1. The Uninsured

5. Many Specialists Won’t See Kids With Medicaid Bisgaier J, Rhodes KV. N Engl J Med 2011;364:2324-2333

6. Under- Insurance

11. Rising Economic Inequality

15. Persistent Racial Inequalities

20. Rationing Amidst a Surplus of Care

21. Unnecessary Procedures

23. Variation in Medicare Spending: Some Regions Already Spend at Canadian Level

25. ACOs: A Rerun of the HMO Experience?

26. Profit-Driven ACO’s: Medicare HMOs Provide a Cautionary Tale

28. Despite Medicare’s Lower Overhead, Enrollment of Medicare Patients in Private Plans Has Grown

30. Private Medicare Plans Have Prospered by Cherry Picking

33. Medicare’s Attempt to Improve Risk- Adjustment of HMO Payment Pre-2004 - HMOs were “cherry- picking” when payment adjusted only for age, sex, location, employment status, disability, institutionalization, Medicaid eligibility 2004 – Risk adjustment formula added 70 diagnoses

35. Risk Adjustment Increased Medicare HMO Over-Payments $30 billion Wasted Annually “We show that... risk-adjustment.... can actually increase differential payments relative to pre-risk- adjustment levels and thus... raise the total cost to the government.... The differential payments... totaled $30 billion in 2006, or nearly 8 percent of total Medicare spending.... recalibration [of the risk adjustment formula] will likely exacerbate mispricing.” Source: NBER #16977

36. Profit-Driven Upcoding Makes Accurate Risk Adjustment Impossible: H igh Cost Providers Inflate Both Reimbursement and Quality Scores by Making Patients Look Sicker on Paper

44. Assumptions Implicit in P-4-P 1.Performance can be accurately ascertained 2.Individual variation is caused by variation in motivation 3.Financial incentives will add to intrinsic motivation 4.Current payment system is too simple 5.Hospitals/MDs delivering poor quality care should get fewer resources

47. Pay for Performance “I do not think its true that the way to get better doctoring and better nursing is to put money on the table in front of doctors and nurses. I think that's a fundamental misunderstanding of human motivation. I think people respond to joy and work and love and achievement and learning and appreciation and gratitude - and a sense of a job well done. I think that it feels good to be a doctor and better to be a better doctor. When we begin to attach dollar amounts to throughputs and to individual pay we are playing with fire. The first and most important effect of that may be to begin to dissociate people from their work.” Don Berwick, M.D, Source: Health Affairs 1/12/2005

48. “We found no evidence that financial incentives can improve patient outcomes.” Flodgren et al. “An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviors and patient outcomes. Cochrane Collaboration, July 6, 2011

49. Investor-Owned Care: Inflated Costs, Inferior Quality

51. For-Profit Hospitals’ Death Rates are 2% Higher Source: CMAJ 2002;166:1399

52. For-Profit Hospitals Cost 19% More Source: CMAJ 2004;170:1817

53. For-Profit Dialysis Clinics’ Death Rates are 9% Higher Source: JAMA 2002;288:2449

57. Drug Companies’ Cost Structure

59. Mandate Model Reform: Keeping Private Insurers In Charge

61. “Mandate” Model for Reform Proposed by Richard Nixon in 1971 to block Edward Kennedy’s NHI proposal

62. “Mandate” Model for Reform Government uses its coercive power to make people buy private insurance.

63. “Mandate” Model for Reform 1.Expanded Medicaid-like program  Free for poor  Subsidies for low income  Buy-in without subsidy for others 2.Individual and Employer Mandates 3.Managed Care / Care Management

64. “Mandate” Model - Problems Absent cost controls, expanded coverage unaffordable ACOs/care management, computers, prevention not shown to cut costs Adds administrative complexity and cost; retains, even strengthens private insurers Impeccable political logic, economic nonsense

65. Massachusetts’ Model Reform: Massive Federal Subsidies, Skimpy Coverage, Persistent Access Problems

67. Massachusetts: Required Coverage (Income > 300% of Poverty) Premium: $5,600 Annually (56 year old, individual coverage) Premium: $5,600 Annually (56 year old, individual coverage) $2000 deductible $2000 deductible 20% co-insurance AFTER deductible is reached 20% co-insurance AFTER deductible is reached

70. Public Money, Private Control

72. U.S. Health Costs Rising More Steeply, 1970-2008

80. Canada’s National Health Insurance Program

88. Quality of Care Slightly Better in Canada Than U.S. A Meta-Analysis of Patients Treated for Same Illnesses (U.S. Studies Included Mostly Insured Patients) Source: Guyatt et al, Open Medicine, April 19, 2007

94. A National Health Program for the U.S.

96. Public Opinion Favors Single Payer National Health Insurance