2. (I) The Minimal Group Paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971)

3. 1. Social Categorization Phase Participants viewed a series of paintings by two artists (Kandinsky and Klee). They were then provided with a code number and randomly assigned to one of two groups, ostensibly on the basis of their artistic preference.

4. 2. Reward Distribution Phase Participants were asked to distribute small sums of money between pairs of recipients using specially constructed reward matrices (the amount of money distributed is the DV). The recipients were only identified by their code number and group membership. This kept the group members anonymous

5. Example of a Matrix for Distributing Money Number 07 of your group receives... 78910111213141516171819 Number 52 of the other group receives... 135791113151719212325

6. Manipulation of the IV Tajfel et al. created different matrices to address three different variables:  Maximum Joint Profit (MJP) – here the boys could give the largest reward to members of both groups  Maximum In-group Profit (MIP) – where the boys could choose the largest reward for the member of their own group irrespective of the reward provided to the other group  Maximum Difference – here the participants could choose the largest possible difference in reward between member of the different groups (in favour of the in-group). These different variables were then pitted against each other.

7. Results 1. In general, participants were fair, but … 2. There was a significant tendency to give more money to in-group members than to out-group members (i.e., in-group favouritism). 3. In-group favouritism occurred even when it meant giving in-group members less than the maximum amount of money (i.e., in-group bias).