1. - Will emerging powers be successful in their rise? - Do the emerging powers want to impose a new world order? - If yes, will they be able to reform the “Western International Society”? How? - If not, will the established powers seek accommodating with the rising ones? - How can the “rest” benefit from such power shift?

2. Class 2 – Emerging Powers in Comparative Perspective Dr. Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira (Postdoctoral Researcher) IRI-USP, São Paulo, 22 February 2016

3. Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic

4. Definition of Power (following Hans Morgenthau): “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 28) Hard Power matters the most? “In practice, material capabilities and power are related in indirect, complex, and often problematic ways. Material capabilities are a principal source of power, but critical choices must be made about which capabilities to develop and how to use them” (Ibid.: 32). Not always, but we need more work on defining soft power, particularly when culture is at stake: “What is the leap of logic that leads from attraction to Americanc ulture or its products to support for American foreign policy? (…) There has been an (…) negative reaction to some American exports, like McDonald’s and fast food chains more generally” (Ibid.: 34).

5. Hard Power Soft Power Realists vs. Liberals

6. Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic Hard Power Soft Power Realists Liberals emphasis on conflict emphasis on cooperation

8. 1 ) Falling and rising (McNeil, 2008) a) The decline of the East; b) The rise of the West; c) Which future? 2 ) Elements of resistance (Reich and Lebow, 2014; Lake, 2009; Morris, 2010) a) Past is not fate; b) From economic to structural (normative) power; c) Building and preserving hegemony.

9. b ) Definitions

10. a ) The decline of the East  GDP size (1500) (source: http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=160)

11. a ) The decline of the East  China achieved Eurasian dominance by 1000 (McNeil, 2008: 220);  Reasons for dominance: trade and technology (Ibid.);technology  Lasted about 500 years… But in the meantime…

12. a ) The decline of the East  Europe “borrows” and adapts Chinese technology (as China did from elsewhere, McNeil, 2008: 226);  Naval/military technology and new routes. Long duration process (Braudel, 1960)…

13. a ) The decline of the East  Closure (not only China, but later Japan);  Social structures  Lack of differentiation (i.e., societies with multiple interests, such as in contemporary capitalism);  Cultural argument: hard to test and tautological/circular.

14. b ) The rise of the West  Geography and economic development;  Military competition (i.e., Europe has various sovereign states, Landes, 1998). Why not other places???  Pommeranz (The Great Divergence)  Coal deposits in Britain were far more accessible than elsewhere (in particular in comparison to China  Weber (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism)  Exceptions???

15. b ) The rise of the West  The only exception (before WWII): Japan  Closure for about 200 years;  Forced opening after the arrival of U.S. squad led by Commodore Perry (1853);

16. a ) The decline of the East  GDP size (1500) (source: http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=160)

17. b ) Definitions

18. b ) The rise of the West  GDP size (1900) (source: http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=161)

19. c ) Which future? Following the example of the table below, discuss in pairs one argument for and another against for the rise of an emerging power and the decline of an established power? (5 minutes) ArgumentEmerging PowerEstablished Power ForCountry X has been growing faster and faster Country Y has technological dominance AgainstCountry Y still faces strong domestic challenges Country Y has high levels of debt

20. Who wants to be powerful forever? “West's dominance of the past 200 years was neither inevitable nor ‘locked in’ for the future” (Economist, 2010);

21. a) Past is not fate  Change comes from “the will to improve”  "Change is caused by lazy, greedy, frightened people looking for easier, more profitable and safer ways of doing things. And they rarely know what they are doing” (Morris, 2010).  Somewhat obvious!!!  So under which conditions does “the will to improve” lead to change?

22. a) Past is not fate  Adding more historical interpretations  Historical statistics of GDP (see class 1) suggest that China was AHEAD of the West at the beginning of the common era (2000 years ago), but..  Morris (2010) argues that the West was dominant BEFORE the East (e.g., Roman Empire would be more advanced than Chinese dynasties);  We will never know the truth…   Yet it is still possible to analyze mechanisms of decline and, therefore, of resistance as well.

23. a) Past is not fate  Let’s remember… Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic  State power in the international system has various dimensions;  Which one is the starting point???  Actually, can we define a starting point?  Let’s HYPOTHESIZE…

24. Does economic power drive military might? "The move in trade flows from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and northwestern Europe from the sixteenth century onward, or the redistribution in the shares of world manufacturing output away from western Europe in the decades after 1890, are good examples here. In both cases, the economic shifts heralded the rise of new Great Powers which would one day had a decisive impact upon the military/territorial order. This is why the move in the global productive balances toward the ‘Pacific rim’ which has taken place over the past few decades cannot be of interest merely to economists alone“ (Kennedy, 1988)

25. b ) From economic to structural power Based on your knowledge of world History, list with a colleague examples of countries and/or empires that exemplify the following chains of power. Justify your choices  Think of a country in different times * Economic  Military * Economic  Military  Structural * Economic  Cultural  Structural * Structural  Economic

26. b ) From economic to structural power Economic  Capacity of improving a country’s overall material well-being, regardless of the conditions of individuals who live there; Structural  Related to the ability of defining the rules of the game, that is, the norms and mechanisms that govern international affairs.  Matters in contemporary times (1990s onwards);  With increasing interdependence (a liberal idea), costs of war became too high.

27. b ) From economic to structural power  Is military power useful?  It is certainly part of the creation of hierarchies in international affairs!!!  How are hierarchies built???  Authority is a relationship between ruler and ruled (Lake, 2009: 44)  Hierarchy is the consequence of the existence of the facto authority of a country over another  POWER DETERMINES HIERARCHY!!!

28. b ) From economic to structural power  For Lake: Hard Power only!!!  Economic + Military!!!  Power complicates sovereignty (Lake, 2009: 46-37) 1. Absolute authority (but not complete authority); 2. External actors do not have authority over subjects/citizens and the state territory; 3. Indivisible  in theory...

29. b ) From economic to structural power  Sovereignty is divisible in practice  Citizens have a private sphere;  Subnational governments;  Indirect rule (e.g.: British Empire).  HENCE, HIERARCHIES MATTTER!!!  IR are not entirely anarchical  at least there is some order…

30. b ) From economic to structural power  Sovereignty is divisible in practice  Citizens have a private sphere;  Subnational governments;  Indirect rule (e.g.: British Empire).  HENCE, HIERARCHIES MATTTER!!!  IR are not entirely anarchical  at least there is some order…

32. b ) From economic to structural power  Discussion: consider examples for one level of hierarchy  Economic  Dependency:  Economic Zone:  Market Exchange  Security  Protectorate;  Sphere of Influence;  Diplomacy.

33. b ) From economic to structural power  Is military power useful?  “…recent surveys reveal that the United States is not perceived as acting in the interests of the international community. Whatever legitimacy its leadership once had has significantly eroded as publics around the world are particularly worried about the way in which the United States uses its military power” (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 44).  Some soft power might be needed to run hierarchies smoothly…

34. b ) From economic to structural power  HEGEMONY!!!  It may be conceived “…as the result of legitimacy as well as power. Drawing on the theories of Antonio Gramsci, Roger Simon describes hegemony as a relation ‘not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership’” (Lebow and Reich, 2014: 18)  “By definition, hegemony requires both economic and military dominance and leadership (Ibid.: 23)” + Soft Power???  Legitimacy  Leadership???  Hegemony or Influence???

35. b ) From economic to structural power  HEGEMONY!!! 1 ) Agenda Setting: “…ability to initiate, legitimize, and advocate policy issues” (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 37); 2 ) Custodianship: stabilization of the international system in economy (economists would say that it is a provision of a public good) (Ibid.: 37), may not depend on a hegemon (Ibid.: 42); 3 ) Sponsorship: “enforcement of rules, norms, agreements, and decision-making processes as well as the maintenance of security to enhance trade and finance” (Ibid.: 43-44);

36. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  INFLUENCE ONLY:  It depends on persuasion (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 36).  Persuasion, in turn, is more effective if it comes from someone who upholds power!!!  built upon shared values and advocate policies that involve accepted practices  Shared values come from who has more power and, thus, is more legitimate!!!  So persuasion does not preclude power;  However, what happens if the parameters for defining what is legitimate/acceptable change???

37. What is missing in Reich and Lebow, as well as in Lake???

38. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  How power shifts from hand to hand!!! Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic  State power in the international system has various dimensions;  The starting point seems to be the ownership of structural power;  So hard power (including economic) does not matter??

39. c ) Building and preserving hegemony

40.  Let’s remember…  State power in the international system has various dimensions;  The starting point seems to be the ownership of structural power;  Yet, having economic power may trigger hegemonic ambitions!!! Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic

41. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  SUMMARY  Power is more than material (hard) capabilities (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 16), particularly military;  Hegemony (focused on hard power ONLY) can be counterproductive (Ibid.: 15);  Persuasion is the best form of influence, but its success depends on a state’s strength on both hard and soft power!!!  hegemony or influence are not automatic;  Economic power may open space for a new hegemon;  Emerging powers: challenges taken-for-granted hierarchies.

42. Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic Hard Power Soft Power Realists Liberals emphasis on conflict emphasis on cooperation Preserving hegemony…

43. Hard Power Soft Power Realists Liberals emphasis on cooperation (influence only  perhaps limited) Power Military Structural (Norms) CulturalEconomic Building hegemony and influence… emphasis on conflict (power without influence) HEGEMONY

44. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  Persuading Allies?

45. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  Not always!!!

46. c ) Building and preserving hegemony  Potential hegemon