterations in Blanket/MLI Usage Reopen review of applications for blockage issues. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 20108
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F05 – Pressurized Systems Warm Helium Gas Supply Removed Remove Control 1.3, 5.2, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2 Update Control 10.1 to remove Warm Helium Gas Supply Cryocoolers/Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed Remove Control 1.10, 1.11, 5.8, 8.8, 8.9 CAB Heat Pipe/ Loop Heat Pipe Removed Update Control 1.8, 8.6 to delete CAB HP. Remove Control 1.9, 5.7, 8.7 TTCS Modified Update Control 1.4, 5.3, 8.4, 8.11 for fill quantity change and any impact to MDP New loop and components, non-welded connections to be used. 9AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F06 – Thrust/Overturning Moments All Cryosystem Sources Removed Remove Control 1.1, 1.3, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 Update 2.1 for removal of cryosystem vents Update 2.3 for the removal of Warm Helium Supply and it’s fill caps Remove Cause 5, Sloshing of Superfluid Helium All Warm Helium Sources Removed Remove Source of Thrust Potential Magnetic Field has new characteristics Update Control 4.1 to reflect lower magnetic field intensity and its resulting torque difference. Magnetic Field can not be shut off Control 4.2 needs to be changed to address compatibility of AMS-02 PM field with the Orbiter, SRMS and SSRMS Magnetic Field is no longer variable Remove Control 4.3 (Quench) 10AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying Substantial rewrite of Controls 1.1 reflect Permanent Magnet design. Control 1.2,review to confirm TIA-310 valid as it envelopes the reduced magnetic field. Sub. rewrite of Control 1.3 to reflect Permanent Magnet does not interfere with Robotic Operations on ISS, Remove required to dissipate field Control 1.11. 11AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F07 – Radiated Fields, EMI, Magnetic (Cont) Magnetic Field is less strong, nonvarying (Cont) Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address compatibility with Orbiter Operations. Remove Control 1.5,1.7, 1.8, 1.9 addressing charging/discharging controls Sub. rewrite of Control 1.4 to address EVA compatibility of new field Remove Cause 3 for charging/discharging effects of magnetic fields on other systems/structures EMI sources from CAB will have to be accounted for in EMI testing results. 12AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Report AMS-02-F08 – Electric Shock/Discharge Remove CAB/Cryocoolers Revise Control 2.7 to remove Cryocoolers and CAB heaters Removed Uninterruptible Power Supply Remove Control 1.2 New Structure Inside open VC Revisit Bonding Implementation in Control 2.2 No Helium Source Revise Control 4.1 to remove helium as a released neutrally charged gas AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 201013
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F10 – Flammable Materials Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipe Removed Remove Control 2.3 to reflect removal of propylene CAB Heat Pipe/Loop Heat Pipe Removed Remove Control 2.4 AMS-02 requires no Power on for Ascent Update Control 3.1 to reflect no power during ascent 14AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F11 – Mechanism Failure No Mechanisms Add, Removed or Altered No changes to Causes or Control required 15AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F12 – Mate/Demate of Connectors Remove UPS Remove Control 1.4 EVA Connector Swap to allow for magnet charging after power loss no longer required Still a viable opportunity for the AMS-02 as a contingency EVA action, Control 1.1 must be rewritten to accurately reflect the new configuration. 16AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F13 – Battery Failure UPS Removed Withdraw hazard report 17AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Report AMS-02-F14 – EVA Operations Hazard New Hardware Review of new hardware/modified hardware for possible sharp edges/ corners/ entrapment Potential impact to Control 3.1 New Heaters Need to review for EVA accessibility/thermal control Potential impact to Control 4.2 Cryogenic System Removed Control 4.3 rewritten to remove references to extreme cold impingement potential Fixed Magnetic Field Control 8.2 updated to new field strength (entrapment of crew) 18AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Report AMS-02-F16 – Shatterable Material Release New Tracker Planes Added New Tracker enclosure Plane New Design of Tracker planes and replacement plane for plane number 1 must be designed and build in the spirit of Control 1.6 and Control 1.6 updated to reflect details of implementation and new verifications. 19AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F17 – EPDS Damage UPS Removed Remove Control 2.2 20AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F18 – Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfig. Cryomagnet replaced with Fixed Magnet that can not be switched on and off. Control 2.2 rewritten to reflect the lower intensity and lack of charging/discharging Removal of Cryosystem, Opening of VC Control 3.2 Revised to remove VC and Helium tank from Control parenthetical note 21AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports AMS-02-F20 – Lasers Removal of Plane Number 1 LBBXs Half of LFCR outputs will no longer be utilized, ports will be blocked. Update Control 1.1 to clarify use of laser output Update Control 1.1 or add Control 2.7 to address use of blocking connectors to close off unused laser ports. Update Control 2.6 to remove reference to “top” tracker plane (Plane number 1.) Possible reconfiguration of thermal blankets Control 2.6 references that the fiber optics are routed exclusively under MLI/blankets. In reconfiguration of AMS- 02 Thermal Management, all blankets may not required and installed. 22AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Hazard Reports STD-AMS-02-F02 – 1230 DDRS-02 No Changes 23AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Verifications Previous pages did not highlight verifications that have already been identified as potentially being impacted by this redesign. Verifications that are no longer relevant Verifications that have to be reexamined for applicability Verifications that must be reopened and closured activities redone New Verifications The plan is to review all Verifications that move forward in the safety process to confirm their status. A new SVTL will be developed in conjunction with a new Verification Tracking Tool. AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 201024
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ESCG\L. D. Hill Safety Review All updated safety documentation will be processed through the Payload Safety Review Panel in accordance with NSTS/ISS 13830. DDRS ISS will be processed separately through the applicable safety processes AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 201025
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