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1 How much do we know about the self in ACT? Mairéad Foody, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, and Dermot Barnes-Holmes Mairéad Foody, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, and Dermot.

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1 1 How much do we know about the self in ACT? Mairéad Foody, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, and Dermot Barnes-Holmes Mairéad Foody, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, and Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth.

2 2 Self in ACT From an ACT perspective, ‘the self’ was initially coneptualised in terms of the three selves (self as content, self as process and self as context), all believed to be natural by-products of verbal behaviour From an ACT perspective, ‘the self’ was initially coneptualised in terms of the three selves (self as content, self as process and self as context), all believed to be natural by-products of verbal behaviour Although the three selves were not technical terms (Hayes 1995), the self has played a central role in both ACT and RFT since their inception Although the three selves were not technical terms (Hayes 1995), the self has played a central role in both ACT and RFT since their inception For example, Hayes (1995) proposed that “a significant role for therapy [is].. to redefine who the client takes himself or herself to be” For example, Hayes (1995) proposed that “a significant role for therapy [is].. to redefine who the client takes himself or herself to be” Similarly, the perspective-taking or deictic relations (I-YOU, HERE- THERE and NOW-THEN) have received considerable empirical attention in RFT research (e.g. McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes- Holmes, 2004) Similarly, the perspective-taking or deictic relations (I-YOU, HERE- THERE and NOW-THEN) have received considerable empirical attention in RFT research (e.g. McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes- Holmes, 2004)

3 3 The three selves as perspective-taking relations For RFT, there are two constant aspects to the self: For RFT, there are two constant aspects to the self: - the observer - your perspective (always located HERE-NOW) - the observer - your perspective (always located HERE-NOW)AND - the doer - your logical content (may be located HERE-NOW or THERE- THEN) depending on which of the three selves you are operating in - the doer - your logical content (may be located HERE-NOW or THERE- THEN) depending on which of the three selves you are operating in Hayes (1995) referred to these as the dual functions of self in terms of “functioning both as a doer and as an observer of the doing” Hayes (1995) referred to these as the dual functions of self in terms of “functioning both as a doer and as an observer of the doing” In short, there is no change in your perspective (observer), just changes in the location of your content (doer) In short, there is no change in your perspective (observer), just changes in the location of your content (doer)

4 4 The three selves as perspective-taking relations Perspective (Self) HERE-NOW THERE-THEN Psychological Content Content is rigid and attached to perspective Content is on-going and experiential (would be attached if was not) Self as Content Self as Process Self as Context Perspective remains stable and constant You can switch between self as content and self as process readily because the content is always HERE-NOW. You can switich between self as process and self as context, but this will involve switching content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN. We do not do this readily- it takes training! You cannot switch between self as content and self as context without first engaging in self as process In this way, self as process mediates all changes in the location of your content Training in self as process is needed for maximum psychological flexibility

5 5 Involves describing and/or evaluating oneself (i.e. creating verbal statements about the self and evaluating these statements) Involves describing and/or evaluating oneself (i.e. creating verbal statements about the self and evaluating these statements) In this mode, your individual world is structured by the literal meaning of your psychological content, such that who you are is interpreted in terms of what your mind tells you at various times In this mode, your individual world is structured by the literal meaning of your psychological content, such that who you are is interpreted in terms of what your mind tells you at various times These co-ordination relations (between content and YOU/self/observer as both HERE-NOW) is often referred to as attachment, because the piece of content in question is attached to YOU as a human being These co-ordination relations (between content and YOU/self/observer as both HERE-NOW) is often referred to as attachment, because the piece of content in question is attached to YOU as a human being Attached content automatically becomes part of the conceptualised self because of this co-ordination (the functions of the content are transferred to the perspective) Attached content automatically becomes part of the conceptualised self because of this co-ordination (the functions of the content are transferred to the perspective) Self as Content in RFT terms

6 6 This level of cognitive fusion makes it very likely that your content will exert some control over your behaviour, because the perspective and the content exist in relational networks with many other types of content, actions, etc. This level of cognitive fusion makes it very likely that your content will exert some control over your behaviour, because the perspective and the content exist in relational networks with many other types of content, actions, etc. The alternative to this fusion or rigidity (and the threat it poses to perspective) is to keep your content as on-going and experiential (i.e. self as process) The alternative to this fusion or rigidity (and the threat it poses to perspective) is to keep your content as on-going and experiential (i.e. self as process)

7 7 Self as Process in RFT terms Self as process involves on-going experiencing and describing of your thoughts, behaviour, etc. Self as process involves on-going experiencing and describing of your thoughts, behaviour, etc. This sense of self increases psychological flexibility because your on-going experience is ever-changing, thus providing you with a broad array of behavioural options This sense of self increases psychological flexibility because your on-going experience is ever-changing, thus providing you with a broad array of behavioural options When thoughts are experienced as rigid or attached (instead of on-going and experiential) then self as process can quickly change to self as content When thoughts are experienced as rigid or attached (instead of on-going and experiential) then self as process can quickly change to self as content The risk of this is considerable and ever-present because of the need for coherence in the conceptualised self The risk of this is considerable and ever-present because of the need for coherence in the conceptualised self

8 8 Self as Context in RFT terms Operating in self as context involves detachment (defusion) from your psychological content (evaluations, etc.) Operating in self as context involves detachment (defusion) from your psychological content (evaluations, etc.) Hayes (1995) similarly argued that: “I in some meaningful sense is the location that is left behind when all of the content differences are subtracted out” Hayes (1995) similarly argued that: “I in some meaningful sense is the location that is left behind when all of the content differences are subtracted out” In self as context all that is left in HERE-NOW is I In self as context all that is left in HERE-NOW is I Just as our developmental histories require (for communicative and social purposes) that our content is HERE-NOW in terms of both self as content and self as process, it is equally important that we acquire the skill of switching content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN (Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009) Just as our developmental histories require (for communicative and social purposes) that our content is HERE-NOW in terms of both self as content and self as process, it is equally important that we acquire the skill of switching content from HERE-NOW to THERE-THEN (Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009) Self as context is unique in terms of the content being located THERE- THEN and this, in turn, provides a more stable perspective of I-HERE-NOW Self as context is unique in terms of the content being located THERE- THEN and this, in turn, provides a more stable perspective of I-HERE-NOW

9 9 Some say self as context is transcendence! Some say self as context is the same as transcendence and this is an important question Some say self as context is the same as transcendence and this is an important question In short, we think it isn’t in the sense that this is still relational and verbal behaviour, although we can see where this apparent co-ordination comes from In short, we think it isn’t in the sense that this is still relational and verbal behaviour, although we can see where this apparent co-ordination comes from Put another way, one might ask: “What happens to the perspective in HERE-NOW when all content is THERE-THEN?” Put another way, one might ask: “What happens to the perspective in HERE-NOW when all content is THERE-THEN?” Barnes-Holmes, Hayes and Gregg (2001) answered this as follows: Barnes-Holmes, Hayes and Gregg (2001) answered this as follows: “spirituality is an experience of “transcendence” or “oneness” that comes when literal, analytic, and evaluative functions of relational framing are massively reduced, and the relational functions of I, HERE, and NOW are thereby allowed to predominate” “spirituality is an experience of “transcendence” or “oneness” that comes when literal, analytic, and evaluative functions of relational framing are massively reduced, and the relational functions of I, HERE, and NOW are thereby allowed to predominate” So, what might that look like? So, what might that look like?

10 10 Scenario 1: The painter as observer and doer The painter’s focus (the canvas) is in addition to her as the observer The painter’s focus (the canvas) is in addition to her as the observer For her, the focus on the canvas feels almost automatic and indeed she is focusing on only this and not on herself For her, the focus on the canvas feels almost automatic and indeed she is focusing on only this and not on herself However, the painter is always observing at the same time However, the painter is always observing at the same time So, even in this example of all-consuming focus, there is always the observer and the doer So, even in this example of all-consuming focus, there is always the observer and the doer

11 11 Scenario 2: The Vipassana Meditator as observer and doer The meditator is focusing entirely on himself (not an external object like a canvas) The meditator is focusing entirely on himself (not an external object like a canvas) He can do this with automaticity because of many years of training He can do this with automaticity because of many years of training For brief periods of time, he reaches a place of almost no content For brief periods of time, he reaches a place of almost no content In this scenario it would feel like the observer and the doer had collapsed into one, because there is little doing (i.e. no transformations of stimulus functions either HERE-NOW or THERE-THEN) and all observing In this scenario it would feel like the observer and the doer had collapsed into one, because there is little doing (i.e. no transformations of stimulus functions either HERE-NOW or THERE-THEN) and all observing So, there is nothing else in the HERE-NOW, except I on an on-going basis So, there is nothing else in the HERE-NOW, except I on an on-going basis

12 12 This type of behaviour is still verbal because you are still operating from the perspective-taking frames This type of behaviour is still verbal because you are still operating from the perspective-taking frames For most of us most of the time, accessing self as context to this extent and in this depth is nearly impossible For most of us most of the time, accessing self as context to this extent and in this depth is nearly impossible Because getting there and staying there would both pose great challenges to a highly verbal organism Because getting there and staying there would both pose great challenges to a highly verbal organism Still verbal behaviour!

13 13 The relationship between defusion and self as context It is reasonable within this account to ask whether defusion is only possible when operating in self as context? It is reasonable within this account to ask whether defusion is only possible when operating in self as context? When your psychological content is THERE-THEN (as in self as context) it would appear that this is defusion because relationally your content is distinct from I (the term ‘de-fusion’ supports this) When your psychological content is THERE-THEN (as in self as context) it would appear that this is defusion because relationally your content is distinct from I (the term ‘de-fusion’ supports this) But do we want to take such a narrow definition of defusion in which your content must be THERE-THERN – if so, defusion is only possible in self as context But do we want to take such a narrow definition of defusion in which your content must be THERE-THERN – if so, defusion is only possible in self as context

14 14 What about self as process? What about self as process? If you are not fused in self as process (that would be self as content), are you then defused? If you are not fused in self as process (that would be self as content), are you then defused? For this to be the case, defusion must be defined more broadly as a massive reduction in the transformations of function regarding your content (but the content is not necessarily THERE-THEN) For this to be the case, defusion must be defined more broadly as a massive reduction in the transformations of function regarding your content (but the content is not necessarily THERE-THEN) In this case, we would argue that self as process facilitates defusion because it is on-going and experiential In this case, we would argue that self as process facilitates defusion because it is on-going and experiential So, operating a broader definition of defusion in terms of the reductions in transformations of functions (with content THERE- THEN or on-going in HERE-NOW) allows for defusion at both self as process and self as context So, operating a broader definition of defusion in terms of the reductions in transformations of functions (with content THERE- THEN or on-going in HERE-NOW) allows for defusion at both self as process and self as context The relationship between defusion and self as process

15 15 The three selves and three levels of defusion Perspective (Self) HERE-NOW THERE-THEN Psychological Content Content is rigid and attached to perspective Content is on-going and experiential (would be attached if was not) Self as Content Self as Process Self as Context Perspective remains stable and constant Fusion Defusion I Defusion II

16 16 Concluding Comments This account is not new, but simply reiterates what was said in original ACT writings on the three selves This account is not new, but simply reiterates what was said in original ACT writings on the three selves We believe that these continue to constitute a functional RFT account of self that has significant implications for our conceptual and technical understanding of ACT We believe that these continue to constitute a functional RFT account of self that has significant implications for our conceptual and technical understanding of ACT

17 17 Contact: Mairead.foody@nuim.ie Mairead.foody@nuim.ie


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