1. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Oblivious Transfer Kenji Yasunaga (ISIT) Joint work with Haruna Higo, Akihiro Yamada, Keisuke Tanaka (Tokyo Inst. of Tech.) 2012.5.8 Crypto Seminar @ Kyusyu University

2. Cryptography and Game Theory Cryptography: Design protocols in the presence of adversaries Game theory: Study the behavior of rational players

3. Cryptography and Game Theory Cryptography: Design protocols in the presence of adversaries Game theory: Study the behavior of rational players Rational cryptography: Design cryptographic protocols for rational players Rational Secret Sharing [HT04, GK06, ADG + 06, KN08a, KN08b, MS09, OPRV09, FKN10, AL11]

4. Asharov, Canetti, Hazay (Eurocrypt 2011) Game-theoretically characterize properties of two-party protocols Protocol π satisfies a “certain” property  A “certain” game defined by π has a “certain” solution concept with “certain” utility functions Properties: Correctness, Privacy, Fairness Adversary model: Fail-stop adversaries Equivalent defs. for correctness and privacy New def. for fairness

5. This work Game-theoretically characterize properties of “two-message” Oblivious Transfer (OT) Advantages compared to [ACH11] 1. Game between two rational players Essentially played by a single player in [ACH11] 2. Characterize correctness and privacy by a single game 3. Malicious adversaries

6. Oblivious Transfer A protocol between sender S and receiver R Correctness: After running the protocol, R obtains x c and S obtains nothing (or ⊥ ) Privacy Privacy for S: R learns nothing about x 1-c Privacy for R: S learns nothing about c x 0, x 1 c ∈ {0,1} xcxc ⊥ S R OT ･･･

7. Why “two-message” OT ? Two-message OT x 0, x 1 c ∈ {0,1} xcxc ⊥ S R Msg1 Msg2

8. Why “two-message” OT ? Two-message OT IND based privacy fits for GT framework Utility is high  Prediction is correct Exit IND based privacy for two-message OT x 0, x 1 c ∈ {0,1} xcxc ⊥ S R Msg1 Msg2

9. Our results Protocol π for two-message OT satisfies “correctness” and “privacy”  A “certain” game defined by π has a “certain” solution concept with “certain” utility functions

10. Our results Protocol π for two-message OT satisfies “correctness” and “privacy”  A “certain” game defined by π has a “certain” solution concept with “certain” utility functions  A game Game π defined by π has a Nash equilibrium with utility functions U = (U S, U R )

11. Cryptographic Correctness of OT Protocol π = (S, R) Correctness ∀ x 0, x 1 ∈ {0,1} * s.t. |x 0 | = |x 1 |, c ∈ {0,1}, Pr[ output R (S(x 0, x 1 ), R(c)) = x c ] ≥ 1 − negl

12. Cryptographic Privacy of two-message OT Privacy for R ∀ PPT S* and x 0, x 1 ∈ {0,1}*, {view S* (S*(x 0, x 1 ), R(0))} = c {view S* (S*(x 0, x 1 ), R(1))} Privacy for S ∃ a function Choice: {0,1}*  {0,1} s.t. ∀ determ. poly-time R*, x 0, x 1, x, z ∈ {0,1}*, c ∈ {0,1}, {view R* (S(X 0 ), R*(c, z))} = c {view R* (S(X 1 ), R*(c, z))} where X 0 = (x 0, x 1 ), and X 1 = (x 0, x) if Choice(R*, c, z) = 0, X 1 = (x, x 1 ) otherwise Choice indicates the choice bit of R*

13. Game π Protocol: π = (S π, R π ), Input: x 0, x 1, x, z ∈ {0,1} *, c ∈ {0,1} Players: Sender (S, G S ), Receiver (R, G R ) Game π ((S, G S ), (R, G R ), Choice, x 0, x 1, x, c, z S, z R ): 1. X 0 = (x 0, x 1 ), X 1 = (x 0, x) if Choice(R, c, z) = 0, X 1 = (x, x 1 ) o.w. 2. b  R {0, 1} and set z to be empty if R = R π 3. Execute (S(X b ), R(c, z)) (  output R ) Set fin = 1  Protocol finished without abort 4. G S guesses c from view S (  guess S ) G R guesses b from view R (  guess R ) 5. Output (fin, output R, guess S, guess R )

14. Utility functions U = (U S, U R ) U S ((S, G S ), (R, G R )) = (− α S ) ・ ( Pr[ guess R = b ] − 1/2 ) + β S ・ ( Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] − 1) + γ S ・ ( Pr[ guess S = c ] − 1/2 ) α S, β S, γ S are some positive constants U S is low if G R ’s guess is correct or finish w/o abort and output is incorrect or G S ’s guess is incorrect U R ((S, G S ), (R, G R )) = (− α R ) ・ ( Pr[ guess S = c ] − 1/2 ) + β R ・ ( Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] − 1) + γ R ・ ( Pr[ guess R = b ] − 1/2 )

15. Nash equilibrium Protocol (S, R) is a Nash equilibrium for Game π  ∃ Choice s.t. ∀ PPT G S, G R, S*, (determ.) R*, ∀ x 0, x 1, x, z ∈ {0,1} *, c ∈ {0,1}, U S ((S*,G S ), (R,G R )) ≤ U S ((S,G S ), (R,G R )) + negl and U R ((S,G S ), (R*,G R )) ≤ U R ((S,G S ), (R,G R )) + negl

16. Game-theoretic characterization Main Theorem: Protocol π = (S π, R π ) for two-message OT satisfies cryptographic correctness and privacy if and only if π = (S π, R π ) is a Nash equilibrium for Game π with utility functions U = (U S, U R )

17. Proof (“Crypto  Game”) Assume π is not game-theoretically secure  π = (S π, R π ) is not NE for Game π  ∀ Choice, ∃ G S *, G R *, S*, R*, x 0, x 1, x, z, c s.t. Case 1: U S ((S*,G S ), (R π,G R )) > U S ((S π,G S ), (R π,G R )) + ε S or Case 2: U R ((S π,G S ), (R*,G R )) > U R ((S π,G S ), (R π,G R )) + ε R

18. Proof (“Crypto  Game”) Case 1: U S ((S*,G S ), (R π,G R )) > U S ((S π,G S ), (R π,G R )) + ε S Recall that U S ((S π, G S ), (R π, G R )) = (− α S ) ・ ( Pr[ guess R = b ] − 1/2 ) + β S ・ ( Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] − 1) + γ S ・ ( Pr[ guess S = c ] − 1/2 ) When S π  S* Case 1-a: Pr[ guess R = b ] is lower Case 1-b: Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] is higher Case 1-c: Pr[ guess S = c ] is higher

19. Proof (“Crypto  Game”) Case 1-a: Pr[ guess R = b ] is lower  Since Pr[ guess R = b ] ≤ 1/2 + negl when S*, (R π, G R ) breaks the privacy for S Case 1-b: Pr[fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R =x c )] is higher  Pr[fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R =x c )] < 1 − ε when S π  Not cryptographically correct Case 1-c: Pr[ guess S = c ] is higher  Pr[ guess S = c ] ≠ 1/2 ± negl when S*  (S*, G S ) breaks the privacy for R

20. Proof (“Game  Crypto”) Assume π is not cryptographically secure  Case 1: Not cryptographically correct Case 2: Cryptographically correct Case 2-a: Not private for S when R π Case 2-b: Private for S when R π, not private for R Case 2-c: Private for R, not private for S when R*

21. Proof (“Game  Crypto”) Case 1: Not cryptographically correct  ∃ x 0, x 1, c s.t. Pr[ output R = x c ] < 1 − ε 1  U S ((S π, G S ), (R π, G R )) < − β S ・ ε 1 U S ((S def, G S ), (R π, G R )) = 0  U S is higher when S π  S def S def : Abort before start Pr[fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R =x c )] is higher when S π  S def

22. Proof (“Game  Crypto”) Case 2: Cryptographically correct Case 2-a: Not private for S when R π  ∃ D 1 who distinguishes view Rπ  U S ((S π, G S ), (R π, G R )) < − α S ・ ε 2 U S ((S stop, G S ), (R π, G R )) = 0 (when G R uses D 1 )  U S is higher when S π  S stop S stop : Abort after receiving a message Pr[ guess R = b ] is higher when S π  S stop

23. Proof (“Game  Crypto”) Case 2: Cryptographically correct Case 2-b: Private for S when R π, not for R  ∃ S* and D 2 who distinguishes view S*  ∃ D 2 who distinguishes view Sπ (since two-message OT)  U R ((S π,G S ), (R π,G R )) < − α R ・ ε 3 U R ((S π,G S ), (R def,G R )) = 0 (when G S uses D 2 ) R def : Abort before start Pr[ guess S = c ] is higher when R π  R def

24. Proof (“Game  Crypto”) Case 2: Cryptographically correct Case 2-c: Private for R, not for S when R*  ∃ R* and D 3 who distinguishes view R*  U R ((S π,G S ), (R π,G R )) < negl U R ((S π,G S ), (R *,G R )) = γ R ・ ε 4 (when G R uses D 3 )  U R is higher when R π  R* Pr[ guess R = b ] is higher when R π  R*

25. Notes Main theorem holds even if γ S = 0 or β R = 0 U S ((S, G S ), (R, G R )) = (− α S ) ・ ( Pr[ guess R = b ] − 1/2 ) + β S ・ ( Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] − 1) + γ S ・ ( Pr[ guess S = c ] − 1/2 ) U R ((S, G S ), (R, G R )) = (− α R ) ・ ( Pr[ guess S = c ] − 1/2 ) + β R ・ ( Pr[ fin=0 ∨ (fin=1 ∧ output R = x c )] − 1) + γ R ・ ( Pr[ guess R = b ] − 1/2 )

26. Conclusions (1/2) Game-theoretically characterize “two-message” OT Protocol π = (S π, R π ) for two-message OT satisfies cryptographic correctness and privacy  π = (S π, R π ) is a Nash equilibrium for Game π with utility functions U = (U S, U R ) Advantages compared to [ACH ‘11] 1. Game between two rational players 2. Characterize correctness and privacy by a single game 3. Malicious adversaries

27. Conclusions (2/2) The first step toward understanding how OT protocols work for rational players Future work Characterize OT with the ideal/real simulation-based security Characterize other protocols Explore good examples of rational cryptography