1. GAME THEORY and its Application Chapter 06

3. Outlines... Introduction Prisoner`s dilemma Nash equilibrium Oligopoly price fixing Game Collusion for profit maximization Sequential game

4. Introduction Game theory is a tool for studying strategic behaviour – behaviour that takes into account the expected behaviour of others and the recognition of mutual interdependence. Game theory was invented by John von Neumann in 1937 and extended by von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. Today, it is one of the major research fields in economics.

5. Emergence of concept Prisoner's Dilemma Two thieves Bob and Art, were arrested for stealing a car, for which they can receive 2-years sentence. They are also suspected for a multi million Bank robbery. If both confess, for both crimes-will receive 3-years sentence If both do not confess, then both will be sentenced to 2-years sentence If one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will get 1-year and the non-confessor will be sentenced for 10- year What should each prisoner do?

7. Nash Equilibrium  To predict the outcome, we use an equilibrium idea proposed by John Nash of Princeton University (who received the Nobel Prize for Economic Science in 1994.  In Nash equilibrium, player A takes the best possible action given the action of player B and player B takes the best possible action given the action of player A

8. Nash Equilibrium To find the Nash equilibrium, we compare all the possible outcomes associated with each choice and eliminate those that are dominated – that are not as good as some other choice. Let’s find the Nash equilibrium for the prisoners’ dilemma game.

9. Nash Equilibrium in prisoner`s dilemma Each square shows the payoffs for the two players, Art and Bob, for each possible pair of actions. In each square, the red triangle shows Art’s payoff and the blue triangle shows Bob’s. For example, if both confess, the payoffs are in the top left square. The equilibrium of the game is for both players to confess and each gets a 3-year sentence.

10. An Oligopoly Price-fixing Game We can use game theory and a game like the prisoners’ dilemma to understand price fixing, price wars and other aspects of the behaviour of firms in oligopoly. Lets see how game theory helps us to predict the prices charged and the quantities produced by the two firms.

11. Example Suppose there are two companies; Trick and Gear They enter into a collusive agreement. A collusive agreement is an agreement between two (or more) producers to form a cartel to restrict output, raise the price and increase profits The strategies that firms in a cartel can pursue are to: 1 Comply. 2 Cheat.

12. Example Because each firm has two strategies, there are four possible combinations of actions for the firms: 1 Both firms comply. 2 Both firms cheat. 3 Trick complies and Gear cheats. 4 Gear complies and Trick cheats

13. Cost and Demand Conditions

14. Colluding to Maximize Profits To maximize industry profit, the firms agree to restrict output to the rate that makes the industry marginal cost and marginal revenue equal. That output rate is 4,000 units a week. Both agree to produce 2000 units each. Both firms agree to charge the highest price £9,000 each. The (ATC) of producing 2,000 switchgears a week is £8,000, so the profit per unit is £1,000 and Total economic profit is £2 million.

15. Colluding to Make Monopoly Profits

16. One Firm Cheats on a Collusive Agreement To set the stage for cheating on their agreement, Trick convinces Gear that demand has decreased and that it cannot sell 2,000 units a week. Trick tells Gear that it plans to cut its price in order to sell the agreed 2,000 units each week. Because the two firms produce an identical product, Gear matches Trick’s price cut but still produces only 2,000 units a week. In fact, there has been no decrease in demand. Trick plans to increase output, which it knows will lower the price, and Trick wants to ensure that Gear’s output remains at the agreed level.

17. One Firm Cheats on a Collusive Agreement Suppose that Trick increases output to 3,000 units a week. While Gear sticks to the agreement and produce 2,000 units a week Total output is 5,000 a week, So price falls to £7,500 a unit. Gear incurs a loss of £500 a unit, and total £1 million a week. On the other hand Trick produces 3,000 units a week at an average total cost of £6,000 each. With a price of £7,500. Trick makes a profit of £1,500 a unit and total profit of £4.5 million Hence, The industry makes an economic profit of £3.5mn.

18. Graphical Presentation

19. Both Firms Cheat When both firms cheat, each firm has an incentive to increase its production till its price equals marginal cost. This situation arises in this case when the price has reached £6,000. At a price of £6,000, each firm covers all its costs and makes zero economic profit (means normal profit) So each firm produce 3,000 units. Total production 6,000

20. Both Firms Cheat

21. Nash Equilibrium in the Duopolists’ Dilemma Do they comply or cheat? To answer this question, we must find the Nash equilibrium. If both firms comply with the collusive agreement, the payoffs are recorded in the bottom right square. The red triangle shows Gear’s payoff, and the blue triangle shows Trick’s. In Nash equilibrium, both firms cheat.

22. PROBLEM Two firms, Soapy and Suddsies plc., are the only producers of soap powder. They collude and agree to share the market equally. If neither firm cheats on the agreement, each makes $1 million economic profit. If either firm cheats, the cheater increases its economic profit to $1.5 million while the firm that abides by the agreement incurs an economic loss of $ 0.5 million. Neither firm has any way of policing the other’s actions. 1)Describe the best strategy for each firm in a game that is played once. 2)What is the economic profit for each firm if both cheat? 3)Construct the payoff matrix of a game 4)What is the equilibrium if the game is played once?

23. Repeated Games and Sequential Games The games that we’ve studied are played just once. In contrast, many real-world games are played repeatedly The real-world games creates a large number of possible outcomes. We’re now going to examine these two aspects of strategic decision making.

24. A Repeated Duopoly Game If two firms play a game repeatedly, one firm has the opportunity to penalize the other for previous “bad” behaviour. If Gear cheats this week, perhaps Trick will cheat next week What is the equilibrium of this game? They will go for Cooperative Equilibrium

25. What is cooperative equilibrium? A cooperative equilibrium might occur if cheating is punished. There are two extremes of punishments. 1) A Tit-for-tat strategy 2) A trigger strategy

26. Tit-for-tat strategy Vs Trigger strategy A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which a player cooperates in the current period if the other player cooperated in the previous period but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A trigger strategy is one in which a player cooperates if the other player cooperates but plays the Nash equilibrium strategy forever thereafter if the other player cheats.

28. Thanks and bye bye