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Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwanda Genocide Jihoon, MOON Szu-Chieh, CHEN International Relation 2013, 06, 19
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Outline What is “Humanitarian intervention” ? Historical background of the Rwanda The trigger of the Rwanda genocide Major events The responses from international Operation Turquoise Society criticism Conclusion
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Humanitarian Intervention An armed intervention in a state, without that state’s consent, to address (the threat of) a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights.
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By the early 1990s, Rwanda, a small country with an overwhelmingly agricultural economy, had one of the highest population densities in Africa.
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Population : Hutu (84%) Tutsi (15%) Twa (1%) Historical background of the Rwanda
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1894 : Rwanda becomes part of German east 1916 : Belgian occupation 1959 : a hutu revolution 1961 : victorious hutu had forced Rwanda’s tutsi monarch into exile and declared the country a republic
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1962 : Belgium officially granted independence to Rwanda 1973 : a military group installed major general juvenal habyarimana, a moderate hutu, in power. Founded a new political party, the national revolutionary movement for development (NRMD).
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Historical background of the Rwanda 1978 : juvenal habyarimana was elected president 1990 : forces of the Rwandan patriotic front (RPF), consisting mostly of tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda 1993 : habyarimana signed an agreement at Arusha, Tanzania
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The trigger of Rwanda genocide On April 6 1996, The plane carrying Rwanda’s president was shot down. Hutu extremists had taken over the government
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Blamed the tutsis for the assassination Genocide began
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The Genocide The hutu extremist radio – RTLM, and also the state supported radio – Radio Rwanda, encouraged the mass murder of the “cockroaches.” These cockroaches weretutsis and hutu moderates
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The Genocide Most victim were killed in their own villages and towns by neighbors usually by being hacked to death by machetes. Rape was also used as a weapon during the Genocide, up to 500,000 tutsi women were raped.
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The Genocide An estimated 10,000 people were murdered each day An estimated 800,000 people were murdered in the course of roughly 100days, most of whom were tutsis. 400,000 children were left orphans
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。。
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The responses to the Genocide The Security Council: should we help? Maybe? Denial of the word “Genocide” On 6 May, New Zealand proposed a draft resolution to create a new UN force to protect civilians in Rwanda. Rejected by USA Authorizing UNAMIR 5500 troops with a mandate to provide humanitarian assistance. USA narrows down the number to hundreds
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The responses to the Genocide African States: No one helps! We have to do something 9 countries came forward with offers of troops for the deployment of UNAMIR Ⅱ. Lack of equipment, heavy lift support, and costs The result – the equipment didn’t arrive until the end of June and it then took a further month for the vehicles to arrive. More Rwandans are dead…
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The responses to the Genocide USA: we cannot help with it Avoiding a repeat of Somalia, 1993 No vital interests in Rwanda Military personnel could not be sent to trouble spot
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The responses to the Genocide FRANCE: we want to help!!! Has political and military involvement in Rwanda Supporting the one-party state of Habyarimana (Hutu) Maintaining its international prestige and bargaining power by controlling French-speaking Africa Operation Turquoise
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France’s Operation Turquoise June 22 nd : UN approve France a 60 days Humanitarian Mission to protect civilians/ save lives. 2500 French troops “safe humanitarian zones” in southwest Rwanda The killings end before OT was replaced by UNAMIR Ⅱ. RPF took control over most of Rwanda in mid-July. Humanitarian Intervention…?
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France’s Operation Turquoise Since the Security Council had acted as a global bystander to genocide, no one felt able publicly criticize to a French mission that was justified in terms of saving lives. However, the french government’s priority was not to save lives but to demonstrate to Africa and the world that France could still rapidly project military power.
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Society criticism The non-humanitarian motives behind the French intervention led to means being employed that conflicted with its humanitarian purpose.
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Conclusion UNAMIR didn’t have a sufficient mandate; lack of resources; ill-equipped to stop the killings. Stopping genocide requires a willingness to use force and to risk soldiers’ lives and it was this that was completely lacking in the Clinton Administration, USA.
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Conclusion France had national interests at stake, did not try to save Rwandan lives, but actively contributed to the genocide. The media failed to report on the genocide, so there was no internal pressure from citizens that could have influenced policy makers.
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