2. Masking affects: Given that we understand so little about conscious experience, it is no surprise that we don’t know this curve. Reported seeing Objective performance Report of (access to) seeing Phenomenology of seeing differentially

3. No big surprise that judgement of seeing is reflected in frontal cortex These data are neutral between the two views REPORTED seen

4. Basic Issue 1 st order phenomenal consciousness 2 nd order “reflective” consciousness “What its like” About a phenomenally consciousness state The 2 nd order state is the source of all genuine consciousness. Something in between?

5. 3 different aspects of consciousness Specific perceptual content— experience of red vs experience of blue What makes a content conscious—the difference between a conscious perception of red and an unconscious perception of red What makes creature a conscious creature: the difference beween a primate and a bacterium or a zombie

6. MISMATCH PROBLEM: sensation of green causes HOT to the effect that one has a sensation of red. What is the phenomenology? Phenomenology goes with… 1 st order2 nd order Higher order view at least partly false All perceptual phenomenology is really the phenomenology of thought! Both Maybe…but higher order view at least partly false

7. Perceptual Certainty ~ confidence judgments ~ visibility ratings ~ tendency to say “yes I see it clearly” (detection bias) Doesn’t apply to animals Animals: How strong the signal is, e.g. contrast Animals: Confidence that the item was there 1 st orde r

8. Animal and child confidence judgments What makes a content conscious Standard HOT 1 st order Biological Hakwan? That it is the content of 2 nd order thought Proposals: Recurrent loops involving thalamocortical connectivity, activation of self circuits, coherent oscillations, etc. Avoids mismatch problem Specific perceptual content Content of 2 nd order thought “I am having a sensation of red” 1 st order biological state Pr >.87: Redness at L Pr >.87: I see redness at L Pr >.87: Redness in world at L 1st 2nd Pr >.87: Redness at L 1 st order Evidence: anesthesia, vegetative state

9. Argues against perceptual certainty views of phenomenology, both 1 st and 2 nd order Attention increases perceived contrast Changes in contrast imposed by changes in attention do not look like changes in the world So: visual system must to some extent discount for the higher contrast resulting from attention Inattention increases perceptual certainty without increasing phenomenology Explanation: the visual system supposes that for equal levels of perceived contrast, an unattended stimulus is more likely to reflect the world than an attended stimulus, i.e. increased perceptual certainty

10. “…whatever changes the feeling of attention may bring we charge, as it were, to the attentions’s account, and still perceive and conceive the object as the same.” When one increases attention, one “feels the increase as that of his own conscious activity turned upon the thing.” Attention increases perceived contrast Changes in contrast imposed by changes in attention do not look like changes in the world

11. Explanation of Rahnev, et.al.: the visual system supposes that for equal levels of perceived contrast, an unattended stimulus is more likely to reflect the world than an attended stimulus, i.e. increased perceptual certainty Upshot for Hakwan: his result suggests that perceptual certainty can vary somewhat independently of phenomenological variables like perceived contrast Attention increases perceived contrast Changes in contrast imposed by changes in attention do not look like changes in the world So: visual system must to some extent discount for the higher contrast resulting from attention

12. “Conscious states are all alike; every unconscious state is unconscious in its own way” 1 st order theorists can hold that failure here can affect subjective judgment without affecting consciousness or objective judgment Dehaene’s dual channel model not mandatory for first order theorists

13. Perceptual certainty view could involve 1 st order positions on both phenomenal content and what makes phenomenal content conscious 1 st order is better if one motivation is to be friendlier to animal consciousness than HOT 1 st order avoids mismatch problem Perceptual certainty views are problematic whether 1 st order or 2 nd order Conclusions