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Chapter 29 Exchange Partial equilibrium and general equilibrium.

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Presentation on theme: "Chapter 29 Exchange Partial equilibrium and general equilibrium."— Presentation transcript:

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2 Chapter 29 Exchange

3 Partial equilibrium and general equilibrium

4 Edgeworth box p497 A pure exchange model of two goods, two consumers with fixed endowments w.

5 Region of mutual advantages. Pareto set and the contract curve. Bargaining for relative prices. Gross demand x (p), Net or excess demand z (p) = x (p) - w (p).

6 Person B Person A xA1xA1 wA1wA1 Endowment wA2wA2 xA2xA2 GOOD 2 GOOD 1 xB1xB1 wB1wB1 xB2xB2 wB2wB2 M

7 Endowment Person B’s indifference curve A Pareto efficient allocation Person A’s indifference curve Contract curve Person A GOOD 1 GOOD 2 Person B

8 From disequilibrium to the competitive equilibrium. Which good is too cheap? Offer curve approach. The existence problem of equilibrium.

9 A’s ind, curves B’s ind. curves A’s offer curve B’s offer curve Good 1 is Too cheap Equilibrium price W E

10 Chapter 30 Production

11 The Robinson Crusoe economy Production function Indifference curves LaborL*L* C* Coconuts

12 Production possibilities set F* C* COCNUTS FISH PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES SET SLOPE=MARGINAL RATE OF TRANSFORMATION (Two outputs case)

13 Trade leads to Separation of prod. and coms. (P/C), Production specialization(A P), and Wealth improvement( A C). A P C

14 Heckscher-Ohlin theory on international trade, under many idealization assumptions.

15 * Costs of exchange. * Price difference between selling and buying. Fig. * GATT and WTO.

16 Chapter 30 Welfare

17 The social preference. Two kinds of voting: majority, and rank-order.

18 The social welfare function. Benthamite: W (u 1, …,u n ) = a 1 u 1 + … + a n u n. Rawlsian: W (u 1, …,u n ) = min {u 1, …, u n }.

19 Three requirements on a social decision mechanism: 1, It should be complete, reflexive, and transitive; 2, If everyone prefers X to Y, then the society should prefer X to Y; 3, The preferences between X and Y should depend only on how people rank X versus Y, and not on how they rank other alternatives.

20 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem If a social decision mechanism satisfies properties 1, 2, and 3, then it must be a dictatorship: all social rankings are the rankings of one individual.


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