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Ostpolitik Brandt gains support from the US and other NATO allies for Ostpolitik by reassuring them that: Brandt gains support from the US and other NATO allies for Ostpolitik by reassuring them that: The FRG did not intend to quit NATO or the EC The FRG did not intend to quit NATO or the EC 1970-1972: five treaties negotiated 1970-1972: five treaties negotiated
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Ostpolitik
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Willy Brandt (left) and Willi Stoph in Erfurt 1970, the first encounter of a Federal Chancellor with his East German counterpart
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1) The Moscow Treaty 1970 The USSR and the FRG declared they had no territorial claims against any other state The USSR and the FRG declared they had no territorial claims against any other state Committed itself to recognizing post-1945 frontiers Committed itself to recognizing post-1945 frontiers Did not officially recognize the GDR but did agree to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine Did not officially recognize the GDR but did agree to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine USSR concedes to preliminary elements towards German reunification USSR concedes to preliminary elements towards German reunification
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The Warsaw & Prague Treaties 2) Warsaw Treaty (Dec. 1970): Neither FRG or Poland have territorial demands on the other 2) Warsaw Treaty (Dec. 1970): Neither FRG or Poland have territorial demands on the other Oder-Neisse Line was “inviolable” (not to be attacked) Oder-Neisse Line was “inviolable” (not to be attacked) Trade and financial assistance from the FRG would be increased Trade and financial assistance from the FRG would be increased 3) Prague Treaty (June 1973): similar to Warsaw Treaty Czechoslovakia 3) Prague Treaty (June 1973): similar to Warsaw Treaty Czechoslovakia Specifically revoked Munich Agreement ‘38 Specifically revoked Munich Agreement ‘38
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4) Four Power Treaty on Berlin March 1970: USSR reluctant to annoy Nixon (Soviets mindful of China); made them more responsive to Western demands March 1970: USSR reluctant to annoy Nixon (Soviets mindful of China); made them more responsive to Western demands Signed September 1971: USSR Signed September 1971: USSR A. unimpeded traffic between FRG and West Berlin A. unimpeded traffic between FRG and West Berlin B. recognition of West Berlin’s ties to WG B. recognition of West Berlin’s ties to WG C. right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin C. right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin
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4) Four Power Treaty on Berlin (cont’d) West West That the Western sectors of Berlin were not legally part of the FRG (even though they had been in practice since 1950) That the Western sectors of Berlin were not legally part of the FRG (even though they had been in practice since 1950)
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The Four Power Treaty meeting
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5) The Basic Treaty (Dec. 1972) Moscow Treaty and agreement on Berlin paved the way for direct negotiations between the GDR and FRG Moscow Treaty and agreement on Berlin paved the way for direct negotiations between the GDR and FRG FRG recognized the GDR as an equal and sovereign state & accepted that both should be represented in the UN FRG recognized the GDR as an equal and sovereign state & accepted that both should be represented in the UN FRG stressed its determination to work towards peaceful German reunification FRG stressed its determination to work towards peaceful German reunification
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Press conference on signing day of the Basic Treaty
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The Helsinki Accord Soviets wanted: Soviets wanted: Permanent recognition of the territorial and political division of Europe made at Yalta Permanent recognition of the territorial and political division of Europe made at Yalta Increased economic, scientific, and technical cooperation to assist in modernization Increased economic, scientific, and technical cooperation to assist in modernization
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The Helsinki Accord (cont’d) US: US: Had consented to the conference in exchange for Berlin agreement and troop reductions Had consented to the conference in exchange for Berlin agreement and troop reductions US wanted to extract human rights concessions from the USSR weaken its grip on Eastern Europe US wanted to extract human rights concessions from the USSR weaken its grip on Eastern Europe
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President Ford meets with General Secretary Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy. August 2, 1975. President Ford meets with General Secretary Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy. August 2, 1975.
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The Helsinki Accord (cont’d) Helsinki Agreement: August 1, 1975 Helsinki Agreement: August 1, 1975 In return for the recognition of Europe’s post-war frontiers, the USSR agreed to sign a guarantee of human rights & political freedom In return for the recognition of Europe’s post-war frontiers, the USSR agreed to sign a guarantee of human rights & political freedom Marked the high-point of détente Marked the high-point of détente Divided into 3 sections (or “baskets”) Divided into 3 sections (or “baskets”)
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The Helsinki Final Act was signed at Finlandia Hall.
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Helsinki Accords
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The Helsinki Accord (cont’d) 1) Questions relating to security in Europe 1) Questions relating to security in Europe Peaceful settlement of disputes, non- interference in internal affairs of other states, “inviolability” of frontiers Peaceful settlement of disputes, non- interference in internal affairs of other states, “inviolability” of frontiers 2) Cooperation in the field of economics, science, technology, and the environment 2) Cooperation in the field of economics, science, technology, and the environment 3) Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields 3) Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields Expanding trade, tourism, and cultural contacts between blocs Expanding trade, tourism, and cultural contacts between blocs
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The Two German leaders talking to each other during the Helsinki Conference, 30 July 1975. On the right is FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, on the left the GDR leader Erich Honecker.
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Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Erich Honecker, U.S. president Gerald Ford and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky Helmut SchmidtErich HoneckerGerald Ford Bruno KreiskyHelmut SchmidtErich HoneckerGerald Ford Bruno Kreisky
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Reaction to Helsinki Right-wing politicians Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw it as a “new Yalta” placing “the American seal of approval on the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe”. Right-wing politicians Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw it as a “new Yalta” placing “the American seal of approval on the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe”. Supporters claim Helsinki was “a time bomb planted in the heart of the Soviet Empire” Supporters claim Helsinki was “a time bomb planted in the heart of the Soviet Empire” The stress on human rights and fundamental freedoms would erode the unpopular Soviet regimes in E. Europe The stress on human rights and fundamental freedoms would erode the unpopular Soviet regimes in E. Europe
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