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Democracy and International Law
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The Right to Democracy The Right to Democracy Democratic Deficit in IOs Democratic Deficit in IOs IOs and Democratization IOs and Democratization Democracy and Commitment Democracy and Commitment
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The Right to Democracy Third generation of human rights Third generation of human rights International legal obligation? International legal obligation? Precondition for legitimate governance Precondition for legitimate governance
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The Right to Democracy Not mentioned in UN Charter Not mentioned in UN Charter Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly of through freely chosen representatives…The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”
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The Right to Democracy Article 25 of ICCPR Article 25 of ICCPR “Promotion of the Right to Democracy” – Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights (1999) “Promotion of the Right to Democracy” – Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights (1999) Regional documents: Regional documents: OAS Charter OAS Charter Statute of the Council of Europe Statute of the Council of Europe Charter of Paris for a New Europe Charter of Paris for a New Europe
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The Right to Democracy Thomas Franck: Thomas Franck: Self Determination Self Determination Freedom of Expression Freedom of Expression Electoral rights Electoral rights Promoting democracy: Promoting democracy: Qualification for membership in IOs Qualification for membership in IOs Precondition for development assistance Precondition for development assistance Restoring democracy by force Restoring democracy by force
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The Right to Democracy Is it a good idea? Disputed content Disputed content More basic rights have not gained sufficient adherence More basic rights have not gained sufficient adherence Imposition of Western values? Imposition of Western values? Can it be reconciled with self determination (freedom to choose political status)? Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of UN Charter? Can it be reconciled with self determination (freedom to choose political status)? Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of UN Charter?
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs No direct electoral accountability No direct electoral accountability Lack of transparency, secretive decision making Lack of transparency, secretive decision making Hard for individuals and interest groups to influence and monitor Hard for individuals and interest groups to influence and monitor Insufficient attention to local values and interests Insufficient attention to local values and interests Override national authorities Override national authorities Unbounded Power?
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs Neo-liberal bias? Focus on trade liberalization and pro-business regulation instead of welfare and redistribution Neo-liberal bias? Focus on trade liberalization and pro-business regulation instead of welfare and redistribution No meaningful participation and political discourse, passive citizens No meaningful participation and political discourse, passive citizens
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs Counterarguments: “Democratization” of IOs is not efficient, risk of paralysis “Democratization” of IOs is not efficient, risk of paralysis Insulation is necessary for desirable yet unpopular decisions (e.g. minority protection) Insulation is necessary for desirable yet unpopular decisions (e.g. minority protection) The baseline for comparison is “real world” democracies, where we find considerable delegation The baseline for comparison is “real world” democracies, where we find considerable delegation
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs Delegation solves the following problems: Delegation solves the following problems: Complexity of decisions Complexity of decisions Decisions which need to be insulated from short term or popular considerations Decisions which need to be insulated from short term or popular considerations Redressing biases in democratic representation Redressing biases in democratic representation
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs “Democratic Deficit” in the EU? European Parliament is the only elected branch European Parliament is the only elected branch Supremacy of EU law over national legislation Supremacy of EU law over national legislation Cultural gap between Brussels and the “average European” Cultural gap between Brussels and the “average European”
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs But on the other hand… Limited mandate: trade and related issues, monetary policy Limited mandate: trade and related issues, monetary policy Limited financial resources Limited financial resources Power dispersion; Policy making and implementation require consensus and cooperation between EU institutions and national authorities Power dispersion; Policy making and implementation require consensus and cooperation between EU institutions and national authorities
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs Multi-level process ensures transparency and public scrutiny Multi-level process ensures transparency and public scrutiny Insulation of Court and central bank: common practice in democratic systems Insulation of Court and central bank: common practice in democratic systems National representatives at the Council of Ministers act under instruction from national executives National representatives at the Council of Ministers act under instruction from national executives
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Democratic Legitimacy of IOs Other oft-criticized institutions: IMF IMF GATT/WTO GATT/WTO NAFTA NAFTA Security Council Security Council Democratic deficit in NGOs?
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IOs and Democratization Determinants of democratic transition are primarily domestic Determinants of democratic transition are primarily domestic But international institutions can matter as well: But international institutions can matter as well: Democracy aid programs Democracy aid programs Diplomatic pressure Diplomatic pressure Economic sanctions Economic sanctions
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IOs and Democratization Assuaging fears of economic elites Assuaging fears of economic elites Socialization of the military Socialization of the military Locking in democratic reforms (e.g. ECHR, NAFTA) Locking in democratic reforms (e.g. ECHR, NAFTA) EU and NATO expansion: Evidence for the democratic impact of IOs? EU and NATO expansion: Evidence for the democratic impact of IOs?
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Democracy and Commitment The traditional view: democracies are less reliable Unstable public opinion Unstable public opinion Many people involved in policy formation Many people involved in policy formation Frequent leadership change Frequent leadership change
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Democracy and Commitment But in fact democratic commitments tend to be more credible: Regularized leadership change, high level of policy continuity Regularized leadership change, high level of policy continuity Democratic culture Democratic culture Democratic interdependence Democratic interdependence Juridical limits on power Juridical limits on power
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Democracy and Commitment Multiple veto points, easier to block policy change Multiple veto points, easier to block policy change Interest groups pressure Interest groups pressure Transparency Transparency Audience costs for reneging on commitment Audience costs for reneging on commitment
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Democracy and Commitment Limitations on democratic credibility: New or unstable democracies New or unstable democracies Weak constitutional constraints Weak constitutional constraints Issues surrounded by secrecy Issues surrounded by secrecy
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