1. International Conference Security in Pervasive Computing(SPC’06) MMC Lab. 임동혁

2.  Introduction  Related Works  Specification  Verification  Implementation  Conclusions

3.  Limitation of sensor  Storage  Computational Complexity  Amount of Data  Transmission Range  Authenticating sensor reading, confidentiality  Assumptions  Limited number of sensors in the range of the base station  Invulnerable and powerful base station  No location awareness, no network topology

4.  SNEP  Block cipher  Authentication, confidentiality, RNG  No forward security  TinySec  Node to node communication security  Early stage malicious message detection  Failure to address replay attacks  Key deployment mechanism are not robust

5.  Authentication  Confidentiality  Freshness  Forward Security  Continuously evolving key

6. Base station node n node m : (n, d)m : Initial key Key evolution Hash function Signature

7. Base station node n node m : Encoding function m :

8.  Message loss, Delay in message delivery  Non-sequential message receipt in the base station  (n,d,s), search for a j  Hash chain update 2w+1 XnXn X n+1 X n+2 X n+3 X n+4

9.  Signature Forgery  Confidentiality Violation  Forward Security

10.  Signature forgery attack  Without knowledge of key x, constructing (n,d,s)  Constructing a valid signature  at most 2 -t ( t <= k )  Acceptable keys   Probability of successful forgery  at most 2 -t+log(2w+1)

11.  Attack can query O C   Attack is successful  Attacker gets any information on d other than |d|  Probability distribution: Uniform over {0,1} |d|  E is random oracle  Input to E is unique  Without, cannot be distinguished from

12.  Assumption  Attacker can physically extract or obtain  Oracle  Attacker can query O F at input (n,j) not (n,i),  Non-invertibility of H  Knowledge of  Do not help to decipher message under any key,

13.  Resource requirements  Hash Function  MAC Function  Encryption Function  Choice of Security Parameter Size

14.  Hash function (SHA-1)  Non-invertibility  Collision resistance property  15 µJ is required to establish a new key assuming k=160  Code size 2000 byte  MAC function  HMAC-SHA1-t  1 µJ/byte is required to generate a signature

15.  Encryption Function  G : non-invertible collision resistant hash function  Encryption Function E  Code size/Chip area viewpoint G, H use the same concrete hash function  Choice of Security Parameter Sizes  k : the size of the key (160 bit)  t : the size of the signature (64 bit)

16.  Wireless sensor networks  Authentication of the origin data  Confidentiality of data  Forward security  Freshness  Minimise the resource requirements  Low computational complexity using a hash function  No data expansion to minimise the communication overhead

17.  Problems  Only the base station verifies the messages  DOS attack  Acceptance window  messages can be ignored