1. Why Utility Pleases By: David Hakim

2. Main Conclusion of EPM5 Utility pleases us because it is constitutive of the virtues that promote the interests of other people/society and it is a principle of human nature that we care about the interests of other people/society

3. What is “Utility” “Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end” (5.2.17) The sentiments excited by the usefulness of an inanimate object are not mixed with affection, esteem, or approbation Only the usefulness of the actions or character of a rational being can be virtuous “The circumstance of utility…is the sole source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honor, allegiance, and chastity: that it is inseparable from all the other social virtues…it is the foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind”

4. Why Utility Pleases Three possibilities: 1. Education 2. It serves our self-interest 3. It serves the interests of others/of society

5. Education? Our approval of the social virtues must be natural, rather than arising just from education, because the words, “honourable and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable” exist in our language and are intelligible (5.1.3) We approve of the social virtues because of their utility So, our approval of utility must be natural (5.1.3)

6. Self-Interest? Objection #1 We praise the virtuous actions performed in distant ages and remote countries The utility of these actions cannot please in virtue of serving our self-interest Therefore, the utility of virtuous actions pleases for reasons other than serving our self-interest

7. Self-Interest? Objection #2 We praise the virtuous actions of our adversaries even while recognizing that the consequences are prejudicial to our interests The utility of these actions cannot please in virtue of serving our-self interest Therefore, the utility of virtuous actions pleases for reasons other than serving our self-interest

8. Self-Interest? Objection #3 When we approve of virtuous actions which do promote our self-interest, “we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments” (5.1.9) We notice an increase in our approval of virtue and our detestation of vice when virtue aligns with our self-interest: gratitude and revenge

9. Interests of Others “Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation…But, useful? For what? For some body’s interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the character or action approved of” (5.1.15)

10. Interests of Others Must Affect Us (P1) Utility is a tendency to promote an end (P2) Something pleases us by promoting an end only if the end affects us in some way “It is a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end where the end itself no way affects us” (5.2.17) (C) Utility pleases us because it promotes an end which affects us in some way So, if utility pleases us by promoting the interests of others, promoting the interests of others must be an end which affect us in some way

11. How the Interests of Others Affect Us “No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This everyone may find in himself.” (5.ax) “’tis impossible, but that every thing, which promotes the interests of society, must communicate pleasure” (5.2.46)

12. Why the Interests of Others Affect Us ’Tis needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others ’Tis sufficient that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature – “social sympathy in human nature” (5.2.35) – “Where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society” (5.2.40) – The natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay [regard] to the interests of mankind and society” (5.2.43) Is this the sympathy of DIS (i.e. the process/operation?)

13. Examples We are affected with the images of human happiness or misery: – In interactions with others, theater, poetry, the news, history, judgments of beauty “None are so entirely indifferent to the interests [of] their fellow-creatures…[all] feel some propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if everything else be equal” (5.2.40)

14. Liveliness of the Sentiments “Where the good…[is] less connected with us, [it] seems more obscure, and affects us with a less lively sympathy” (5.2.41) “Sympathy…is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons, remote from us, much fainter than that with persons, near and contiguous” (5.2.42) Judgment corrects the inequality between our sentiments about the good and its merit

15. The General Standard “Without such correction of appearances…men could never think or talk steadily, on any subject; while their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects” (5.2.42) Social interaction to familiarize us with general preferences and general language moulded on these general preferences “makes us form some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners” (5.2.42) Moral distinctions depend on this standard

16. The General Standard “Every particular person’s pleasure and interest being different, ‘tis impossible men cou’d ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them.” (3.3.1.30)

17. The General Standard “Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have a connection with him. And tho’ such interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and universal, they counter-balance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality” (3.3.1.30)